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In the years before the Civil

and economic transformation.

Agriculture declined as

and rural areas lost population.

creation of

a

War, Massachusetts underwent
a

a

great social

source of state income

Changes in the factory system lead to the

large, permanent laboring force of Irish, dependent on daily

wages for survival.

The status of Massachusetts' artisans was imperiled by

absentee ownership and new technology.

Economic power gravitated to

a

small

group of textile magnates who also gained influence over cultural, educational,
and political

institutions.

The political history of the fifteen years before

the Civil War is largely a contest between these Cotton Whigs and those who

resented the changes in Massachusetts society.

As long as the Cotton Whigs

were able to clothe themselves in the mantle of social and moral conservatism
they were able to dominate the politics of the state.

But when the slavery

issue made the Cotton Whigs appear to place their economic interests above

their ethical sensibilities, their antagonists seized the opportunity to displace them.

Republicans, who represented the middle-class voters of the

small towns and the countryside, became Massachusetts' new dominant political

force.

Having consolidated their hold over Massachusetts by 1857, the Republicans turned their attention toward the presidential selection of 1860.

Initially they feared that the Harpers Ferry raid would upset their carefully
laid plans.

But after success in the 1359 elections, Massachusetts Republi-

incarnation
cans began to look more favorably at John Brown, seeing in him the
of their Puritan values.

During the election of 1850, Massachusetts Republi-

campaigned upon
cans were careful to mute the divisions within their party and

the moderate platform of anti-extensionism.

Initially the Massachusetts

Republicans refused to concede the significance of the secession movement.

Their opponents attempted to use the political crisis to divide the Republican party.

However, no serious economic panic occurred in Massachusetts and

the state's Congressmen generally ignored conservative pressure to compromise.

Conservative mobs silenced abolitionist meetings but their efforts merely
The Massachusetts

helped the abolitionists achieve a new respectability.

Republican party came closest to dividing itself when Charles Francis Adams
proposed the admission of New Mexico to statehood,

a proposal

denounced by

the radicals.

Massachusetts radical Republicans and abolitionists shared considerable
common ground.

The Garrisonians believed that the election of Lincoln was

their victory as well.

They welcomed the secession crisis and believed that

they had been instrumental in weakening Massachusetts' devotion to the Union.

Massachusetts blacks likewise welcomed the crisis as an opportunity to abolish
slavery, but feared that compromisers might seek to limit their own rights,

earned after decades of struggle.

There was

a

close relationship between the social and economic com-

position of Massachusetts' churches and their teachings on slavery and
politics.

Conservative clergymen argued that Christians should regard the

Constitution as divinely inspired and viewed disunion as
ity, order, and even Protestantism itself.

a

threat to moral-

But many reformist ministers

saw the crisis as
wondered if the Union had outlived its usefulness and

punishment for the nation's sins.

Of all the denominations, the most con-

servative on slavery was the Catholic Church.

Seeing

a

connection between

gravitated toward the Southern
antislavery and nativism, Irish Catholics

cause.

They hoped to prove their loyalty to their adopted country by fidelity

to the Union in a time of crisis.

Massachusetts political conservatives defined their identity by reference to the Union, but Republicans considered themselves as New Englanders
first.

Most Massachusetts Republicans did not believe the Union was worth

sacrifice of party principles.

Thus they fought modification of the state's

Personal Liberty Laws, opposed the adoption of the Crittenden Compromise,

and obstructed the Washington Peace Convention.

Many were willing to allow

the South to leave in peace as long as secession was accomplished through

orderly and legal means.
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CHAPTER

I

WORKING MEN AND MILLIONAIRES

Massachusetts, on the eve of the Civil War, was
throes of

a

great social and economic transformation.

a

society in the
The Commonwealth

was no longer the homogenous, agricultural society of her Puritan past.
As the dams went up along the Connecticut and Merrimack rivers and hill

town farmers and Irish peasants streamed into the cities, thoughtful

•

men in Massachusetts wondered if traditional New England values could

survive.

The rude Irishman with his authoritarian church, unclean .cities

with their vices and temptations, the new breed of factory worker who

depended on his boss for sustenance--al

1

seemed to threaten the temDerate

self-reliance that was the hallmark of the Yankee way of life.
No figure in Yankee folklore is more predominant than the sturdy

independent farmer.

He had wrested the Bay Colony from the wilderness.

As minuteman, he drove out the British oppressor.

He was responsible

for his own destiny, free from servile relationships.

But the ante-

bellum years were not easy for the Massachusetts farmer.

In the hill

towns of Western Massachusetts the thin soil eroded; and the farmers

followed the streams which had washed away their soil into the valleys.
In

the decade of the 1850's ninety-five towns in the Commonwealth lost

population; some like Wendell and New Salem in Franklin County diminished
by almost

a

quarter.

Pel ham,

despairing of its decline, voted to sur-

render its charter of incorporation.
roads, had become isolated backwaters.

These towns, avoided by the rail-

Many of their fields turned once

again into woodlots, as the new agricultural machinery— so useful on the

2

broad level prairies of the West— was unsuited to the small,
rocky
fields of the New England hills.

1

The factories that began to open in the 1830

some opportunities to the farmer.

's

brought with them

Once operating on essentially

a

subsistence basis, certain farmers could take advantage of new markets

which the mill towns provided.

In areas of the

Connecticut Valley and

in Worcester and Essex counties, farmers discovered that the rivers

which provided relatively fertile soil also attracted consumers of agricultural products.

As the mills grew so did market crops such as

cereals, pork, beef, and wool.

2

But the economic expansion that created these new markets soon

destroyed them.

The building of the western railroads brought the New

England farmer into competition with areas far more suited to the production of these staples than his own land.

of 1850 was barely

a

third of its 1840 size.

half the state's beef came from the
cereals had becone

a

The Massachusetts sheep herd
By the mid-1 850

VJest and its

relatively minor industry.

's

more than

oroduction of pork and

3

It would be a serious misstatement, however, to suggest that Mass-

achusetts' agriculture was in

a

state of collapse.

Some new products,

such as apples, cranberries, and tobacco, helped take up the slack.

In

areas such as the Connecticut River Valley, whose rich soil was amenable
From 1845 to 1855 the value of

to new techniques, the farmers prospered.

agricultural production in Massachusetts rose from $22,590,000 to
$37,867,000.

But these figures also tell

a

different story.

In

1845,

agriculture accounted for nineteen percent of Massachusetts' productive
wealth; but in 1855 it provided only thirteen percent.
1855 statistics show that agriculture was in

the'

In addition,

the

hands of fewer individuals

3

working in fewer towns.

Only individuals in those areas favored with

fertile soil could make agriculture

a

field for ambition.

farmers were forced either to accept the prospect of

Other

static economic

a

life or leave their homesteads for industrial pursuits.^

While Massachusetts' social theorists argued that agriculture was
the healthiest and the most desirable of all occupations, Massachusetts'

farmers were likely to disagree.

In some agricultural

fewer hands than there was work.

One example was Hampshire County, whose

areas there were

farmers, as the 1860 Agriculture Report revealed, had switched from dairying to raising beef cattle largely because there were not enough help

available to milk the cows.

Young rural folk who had seen the city and

its diversions were unwilling to return to the farm.

Their elders worried

that the Irish hired men and servant girls who took their places would be

corrupting influences.
ported

a

Simon Brown, editor of the New England Fanner

conversations with young women that nine in ten would prefer

a

husband

5

A primary function of the county agricultural

vince farmers to stay on the land.

re-

He discovered in his

final blow to the dignity of agriculture.

of almost any occupation other than farming.

,

societies was to con-

At the annual meetings, non-farmers—

often leading politicians— would warn about the pitfalls which awaited
those who went west or entered industrial

Speaking to the

life in town.

1860 meeting of the Norfolk Agricultural Society, George Hillard urged
the farmer to ignore the temptations of the West:

"These corn-bearing

plains are the prose of earth and not its poetry, and the imagination

languishes and dies amid those wastes of fertility."

He warned his

lacking
audience that the West had no mountains or oceans and that it was
the "blessings of civil society."

What would happen to

a

New Engla.ider

4

deprived of his schools and lyceums, his town meetings and his cattle
shows?

At home he had good laws and good roads; and, above all, he

had order.

gain?

Should he exchange all this for the chance of economic

6

Other commentators emphasized that the New England farmer enjoyed
greater freedom than his Western counterpart.

In

Massachusetts he could

deal directly with his market, but in the West he would be at the mercy
of voracious middle men.

In the West he would find the waters

"turbid"

and "stagnant," and succumb to "diseases of miasmatic origins, chills

and fever."

One county orator, John L. Russell, offered another reason

to persevere on the stony New England terrain.

He declared that "the

hardier the soil and more obstinate the earth, the freer and more developed
the race which subdues it," and suggested that Yankees might degenerate on

the rich soil

of the prairies.^

But if the West was unhealthy so were the Massachusetts cities to

which New England farmers moved in substantial numbers.

Indeed, during

the ante-bellum years, more migrated to these cities than to the West.
In

January 1861, concerned citizens organized the Massachusetts Sanitary

Association to inquire into the deterioration of health in urban areas.
The organization noted that the death rate in the cities was twice that

of the rural areas and that the life span of Massachusetts farmers was

sixty-four years while
forty- two.

a

Massachusetts cobbler could expect to live only

Theodore Parker, in his sermon "The Material Condition of

the People of Massachusetts," noted that the average death in Boston was
at age twenty, far below that in rural
all

areas of the state, and that, of

occupations, printers were most subject to

a

premature death.

He

offered as an explanation that "the farmer breaths air; the shoemaker

5

wax and leather; the printer, ink and typemetal."
Boston with disdain.

upper classes.

.

He liked neither the dependent workmen nor the

The latter, by avoiding manual labor, had become

"puny set of men

yet pampered

Parker looked at

.

.

.

.

.

spindle legged

with luxuries."

.

.

.

a

ashamed of their bodies,

These men, divorced from the land,

needed some honest work to perspire away the "effete matter" hanging
o

to their bodies.
To farmers who felt that urban employment might be less grueling,

Silas Brown pointed out industrial alternatives.

The farmer's work

was clean compared with that of the slaughter-house worker who all day

stood ankle deep in blood and filth, his days short compared to the

shoemaker toiling fourteen to sixteen hours over his bench.

The Spring-

field Republican warned young men who hoped to earn their fortune in the
city that the chances of success were less than one in a hundred.

Cities

were places where young lives were wrecked and aspirations crushed.
Farmers were secure from the anxieties and uncertainties of the commercial

world; they were not subject to the economic fluctuations which might
impoverish the merchant overnight.
in the stock market to fill

And not relying or

a

fortunate rise

his barns, the farmer was entitled to more

respect than the businessman.

Josiah Quincy was particularly indignant

that many Massachusetts' youth mistakenly had emulated Amos Lawrence;

they ought to understand the joys of farming and reject the trouble of

commerce.

9

But beyond these moral exhortations, how could one keep the Mass-

achusetts farmer on his land?

education as the answer.

Many anxious commentators saw agricultural

Josiah

G.

Holland,

a

colleague of Samuel Bowles

on the Springfield Republica n, worried that constant labor on the farm was

^
6

degrading the farmer, and that he needed to exercise his mind as well
as

his body.

Work alone could be dangerous if unrelieved by creativity.

Holland warned that Yankee farmers could become as debased as the Irish
laborer and pointed to rural Ireland as an ominous example of the effects
of mindless toil.
as

Massachusetts' rural population was in danger of decay

the brighter and more ambitious boys left for the towns.

The trend could be reversed only by making agriculture a science and

turning every farmer into an inventor.

The Massachusetts farmer needed

new ideas more than he needed new tools; his mind was more in need of

regeneration than his soil.

George Boutwell

,

a

leading Republican poli-

tician, echoed these sentiments in an address before the Middlesex North
He emphasized that labor was respected only when

Agricultural Society.

it combined with a high order of intelligence and degraded whenever it

was associated with servility or ignorance.

This concern with the quality

of work became more pervasive as the changes in society accelerated.^

II

Concurrent with the changes in agriculture, there were alterations in
the New England industrial system that made the factory's image more
The entrepreneurs who had erected the

threatening to traditionalists.

first mills in Waltham and who had founded the industrial community of
Lowell, were aware of the prejudices which existed against their new

establishments.

The Lowells, the Lawrences, the Appletons, and their

peers realized that popular fears of

could impede the recruiting of

a

a

permanent, dependent factory class

labor force and could breed an ill -will

that would have political repercussions.

millowners developed

a

paternal

To meet these objections, the

labor syslem.

They recruited young,

—

3

7

unmarried women from the declining hill towns and placed them in boarding houses under the watchful eyes of matrons.

The Boston Associates

the capitalists who owned the majority of the New England textile mi

—
Is

1

announced that they would refuse to hire anyone "habitually absent from
public worship on the Sabbath, or known to be guilty of immorality."

1

7

The girls, who came from rural areas of New Hampshire, Vermont,

and Massachusetts, usually stayed in the mills no longer than a few

years.

Saving something for their dowry, they generally returned to

their native towns to marry.

Their experience often provided

a

period

of adventure and relative independence in an otherwise restricted life.
These girls, whose backgrounds were steeped in native New England values,
posed little threat to traditionalists.

They were less susceptible to

the vicissitudes of the business cycle than any other potential labor

force.

If orders were slack and the mills forced to close, these girls

had no hungry children to feed.
to await better times.

As

They could return to the family farm

an early Lowell

historian wrote:

"While

most of our operatives are born and bred in virtuous rural homes, and
after working for

a

few years in the mills, return to agricultural
1

pursuits, the interests of Lowell will rest secure."

With the influx of the Irish the paternalism of the mills ceased.
The Irish began to enter the factories in the 1840's, but it was not
until

the 1850's that they made their full impact.

Country girls no

longer traveled to the Merrimack mills as the presence of aliens made

employment less respectable.

Unlike Yankee girls, the Irish newcomers

were often illiterate and unruly.

One Native American paper in Lawrence

brawl on
complained about the Irish propensity to attack policemen,

Sundays, and deface trees.

While one has to recognize the bias of the

4

8

author of these remarks, there is little doubt that these
impoverished
immigrants were

a

disruptive force in the new urban environment. 1

Nevertheless, the Irish, by providing

expensive labor, were

a

a

tremendous source of in-

great stimulus to the Massachusetts economy.

As Oscar Hand! in has noted, Massachusetts'

low wages, which were well

below those in New York, gave the Commonwealth's employers
advantage.

a

substantial

Furthermore, the mill owners could now pursue economic ob-

jectives more singlemindedly

.

They did not feel constrained to look

after the morals of these unruly newcomers, nor would they require

attendance at religious services for Catholic employees. 15

Massachusetts now had
wages for survival.

permanent laboring class dependent on daily

a

More ominous, there were now large numbers of

laborers whose annual earnings averaged from $300 to $350

were thus unable to support

a

family by their own efforts.

a

year, and
This f act-

along with Irish hostility to the Protestant-dominated schools— accounted
for the willingness of Irish parents to send their children into the mills
at an early age.

As child labor became more common, the Massachusetts

factories began to assume the odious aspects of the European industrial
system.

The Irish had little chance to rise to positions of responsibility;

they were relegated to the lowest operative positions in the mills or to

lifetime of casual day laboring.
physical sense.

The Irishman's only mobility was in

a

As Stephen Thernstrom and Peter Knights have pointed out

in their studies of Newburyport and Boston, the Irish laborer was often

transient, drifting from one community to another in search of work to

sustain him.
to traditional

This floating population of alien workingmen, unsusceptible

social

native Mew Englander,

control, was another source of anxiety to the
16

a

9

Along with the Irish came an increase in expenditures
for the
care of the destitute.

In

1860 Boston's North American Review noted

with alarm that since 1845 expenditures for the city's House of
Industry
had increased six-fold.

The Overseers of the Poor spent seven times what

they had needed fifteen years earlier.

Those Yankees who did remain in

the textile mills found that their interests conflicted with the Irish.
In 1853,

native workers in Salisbury and Amesbury went on strike when

their employers abolished the traditional morning break.
the employers fired them and hired Irish replacements.
in 1358, native workers

Irish workers.

refused to support

a

In

response

In Chicopee,

strike led by dissatisfied

Cultural differences prevented the two groups from per-

ceiving their common interest.

^

The experience of Lawrence is typical of the transformation of the

Massachusetts industrial city.

Created in 1845 and named after entre-

preneur Abbott Lawrence, it resembled in its first few years an idyllic
planned community.

But the city quickly changed.

Along the Merrimack

River, rank with sewage brought down from Lowell, grew an Irish shanty
town.

The city suffered from a typhoid epidemic brought on by the

pollution of the water supply.

Ten years after its birth, Lawrence had

become an unhealthy, immigrant city, unloved and alien to its rural
neighbors.

®

III

Despite their importance, cotton mill workers represented only
fraction of the ante-bellum Massachusetts labor force.

a

The 1860 census

listed 57,032 persons as "agriculturists," 69,049 as laborers or factory
operatives, and 122,251 as mechanics.

The latter group, overwhelmingly

10

Protestant and native-born, had an identification and value structure
distinct from the Irish operative.^
Although the Massachusetts textile industry has served as

a

symbol

of nineteenth-century New England manufacturing and has attracted the
attention of historians as the first American industry to revolutionize
the factory system, it was second in importance to boots and shoes.

In

1855 the value of cotton textiles produced in the state was $26,000,000

while that of the boot and shoe industry was $37,000,000.

As the shoe

business was far less technologically sophisticated, the number of
persons employed was far greater than in textiles.

In

1855, some

74,326 earned their living by producing shoes while 34,787 were employed
by the cotton industry.

There were striking differences between the

wage scales of the two groups.
weekly wage for

a

During the latter 1850's the average

shoemaker was nine dollars while that of

a

male mill

20

operative was from $3.75 to $6.00.
These disparities in productivity and wages hint at some of the

differences between the two work forces.

Paul

Faler, in his study of

the ante-bellum shoemakers of Lynn, Massachusetts, describes their work
as being "halfway between the cottage industry of the subsistence farmer

and the mechanized factory system."

Cobblers still owned their own tools,

worked in small shops known as "ten-footers," and aspired--occasionally
with success

— to

become bosses.

Unlike the Irish day laborer or operative,

the shoemakers formed a highly stable community.

Due to a relative lack

of mechanization, their industry required greater skill and allowed them
greater independence.

One of the pillars of their value system was the

Methodist Church with its emphasis on the availability of salvation for
all men.

The other was their mechanic's ideol ogy--the labor theory of

11

value— which maintained that

the source of all wealth was the applica-

tion of human labor to raw materials.

The mechanic identified him-

self—along with the farmer— as the producing class and considered himself superior to such non-producers as aristocrats, capitalists, and
paupers.

21

But while the shoemaker-mechanic of 1860 was proud of his status
as

a

skilled artisan and convinced that he was the backbone of the

Commonwealth's industrial health, he was becoming increasingly convinced
that he was not reaping his fair share of the rewards.

Shoemaking had

no tradition of absentee ownership, but the signs were clear that the

industry was becoming concentrated in fewer hands with new machines

making the expense of establishing
anyone without great wealth.

a

shoe manufactury prohibitive for

In 1854 the sewing

machine first found

its way into shoemaking; and while it initially replaced only the female
sti

tchers— the least skilled and most poorly paid workers

in the

industry—the male cordwainers worried that their turn would

be next.

22

Outside market forces were increasingly dictating the work patterns
for the New England shoemaker.

The agent who sold shoes was unconcerned

with the craft satisfaction of the worker and urged the production of
more cheap brogans destined to be worn by Southern slaves.

This demand

for speed rather than skill threatened the very basis of the shoemakers'

way of life, for work divorced from creativity and thought was
basing to the mechanic as it was to the farmer.

as de-

By 1860 shoe manufacturers

were shipping much of their business to rural areas where unskilled hands
were willing to work at lower rates.

As the real wage for shoemakers

declined, another unwelcome element entered the industry; by 1860, twelve

percent of the Lynn shoemakers were Irish.

A few years earlier there had

12

been virtually none.

3ut the shoemakers, seeing that forces were making them more like
the Irish, made every effort to establish their cultural differences.
If the Irishman was known for his affection for hard drink, the

mechanic's alternative was to form temperance societies and affirm the

inappropriateness of liquor

in

an industrial

society.

If Irishmen

were sterotyped as slothful, immoral, and illiterate, the mechanic
formed self-betterment societies which emphasized thrift, punctuality,
and moral behavior.

If the Irishman was attracted to the Democratic

party and its proslavery sympathies, the mechanic would support the

Republicans and their emphasis on the dignity of labor and the im-

morality of the plantation system.

24

IV

While farmers and mechanics suffered from the pressures of declining status and income,

a

small, tightly-knit group of capitalists were

reaping the benefits of the changing economic conditions.

In

the first

quarter of the nineteenth century, this group of ag-jressive and resourceful entrepreneurs,

led by the Lawrences and the Appletons, left their

homes in the hinterland and penetrated Boston's commercial world.

Though Nathan Appleton was the

son',

of a middling New Hampshire farmer

and Amos Lawrence started his career as

a

clerk in Groton, Massachusetts,

they became the symbols of power and wealth in the Commonwealth.

By

marriage and by business partnerships they allied themselves with such

established trading families

as

the Lowells and the Cabots.

Together

they formed the apex of the class that dominated Massachusetts for much

of the nineteenth century.

Based on the ownership of the great textile

13

mills, their holdings also included most of Boston's banking and in-

surance and much of Massachusetts' railroad system. 25

Economic power was the foundation of the cotton elite's authority,
but not its entire compass.

As Thorstein Veblen has noted:

"In order

to gain and hold the esteem of men it is not sufficient merely to possess

wealth or power.

The wealth or power must be put on evidence."

The

vulgar display of wealth typical of the late nineteenth-century millionaires was inappropriate to the values of ante-bellum Boston.

The

Lawrences and Appletons were too close to their Puritan roots to build
garish mansions on Beacon Hill to overawe the masses.

But the control

of cultural institutions was an accepted and even necessary part of the

creation of this new elite class.
As Ronald Story has argued in his study, "Class Development and

Cultural

Institutions in Boston," Harvard University was one of the

primary vehicles of cultural control.

The leading educational institution

in New England and an important symbol of historical

continuity with

previous upper classes, Harvard in the 1850's came under the close control
of the manufacturing elite.

Harvard's support had once been based on

a

fairly broad public subscription and on periodic grants from the state
legislature.

But by the eve of the Civil War

handful of wealthy contri-

a

butors had taken over the support of the university; they now dominated
the Harvard Corporation and carefully selected

their political and social outlook.

Harvard remained

a

a

faculty to conform to

27

small, largely provincial institution.

Though

the class size increased slightly during the pre-Civil War years, due
to the increased enrollment of Southern students,

1860 still had only 106 members.

the senior class of

College authorities intentionally kept

14

the enrollment limited as
the school.

way of preserving the elite character of

a

Their conception of Harvard was patterned after the

British example.

The college was to be

a

place where the children of

the upper class would become acquainted with one another and recognize

their social unity.

This function was even more necessary in Massachu-

setts than in England due to the mobility of American society and the

newness of the elite; young Lawrences and Appletons needed

a

conscious-

ness of their position instilled upon them.

Harvard's role as

a

class arbiter was not lost on the rest of the

Massachusetts population.

Those outside the social pale of Cambridge

sent their children to less expensive institutions such as Amherst,

Dartmouth, Bowdoin, or Brown--insti tutions which o^ten demonstrated

a

greater tolerance for antislavery and unorthodox economic opinions.
Those in Western Massachusetts, particularly, complained that Harvard
Henry

was the "College of Boston and Salem and not of Commonwealth."

Wilson, speaking for the artisan viewpoint complained that the men who

controlled the Corporation "assume it to be their mission to keep Harvard
John Murray Forbes

College from the influences of the outside barbarians."

—

whose fortune was made in Western railroads after those of the textile
magnates and was thus not of the inner circle of Massachusetts societycomplained that Harvard was

a

club of the favored few and became

of the embryonic Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Edward

L.

Pierce,

a

a

supporter
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close friend and biographer of Charles Sumner,

has left a keen description of the ante-bellum Boston elite.

"There

knew
was but one society to which admission was sought, and everyone in it

every one else who was in it.

It was close and hard, consolidated, with

uniform stamp on all, and opinion running

in

the

grooves,— in politics

a

15

Whig; in faith, Unitarian and Episcopalian."

Intellectual, despotic-

over individual thought, ante-bellum Boston, Pierce argued,
was com-

parable only to ancient Athens.

An integral part of the elites'

tige was the preservation of its rectitude,

pres-

They were deeply concerned

with the esteem of those who were their fellow citizens, if not their
social equals.

And to gain their esteem it was insufficient to wield

mere economic power.

One had to prove one's moral virtue as well.

30

Understanding the traditional New England emphasis on community
responsibility, the elite was concerned with their duties as well as
their privileges.

In this regard, Boston's elite was significantly

different from its most important economic rival
class.

New York's upper class was

than that of Boston.

— the

New York merchant

far more mobile, heterogeneous group

a

At the same time, it was more singleminded.

The

New York merchants were satisfied to increase their fortunes and leave

other elements to wrestle with the problems of morality and social control.
New York's upper class, living in

a

city both larger and mere diverse than

Boston, had less sense of responsibility and less concern for reputation
31

than did their counterparts in Massachusetts.

Still, paternalism flourished in Boston.

The journals and memoirs

of the Boston elite are filled with expressions of social responsibility.
Amos A.

Lawrence was

a

pious example.

On signing the papers

for an im-

portant business transaction he hoped that, in the event it was successful

,

"I

may not forget my duty in using it, not for my own aggrandizement,

but for the advance of Christ's Kingdom on earth."

Robert Winthrop, in

his 1861 memorial of Nathan Appleton, wrote that "the very investment of

so large a part of his property in domestic manufacture had many of the

best elements of charity."

Winthrop suggested that Appleton

's

satisfaction

.
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with his own success "was not

little enhanced by the consideration

a

that he had been the means of affording employment to so great

number of operatives
work and wages."

...

a

who might otherwise have failed to obtain

32

The elite's sense of moral accountability would make the question

of slavery especially agonizing.

On the one hand, their economic position

depended on the continued supply of slave-grown cotton and, partly, on the
Southern market for textiles.

Many of the elite had close relationships

with Southern planters through both business dealings and class ties at
Harvard.
more, as

Some had marriage alliances with Southern families.
a

Further-

ruling class, the Boston elite v/ere psychologically disposed

to sympathize with the efforts of the planter class to avert social

turmoil
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But antislavery contentions to the contrary, the Boston elite did
not cower craven ly at the feet of the slaveowners.

The elite were aware

of the New England repugnance to slavery and sensitive to charges that
they were abandoning traditional values for economic gain.

During the

1850's they were repelled by the crass, proslavery tactics of the Demo-

cratic administration and desperately hoped to find some solution which

would ensure sectional peace without wholly supporting the slavery position.

But the Cotton Whigs found it impossible to satisfy both their

consciences and their pocketbooks, and in their failure lies much of the

history of Massachusetts politics in the fifteen years before the Civil
War.

CHAPTER

II

THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION

Until slavery uprooted the old parties, the Cotton Whigs— an

amalgam of conservative business interests led by the textile manu-

facturers—dominated Massachusetts' political life.

The cotton mag-

nates, whose economic power had developed so dramatically in the
1820's and 1830's, had quickly translated their new fortunes into
political power.

An event symbolic of the passing of authority into

new hands was Boston's 1830 Congressional election.

In that

year

Nathan Apple ton defeated Henry Lee, the representative of the older

mercantile families and their principles of free trade.

At about the

same time, Daniel Webster, sensing the changing winds, embraced the

tariff as the touchstone of his political creed and became the primary

ornament of the Massachusetts Whigs

J

The enormous financial resources of the textile manufacturers,

which enabled them

to

support conservative pulpits and

a

conservative

university at Cambridge, gave them great influence within the Massachusetts Whig party.

Due to their generosity, the party was rarely

without funds enough to stage enormous rallies for their candidates,
subsidize friendly newspapers, or flood the state with pamphlets that
proved that prosperity was inseparable from the protective tariff and

Whig rule.

In

order to keep Webster in public life, the mill owners

gave their foremost statesman substantial shares in their corporations.
When these gifts failed to maintain Webster in the style of life to

which hewas accustomed, the leading manufacturers subsidized him with
substantial cash payments.

2
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A weapon nearly as effective as the purse was the threat of social

ostracism.

Those who embraced political heresies found themselves un-

welcome at the most fashionable homes--a significant snub in
knit society like Boston.
a social

a

closely-

Thus, in the 1840's, Charles Sumner became

outcast for his excessive zeal in promoting prison reform.

George Ticknor, an arbiter of Boston society, explained to one of

Sumner's friends the necessity for such action:

"I

am sorry as you

for the effect these discussions produce upon society in Boston; but
the principles of that society are right, and its severity toward dis-

organizes and social democracy

in all

its forms is just and wise."

Ticknor asserted that, by disciplining the apostles of unsound opinions,
public morals--that is, those of the ruling

oligarchy--coul d be main-

Antislavery men whose family ties normally would have admitted

tained.

them to the inner circles suffered under this rule.

Richard Henry Dana
"There

once drove down Beacon street and commented to his companion:
was a time when

I

was welcome at almost every house within two miles of

us, but now hardly any are open to me."
As

3

long as the tariff remained the foremost political issue, the

Cotton Whigs remained in

a

commanding position.

Leading politicians

such as Webster, Robert Uinthrop, and Edward Everett had successfully

convinced

a

majority of the native-born operatives and artisans and the

more prosperous market-oriented farmers of their interest in
tariff.

a

protective

The Massachusetts Democrats appealed to those who, for

of reasons, considered themselves outsiders in the Commonwealth:

a

variety
busi-

nessmen unable to crack the inner circle of the Lawrences and Lowells,
in
religious dissenters (especially Methodists and Baptists), farmers

the poorer and more remote areas, and the Irish.

These groups, though

19

substantial in numbers, were not a majority in Massachusetts.

The

Democrats voiced their suspicion of the banks and opposed special
privileges for corporations.

They called for reforms in the election

laws and in the penal system and for a more democratic judiciary.

They

denounced Massachusetts' liquor laws (which forbade the selling of
spirits in quantities less than fifteen gallons) as imposing temperance
on the poor but allowing indulgence to the rich.

But as long as the

Whigs could clothe themselves in the mantle of social and moral conserva-

tism and while the majority of the Massachusetts voters identified them

with the traditions of the Commonwealth, the Whigs would remain in power.

4

It was the escalation of the slavery issue that finally destroyed the

political supremacy cf the Cotton Whigs.
ic interests before their ethical

By seeming to place their econom-

sensibilities, they could no longer con-

vince their constituency that they were defenders of the traditional values
of the Puritan Commonwealth.

Their antislavery opponents could claim with

credibility to represent the moral sentiment of Massachusetts and could assert that the Cotton Whigs were
the mainstream of the state.

a

narrow, self-interested clique apart from

Such an assertion found

a

receptive audience

among those who were coming to resent the dislocation the manufacturers
had brought into their lives.

antislavery.
Sentiment in Massachusetts had been always at least mildly
to the mid-1840's reBut except for a few abolitionists, most people prior

garded slavery as

a

relatively unimportant issue.

An upright citizen of

institution as an unMassachusetts would look upon the South's peculiar

pleasant, though happily remote, problem.

And most men agreed that the

citizens from any substantive
federal Constitution prohibited Northern
action.

all Massachusetts Whigs
When the Texas issue arose in the 1830's

.
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joined to oppose annexation.

Many New England conservatives had long

opposed expansionism as disruptive of the fabric of the nation.

They

believed that men on the frontier would be without law and civilization.
As the nation expanded,

the influence of New England would decline.

These Whigs feared that the interests of the newly settled areas would
be closer to the agrarian South than to the Northeast.

Furthermore

the continued westward migration might draw away a work force needed in

the mi 11 s

President John Tyler, already unpopular in Massachusetts for abandoning Whig economics, pushed for the annexation of Texas, and the Boston

establishment rallied against him.

Abbott Lawrence, declaring that the

North "must resist every attempt at the acquisition of territory to be

inhabited by slaves," became

a

leader of the anti-Texas movement.

Winthrop, Boston's representative in Congress and
of the manufacturers'

a

Robert

leading spokesman

interests, announced that should Texas be added to

the Union it would "break up the balance of our system, violate the

compromises of the Constitution, and endanger the permanence of the
Union."

The Massachusetts Whigs united as they never would again when

the Democrats nominated the ardent expansionist James Polk for the
5

presidency in 1844.
Shortly after Polk's election, the Massachusetts legislature sent
Samuel Hoar,

a

leading Concord lawyer, to South Carolina to protest the

practice there of arresting black sailors—some of them Massachusetts

citizens—when their ships stopped at South Carolina ports.

The South

Carolina legislature, hearing of Hoar's mission, passed with only one

dissenting vote

a

resolution declaring the Massachusetts emissary

persona non grata and directed the governor to expel him from the state.
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With an angry mob milling in front of his Charleston hotel, Hoar

quickly slipped away to Boston.
Massachusetts reacted angrily to the incident.
drafted

a

The legislature

resolution accusing South Carolina of an act of war and

warned that she had attacked the basic foundation of the Constitution.
She had forfeited her right to ask Massachusetts citizens to uphold

Constitutional provisions that benefited Carolinians.

The Hoar affair,

in addition to straining the relations between the two states, gave

political leverage to

a

group of younger anti slavery Whigs--men like

Charles Francis Adams, Charles Sumner, and Henry Wilson—who had
7

grown restless in their subordinate role in the party.'
In March 1845, Congress

motion

a

party.
as ever,

narrowly voted to annex Texas, setting in

series of events that would shatter Massachusetts' dominant
The conservative Whigs disliked Texas annexation as heartily

but argued that the national government had now entered into

compact it was required to honor.

a

These Whig leaders understood that any

continuation of the controversy would only further strain relations with
their Southern friends.

With a Democratic administration taking office

in Washington, they recognized that the Southern Whigs were necessary

allies if they were to retain

a

favorable tariff.

But if Texas annexation

presented difficulties for the leaders of Massachusetts Whiggery, it
provided an opportunity for the antislavery Whigs.
Wilson, Horace Mann, and John

G.

Led by Adams, Sumner,

Palfrey, this young and ambitious group

became known as the Conscience Whigs.

Though the artisan Wilson was

a

notable exception, many of the Conscience Whigs were men of influence,
eduration, and breeding.

But they were not part of the powerful textile
8

instincts.
class whom they often viewed as parvenus with crass materialistic

22

Mobilizing the popular sentiment stirred by the expulsion of

Hoar and Texas annexation, the Conscience Whigs pushed through the
legislature resolutions that opposed the acquisition of any new slave

territory and denied the legality of Congress' action on Texas.

As

the debate over Texas continued, the Boston manufacturers grew more

upset with their upstart opponents.

Thomas

G.

Cary, a state senator

from Boston, urged that the inflammatory speeches cease lest
take offense and retaliate against Boston's commerce.

the South

Ebenezer Rockwood

Hoar, son of Massachusetts' emissary to South Carolina and later Attorney-

General of the United States, declared in response:

"It is as much the

duty of Massachusetts to pass resolutions in favor of the rights of man
as in the interests of cotton."
In

9

May 1846, President Polk announced to the nation that Mexican

troops had drawn American blood on American soil.

Many in Massachusetts

were skeptical of the President's account and believed that his call for
a

declaration of war was

slavery.

a

move to conquer additional territory for

The state refused to appropriate money to support volunteer

companies, and recruitment in Massachusetts met with less response than
in other sections of the country.

Polk's actions placed the Cotton Whigs in

a

difficult position.

If

they opposed the Fresident they would run the risk of seeming unpatriotic,

but if they supported him the antislavery faction at home would accuse
them of being tools of slavery.

when the vote on war came.
not so fortunate.

Webster was happy he was out of Washington

But Boston's representative in the House was

Though he disliked the war, Winthrop reluctantly voted

Whigs to do so.
to authorize it, and became one of only two Massachusetts
"Blood! Blood!

is

wrote
on the hands of the representative from Boston,"
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his former friend Sumner; "Mot all Neptune's ocean can wash
them clean."

Winthrop's vote made him the Conscience Whigs' primary target.

Though

Samuel Gridley Howe did pocrly when he challenged Winthrop in the 1846

election, the an ti slavery forces had their revenge in 1847 when John
Palfrey's refusal to vote for Winthrop cost the Bostonian election as

Speaker of the House.

10

The final breach in the Massachusetts Whig party came in 1848 when
the national

party nominated Zachary Taylor for the presidency.

A

slaveholder so inexperienced in politics that he had never voted, Taylor
was known solely for his military record in the recent Mexican War.
the Conscience Whigs, Taylor's nomination was

a

To

conspiracy between the

cotton planters and the Northern manufacturers— "the Lords of the Lash
and the Lords of the Loom," as Sumner called them.

The Conscience Whigs

then joined with disaffected Democrats and members of the abolitionist

Liberty party in supporting Martin Van Buren and the new Free Soil party.
The nomination of Charles Francis Adams for Vice-President helped the

new organization become the second party in the Commonwealth and denied
the Whigs a majority in Massachusetts'

state and national elections.

The

Cotton Whigs took this as an ominous sign; for, by combining forces, the
Whigs' opponents could remove them from power.
In the wake of the

conquered territory.

11

Mexican War came the problem of governing the newly

Inevitably, this involved the question of slavery.

Henry Clay, hoping to avoid

a

serious conflict, offered

a

broad compromise

designed to settle the outstanding differences between North and South.
For Daniel Webster, looking ahead to 1852 as his last hope for the presidency, the Clay proposals came as an opportunity to remove slavery from

national politics.

He had discovered that his position on

slavery— that

24
it was morally evil but politically insignificant— appeased neither
his constituents at home nor his friends in the South.

He thoroughly

disliked antislavery agitators and called the Wilmot Proviso— the
resolution to prohibit slavery in territories acquired from Mexico— "a

mere abstraction" which would prohibit "a naked possibility upon which
no man would act."

Slavery was

political albatross around Webster's

a

neck, and as he strode into the Senate chamber on March 7, 1850, his

intention was to remove it once and for all.
Speaking, he said, not as

a

12

Massachusetts man but as an American,

Webster urged his colleagues to accept the compromise proposals, which
included

a

stronger fugitive slave act and the organization of New

Mexico without

a

prohibition of slavery.

the speech with surprise and disapproval.

Most of Massachusetts received
Even Robert Winthrop thought

Webster had gone too far and worried that support of the compromise would
"overturn every Whig state north of the Potomac."

Antislavery men re-

In John Greenlea," Whittier's

sponded immediately and vigorously.

cruel

phrase Webster was now Ichabod:
So fallen! so lost! the light withdrawn
Which once he wore!
The glory from his gray hairs gone
Forever mo re.

Most of the Massachusetts delegation in Congress, sensing the unpopularity
of Webster's position, refused to support the compromise when it came to
.

a vote.

13

But while the Commonwealth as

a

whole rejected the compromise, Boston's

economic elite— though dubious at first— rallied to Webster's cause.
representative in Congress, Samuel

A.

Their

Eliot, was the sole Massachusetts

Congressman to vote for the Fugitive Slave Law.

Webster had convinced

the Boston business comnunity that without an appeasement of the South

4
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their commerce was likely to suffer.

He quoted an unnamed Southern

Senator as saying that "the Lowell mills might and should all stop
unless the North quit this violence of abuse."
a

The Boston Advertiser ,

spokesman for Boston conservatives, noted that the Fugitive Slave Law

might put the South in

a

frame of mind to accommodate on the tariff.

As the Compromise of 1850 became law, hundreds of Boston's most in-

fluential men rushed to sign
of the Union, and

a

letter praising Webster as the savior

hundred cannon volleys sounded on the Common.

a

1

II

Boston's Whigs might celebrate the enactment of the compromise
but they would pay
it.
a

a

heavy political price for their association with

The compromise, and especially the Fugitive Slave Law, served as

catalyst for forces which had long resented the domination of the

Boston Whigs but which had been divided among themselves.

The Free

Soil movement had been a tentative step in the direction of an anti-

slavery coalition, but the Whigs of 1848 had still retained

a

certain

credibility as an antislavery party--a credibility that vanished on
the seventh of March, 1850.
In

the 1850 elections a new coalition of Free Soilers and Democrats

swept the state.

Loco-foco as well as Free Soil, the coalition was anti-

Boston as well as antislavery.

It was strongest in

rural areas, among artisans and farmers.

the small

towns and

Though its most dramatic act

was to give Daniel Webster's old Senate seat to Charles Sumner, most of

those gaining office under the Coalition were men of humble backgrounds
and anti-aristocratic views.

Democrat and the son

oi

George Boutwell, the new governor, was

a farmer.

a

Nathaniel Banks, the Speaker of the

5
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Massachusetts House, was

a

former Waltham bobbin boy.

The coalition

had great appeal among the shoe towns of the Commonwealth, and at

least three of its prominent members had been cobblers:

Henry Wilson,

who became President of the State Senate; Amasa Walker, the new Secretary of the Commonwealth; and John B. Alley,
Council.
loyal

All

a

member of the Governor's

this prompted Caleb Cushing, an anti -Coalition Democrat

to the slavery views of the national party, to ask scornfully if

"the state were to be shoemakeri zed or not."

1

An important objective of the Coalition (which upper class Free

Soilers such as Adams and Palfrey found too radical) was to weaken the

institutions that gave the Cotton Whigs their hegemony, and to restore
the influence of the countryside at the expense of Boston.

Harvard,

with its aristocratic airs and its opposition to anti slavery, was

a

The Coalition-dominated legislature sought to control

primary target.

the election of the Harvard corporation and to secure the appointment

of more liberal members of the faculty.
the passage of

a

The Coalition also supported

general incorporation law as a way to weaken the

financial oligarchy of Boston.

Previously,

a

bank charter could be ob-

tained only by special act of the legislature—a favor that was restricted
to a select few during the years of Whig rule.

correctly perceiving the Coalition as

a

Some of the mill owners,

threat to their interests,

threatened operatives who voted for the reformers with dismissal.

Here

was primary evidence for the Coalition of the arrogant power of their

opponents and the need for electoral reforms such as the secret ballot.

16

governEven though the Cotton Whigs had lost control of the state
to demonment, they retained their authority in Boston and were anxious

strate their fidelity to the 1850 Compromise.

Massachusetts had never

o
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returned

a

fugitive slave and its mercantile community considered the

rendition of

a

clients.

L.

E.

Negro necessary to prove reliability to Southern
Pierce, recollecting the atmosphere of Boston at the

time, wrote that "the capital, the society, the culture and intellect

of the city took part with no apparent regret or sense of shame but
with alacrity, in
as

a

service which in other days would have been shunned

unworthy of humane or Christian men."
In

anticipation of this sentiment,

17

a

group of militant abolitionists,

Gridley Howe and Theodore Parker, formed

led by Samuel

to frustrate the enforcement of the law.

a

Vigilance Committee

They successfully prevented the

abduction of two of Parker's parishioners, William and Ellen Craft, and

assisted twenty Negroes to burst into the Boston Court House and rescue
the fugitive Shadrach.

Thomas Sims,

a

In April

1851, a Georgia slaveowner claimed that

black man living in Boston, was his property.

The civil

authorities of the city were determined that this time their efforts to
enforce the Fugitive Slave Law would succeed.

They placed an armed guard

outside the courthouse where Sims was held and strung iron chains before
the entrances to frustrate a rescue.

Abolitionists were quick to note the

symbolism when Justice Lemuel Shaw stooped low beneath the chains as he
.

entered his courtroom to send Sims back to slavery.
ist William S.

Antislavery journal-

Robinson claimed that the money and the Websterism of

Boston were responsible for this outrage:

though the return of Sims
18

humiliated the entire state, the infamy belonged to the city alone.
Spurred in part by the Sim's case, the Coalition mobilized behind
a

attacks on the
new state Constitution that would institutionalize their

Whig establishment.

Of primary interest to the reformers was the re-

sent
duction of the political influence of Boston which annually

a soli
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block of forty-four conservative Whigs to the lower house of the
legislature.

The Coalition's newspaper, The Commonwealth

,

argued that

"with a vast accumulation of capital on the one hand and the influx of
a poor,

ignorant, foreign population on the other," the cities no

longer represented "historical Massachusetts."

The proposed constitution

greatly increased the representation of the rural areas at the expense

of the cities.

Had it become law the Whigs would have lost any chance

to regain power.

But by combining with the Irish—who disliked the new

charter because it prohibited the use of state funds for religious

schools--the Whigs were able to defeat the new constitution.

This

"Cotton and Catholic Coal ition"--of Abbot Lawrence's wallet and the
Irish

vote— infuriated

Sumner, though not

a

the Coalitionists and stimulated latent nativism.

nativist himself, mourned the defeat of the consti-

tution; "It would have broken the back of the Boston oligarchy, the

stumbling block of all reform," he wrote.

Following this setback in

1853, and with the insistence of the new Pierce administration that

Massachusetts' Democrats eschew all alliances that might offend the
South, the first antislavery coalition to govern Massachusetts disintegrated.

Ill

After the defeat of the Coalition the Whigs regained office.

But

their tenure would be brief, as the events of 1854 stirred an antislavery
Commonstorm that would remove them forever as the ruling party of the

wealth.

Stephen A. Douglas' Kansas-Nebraska Act opened the fertile

areas of Kansas and Nebraska

Compromise.

to

slavery by repealing the Missouri

Whigs roared
At this betrayal Massachusetts' conservative
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with anger.

Had they not acted in good faith in upholding the Compro-

mise of 1850?

Had they not risked severe political reprisals by aiding

in the return of Sims?

This new act dashed their hopes that slavery—

with its damnable tendency to incite fanatics—could be put to rest, and
that in the return to older issues, they could re-establish their pre-

eminence in Massachusetts politics.
casion:

Amos A. Lawrence wrote of the oc-

"We went to bed one night, old fashioned, conservative, com-

promise Union Whigs and waked up stark raving mad Abolitionists."
proved to be

This

substantial exaggeration, but Lawrence and his peers did

a

pack Faneuil Hall to denounce Douglas' bill in uncompromising and un-

Theirs was the bellow of

whiggish terms.

a

man on

limb who had just

a
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heard the buzz of

a saw.

In May, two days after the House of Representatives passed the

Kansas-Nebraska Act, federal officers in Boston seized Anthony Burns,
a

fugitive Negro from Virginia, and held him for transportation back to
Boston's merchant class, who had made the return of Sims

his master.

a

token of their Unionism, now came forward with funds to aid in Burns'
legal

Richard Henry Dana, the slave's attorney, noted that

defense.

men who for years had spurned him because of his antislavery activities
now greeted him like an old friend.

merchants nor

a

But neither the protests of the

desperate raid on the court house led by Worcester

minister, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, could save Burns.
Benjamin

F.

Federal Attorney

Hallett, working closely with President Pierce, mobilized the
Boston had not seen such an occupying

militia and called in federal trooDS.

force since the early days of the Revolution.

On June 2, with the city

the
under virtual martial law, lawmen escorted Anthony Burns through
.

streets of Boston and put him aboard

a

.

South-bound ship.
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The unhappiness of the Cotton Whigs over the Kansas-Nebraska Act
and the Anthony Burns affair was as much out of self-interest as moral

indignation.

As

Robert Winthrop noted, these events formed "a recipe

for reinflating Freesoilism and Abolitionism" with all their potential

for disruption of authority.

But those conservatives who continued

their protest against the Kansas Act after 1854 usually did so outside
of politics.

They were attracted to the New England Emigrant Aid

Company, which textile magnates such as Amos A. Lawrence and Providence's
John Carter Brown could control and which was confined to such safe ob-

jectives as the spread of New England industry and values in the West.
Had the Cotton Whigs joined an antislavery political coalition at this

point, they would undoubtedly have had to share leadership with Banks and

Wilson--men they considered their social inferiors.
In

the fall

Massachusetts.

of

"i
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854 an unparalleled political tidal wave struck

A new political party, the Americans, won every statewide

office, all of Massachusetts' Congressional seats, the entire State Senate,
and all but three of the 380 seats in the lower house.

Unlike the narrowly

anti-foreign Know-Nothingism of many states, the Massachusetts American
party was a highly diverse coalition of voters.

Some saw the Slave Power-

as their greatest enemy while others were more concerned with the foreigners
in

their midst who increasingly made Massachusetts' cities alien places.

There was, however, no necessary conflict between antislavery and nativism—

indeed, many New Englanders believed slavery and Popery to be parallel
evils.

were agents of
In their minds both the slave owner and the priest

judgment.
monstrous conspiracies to subvert individual freedom and

there was
direction.

a

But

fundamental
serious conflict among the Americans as to their
as
Certain leaders, like Henry Wilson, saw the movement

a

step

31

toward

thoroughly antislavery party.

a

Others like Henry Gardner,

the Boston dry-goods nierchant who became governor in 1854, hoped

that nativism could divert popular attention from slavery and unite

North and South in

a

common antipathy toward foreigners.

23

The Americans enjoyed their greatest strength among the artisans
and farmers who had supported the an ti -Whig program of the old Coalition.

The men who served in this Know-Nothing legislature— whom the Whigs

ridiculed for lacking experience in government and eloquence in debate-

represented those elements of Massachusetts society who felt their
They struck out at forces in society which

independence slipping away.

represented

a

threat to the ascendancy of the Protestant artisan and

yeoman, whether it be the mi
Power.

11

owner, the Catholic Church, or the Slav3

The 1855 legislature passed a spate of bills which registered

the frustration of the working men of Massachusetts against those who

controlled the state's economic institutions.

worked in

a

loco-foco spirit:

The new legislators

they abolished imprisonment for debt, re-

stricted child labor, and enacted

a

mechanics lien law.

They also showed
24

great interest in, though failed to pass,

a

Ten-Hour Law.

defeating
The Americans, recalling the role of Catholic voters in
political
the 1853 Constitution, were determined to reduce the newcomers'

influence.

twenty-one
The party's platform demanded that immigrants wait

office.
years before voting and be permanently barred from holding

The

loyal supporters
Know-Nothings charged that the Massachusetts Irish were

of slavery.

provided by the Irish
As evidence they pointed to the aid

Columbian Artillery in the return of Anthony Burns.

Nativism and anti-

abolished all foreignslavery coalesced as the Massachusetts legislature
born military organizations in the Commonwealth.
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Revenge for the Burns affair did not end with
reprisals against
the Irish militia.

Antislavery legislators were determined to punish

Edward Loring, the Federal Conmissioner who had sent Burns
back to
slavery.

They petitioned Governor Gardner to remove Loring from
the

county judgeship he also held.

Gardner, with a record of accommodation

to the Fugitive Slave Law, emphasized the old Whig principle
of the

independence of the judiciary and refused to follow the legislators'
request.

Later the legislature enacted over Gardner's veto

a

personal

liberty law which nullified the Fugitive Slave Law in Massachusetts by

making it practically impossible to enforce.

This signaled an open

split between the Governor and the antislavery majority of his party. 26
The emerging leader of the Massachusetts Americans was Henry Wilson.
His election to the United States Senate was a galling blow to the Whig

establishment.
was

a

Sumner's victory had been bad enough, but at least he

Harvard alumnus and

a man

of letters.

ting in Edward Everett's former seat.

But now

a

cobbler was sit-

Wilson was no less objectionable

to those conservatives who had hoped to forge an alliance with the

Southern Americans.

By 1855 it was clear to Wilson ard his allies that

the national American party was dominated by conservatives who sought to

mute the slavery issue.

Wilson's subsequent search for

a

new antislavery
27

coalition lead to the foundation of the Massachusetts Republican party.
In

order to complete his coalition, Wilson needed the support of the

Conscience-Whig Free Soilers like Dana and Adams who had spurned the
Know-Nothings.

Despite overtures from the Americans, the antislavery

upper class wanted no part of this plebian movement.

The secret ritual

of the working-class Know-Nothing lodges repelled these men of family
and culture.

Their disapproval hardened as the legislature pursued an
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unsavory investigation of the state's nunneries under the leadership
of Joseph Hiss, the Grand Worshipful Instructor of the Massachusetts

28
Know-Nothings.
In

1854 the upper-class Free-Soil ers had formed an anti slavery

party which they called "Republican."

But this tentative attempt met

with ignominious defeat in the year of the great Know-Mothing sweep.

The true foundation of the Massachusetts Republican party occurred only
when these old Free-Soilers joined with Henry Wilson's antislavery
Americans.

For Massachusetts Republicanism could only be complete when

it tapped all the sources of antislavery in the state, and this included
the nativists and artisans represented by Henry Wilson as well as the

reformers who supported Sumner.

Nevertheless, their 1855 gubernatorial

candidate, Julius Rockwell, lost to the incumbent Gardner.

But this in-

dicated only that they had failed to build their organization and discover winning issues.

This would come the following year when "Bleeding

Kansas" and "Bleeding Sumner" became the catalytic forces for Massachusetts
29

Republicanism.
On May 21

,

1856, proslavery raiders from Missouri rode into Lawrence,

John

Kansas, looting and burning, and left the free-soil town in ruins.

and
Brown retaliated by killing Southern settlers at Pottawatomie Creek,

soon the entire territory was in a state of civil war.
s

Massachusetts anti-

the State Kansas
lave ry men responded by pledging arms and money through

Committee to the beleaguered free-state settlers.

On the day following

Preston Brooks, enraged over
the Lawrence raid, South Carolina Congressman

approached the Massachusetts
Charles Sumner's recent SDeech against slavery,

Senator on the Senate floor.

Using

a

gutta percha cane, Brooks beat

Sumner until he was bloody and unconscious.

Brooks was showered with

34

testimonials from throughout the South;

gold-headed cane.

a

group of students gave him

a

When the House of Representatives failed to expel

the assailant, resentment in Massachusetts rose to explosive levels.

What better proof, Republicans argued, of the barbarism of slavery
and the shallowness of Southern attachment to the Union. 30

The presidential election of 1856 was well suited for the consummation of the Massachusetts Republican party.
John

C.

Fremont

The party had in

candidate whose political record was obscure enough

a

to offend no one.

The trouble in Kansas gave Republicans an issue—the

non-extension of slavery in

the territories—win" ch could unite all

voters of an antislavery persuasion.

Still, Massachusetts Republicans

were uncertain of their strength and entered into

a

compact with Gardner

not to challenge him, in return for the governor's neutrality in the

presidential race.

The Fremont ticket swept the Commonwealth, receiving

sixty percent of the vote.

Especially encouraging to the Republicans

was the defection en masse of the Whigs from Western Massachusetts and

Worcester County.

The Boston Whigs watched glumly as their candidate,
31

Millard Fillmore, was crushed.
In his

excellent study of ante-bellum Republicanism, Free Soil, Free

Labor, Free Men

,

Eric Foner notes that Republican ideology was more than

merely an attack on Southern slave society; it was "an affirmation of the
superiority of the social system of the North."

But there was an added

dimension to the struggle for free institutions in Massachusetts.

Unlike

those in the more purely agricultural states of the North, Massachusetts

Republicans believed that the threat to free labor was internal as well
as external;

as

it came from the mill

owner and the Irish immigrant as well

from the Southern cotton planter.

Moderate antislavery became the

common bond that united those who resented the changing structure of

35

of Massachusetts society.

Loco-focoism and nativism, though they

touched deep well-springs of sympathy, could not unite both
and an Adams.

a

Wilson

Some might resent the domination of the cotton elite

because they saw them as obstacles in the path of upward mobility,

while others saw them as materialistic usurpers of traditional authorBut all could agree that compromising Cotton Whigs had acquiesced

ity.

to the wishes of the slaveowners for the sake of preserving and ex-

panding their manufacturing enterprises—the most visible cause of the
social

dislocations they resented.

slavery as

a

To say that the Republicans used

symbol for a myriad of frustrations is not to say that

they were either cynical or hypocritical.

Most Massachusetts Republicans

genuinely disliked the South's peculiar institution.

But slavery was

politically useful because it was the evil most universally understood.
Men of many backgrounds could see in slavery the epitome of all they

disliked.
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By 1857 the Republicans were strong enough to defeat Gardner.

Their

candidate was Nathaniel Banks, the former bobbin boy, who had risen
through the ranks of Massachusetts politics and had served as Speaker
Though the Sumner wing

of the United States House of Representatives.

was an
of the party thoroughly distrusted Banks, even they admitted he

improvement over the Hunker Gardner.

To professional politicans like

in attractWilson, Banks' moderate position on slavery was an advantage

ing

a

The following year the

broader spectrum of voters to the party.

political offices
Republicans completed their capture of Massachusetts'
.

.

legislature.
by winning control of both houses of the
in
By 1859 the Republicans were so dominant
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the Commonwealth that

groups that refused to support
it is easiest to define the party by the

36

them:

the urban commercial elite and the Irish Catholics.

The broad

middle classes of the Commonwealth were solidly within the Republican
ranks.

With

a

sprinkling of reformers and intellectuals, it was the

party of the Protestant farmer and artisan, the countryside and the small
town.

The Republicans considered themselves the backbone of Massachusetts

society.
still

They looked hopefully to the future and the opportunity to in-

their Puritan values into the federal government.
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CHAPTER III
HARPERS FERRY AND BEACON HILL

On the night of October 16, 1859, John Brown and his small band

of whites and free blacks slipped into Harpers Ferry, Virginia, and

seized the federal armory.

The raiders hoped to initiate

a

massive

rising of slaves and topple the South's "peculiar institution."
cept for

a

Ex-

handful of conspirators— who were privy to Brown's plans-

Massachusetts was perplexed by the strange events that were unfolding
along the edge of the Blue Ridge Mountains.
that workers at

a

First reports indicated

government dam near Harpers Ferry, enraged when

a

contractor had absconded and left them unpaid, had seized the town,
and that local Negroes had joined the rioting "out of compulsion."
Each telegraph report increased the numbers involved in the distur-

bance, and Bostonians scanning their newspapers on the evening of the
18th were informed that as many as 500 to 600 armed Negroes were in-

volved.

The Boston Evening Transcript could discover
even on the basis of these fragmentary reports.

a

lesson in this event,

Such

a

labor dispute,

should it occur in the North, could never cause the alarm it was generating in Virginia.

For the South "glories in

a

social condition making it

subject to continual trepidations," while the North's social system was
based on the firm bedrock of free labor.
herent weakness of

a

"At times like these the in-

state of society where large numbers are held in

state of servitude is revealed."

a

Only when later reports indicated the

leader and the purpose of tne raid did the Transcript's editor realize
2

how meaningful his comments had been.
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By the morning of October 19, the nation knew that
the mysterious

old man at the head of the Harpers Ferry raiders was
the Kansas war-

rior John Brown.

Massachusetts.

Brown had

a

long connection with New England and

Born in Torrington, Connecticut, he later lived in

Springfield, Massachusetts, where he ran
in spectacular failure.

a wool

business that ended

Returning to Springfield in 1851 he organized

the "League of Gileadites," a secret group pledged to resist the Fugi-

tive Slave Law.

After he made his reputation as

a

Kansas guerrilla

'

captain, Brown was in demand with Massachusetts an ti slavery groups,

speaking in several cities and meeting figures like Emerson, Wilson,
and Sumner.

In 1857 he testified before a committee of the Massachusetts

legislature to urge an appropriation for the defense of Kansas. 3
As further information about the raid became known, a feeling of

uneasiness spread among influential circles in the Bay State.

Virginia

authorities had discovered letters in Brown's possession with Massachusetts

postmarks, which suggested that their authors had helped Brown.
cated were:

Thomas Wentworth Kigginson, a radical Unitarian minister from

Worcester; George Luther Stearns,
in reform; Frank Sanborn,

cendentalist

Impli-

;

a

a

wealthy suburban businessman who dabbled

Concord schoolteacher and minor-league Trans-

Samuel Gridley Howe, head of the Perkins School for the

Blind; and Theodore Parker, the controversial Boston minister who was
dying of consumption in Italy.

These men were all uncompromising radicals

and their involvement in such a desperate activity might not have come as
a

surprise, but the newspapers also reported that the New England Emigrant

Aid Company had supplied Brown with rifles.

Respectable and conservative

businessmen had been associated with the company during the Kansas troubles:
men like Amos Lawrence, the great textile magnate, and John Carter Brown,
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Rhode Island's most important merchant.

Many of these men had South-

ern commercial connections and prudent reputations to preserve.

Brown's confiscated letters also mentioned, though less directly,

politicians like Henry Wilson and William Seward.
achusetts elections only

anxiously if the Harpers

a

With the Mass-

few weeks away, Republicans wondered

Ferry raid would hurt their chances of

retaining political control of the state.

4

The Republican newspapers of Massachusetts— such as Boston's

Atlas and Daily Bee and the Springfield Republican— were loyal and

effective organs of the party.

Like most partisan sheets of the

period, they carefully presented the news to conform to the opinions
of their readers and to advance the objectives of the party.

Their

first objective after the Harpers Ferry raid was to establish the fact
that Brown was not a Republican.

nouncer,

a

Indeed, the old fanatic was "a de-

bitter hater of the Republican party."

He was no friend of

responsible statesmen like Seward and Wilson but only of extremists like
Gerrit Smith and Frederick Douglass.

He differed from them only in that

they, unlike Brown, had too much regard for their personal safety to en-

gage in such violent expeditions.

5

The Republican editors reminded their readers that the party's policy

was one of "pure State's Rights" with respect to slavery.

If Southerners

wanted to retain their "peculiar institution," it was cf no concern to
Republicans as long as they did not attempt to expand it beyond its existing boundaries.

Republicans were but followers of those great Virginian

statesmen, Washington and Jefferson, who believed that "the silent yet

potent laws of political economy" would eventually favor freedom.

Some

Republicans resurrected Daniel Webster and claimed that he had never

concealed his belief that slavery was an unparalleled evil and that
its expansion ought to be curtailed.

His position, they claimed,

was essentially the same as the Republicans.

Had Brown staged his

raid on March 8, 1850, could anyone have claimed that Webster had

encouraged it?

The editor of the Boston Traveller suggested that

Brown's actions were more in keeping with Democratic principles.
In an aimless attempt at historical

parallel, he claimed that Demo-

cracts from the Whiskey Rebellion to the Dorr War had justified the

right of rebellion.

Furthermore, Brown's raid

v/as

but the practical

application of Popular Sovereignty-- the right to do anything without

respect to the Consi tution.

6

It was in the interest of the Republicans to portray the Harpers

Ferry raid as

that

a

a

bit of opera bouffe

to emphasize how ludicrous it was

ragged little band could attack the sovereign state of Virginia
It was, as the Springfield Republican

and arouse the entire South.

wrote,

,

a

tragedy.

farce, and not even the hanging of Brown could turn it into

a

Besides no more serious consequences would result than an
lash in order to make him "con-

occasional slave getting an additional

tented in his natural and proper

pi ace.

Lest it be asserted that Harpers Ferry was the logical result of

antislavery politics, it was also essential that Republicans portray
Brown as insane.

And how better to maintain the Republican position

than to assert that the Democratic administration had driven Brown mad.

The press pictured Brown as

a

peace-loving man who had gone to Kansas

attacked
to establish a new home for his family but had been brutally
by the forces of slavery.

The Republican

messianic and controversial career as

a

,

choosing to ignore Brown's

Springfield wool merchant,
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remembered him as "naturally

a

and respect of his neighbors.

quiet man" who had enjoyed the trust
It was men in the service of Buchanan

who had murdered two of Brown's sons and had destroyed the old man's
reason.

Two years before the Harpers Ferry raid, Brown had lectured

in Massachusetts, exhibiting a heavy chain and relating a story of

great brutality.

In

October 1859, Republican papers told the story

again of how Brown's sons, bound in oxen chains, were forced by federal
o

troops to march thirty miles under

a

broiling Kansas sun.

When Brown's trial began in late October, Republicans shifted their

attention to the indecent haste with which the Virginia authorities were

trying their prisoner.

Judge Richard Parker denied motions for time to

gather affidavits to demonstrate that Brown was insane; and when two
Northern lawyers arrived to replace the court-appointed Virginians,

Parker allowed them no recess to become acquainted with the case.

The

Evening Transcript rhetorically asked whether anyone had ever heard of
such

a

request being denied in

country," the paper replied.

a

capital case.

"Never in

a

Protestant

There was old Brown, lying wounded on his

cot, unable to hear clearly the proceedings of his trial, while the
9

Virginia authorities railroaded him to his doom.
Behind this attack on Virginian justice was
anxiety.

a

deep Republican

The Middlesex County Republican convention met in Charlestown,

Massachusetts, to nominate candidates for local offices and the subject

of Brown was an unwelcome embarrassment.

As the delegates debated how

to best preserve the party's image, a majority seemed ready to suoport
a

resolve deploring the raid but blaming it on the Buchanan administra-

tion, until someone suggested that the most expedient course was to

avoid any mention of Brown at all.

In Concord,' the

town Republican

committee asked local author Henry Thoreau to refrain from
giving
his "Plea for Captain 'John Brown."'

0

First term Congressman Charles Francis Adams worried that Harpers
Ferry would make his new position more difficult.

become

a

Would Washington

more chaotic and dangerous place for a Massachusetts Repre-

sentative?
years that

"I

I

have lived so little in any school of trial in late

know not how weak

am."

I

Adams wrote to his son Henry

then studying in Dresden that "in your little German corner of the

world" the recent events in America might seem distant and obscure,
but there was nothing occurring in Europe that would have such

found impact on the world.

a

pro-

11

II

No one was more unsettled by Harpers Ferry than Henry Wilson, who

feared that Brown might destroy the coalition which formed the Mass-

achusetts Republican party--a coalition which Wilson had been instrumental in creating and which represented his life's work.

If Charles

Sumner were the symbol of the Massachusetts Republican party, Wilson
was the engine that made it work.

mentally unfit for compromise.

Sumner, the ideologist, was tempera-

Wilson was the pragmatic politician

who pursued immediate objectives, seeing that the war against slavery

would be won one skirmish at

a time.

Politics was the vehicle which

had enabled Wilson, born to a poor family in

hilltown, become an influential Senator.

a

declining New Hampshire

Politics had enabled "the

Natick Cobbler" to lay aside the tools with which he once made the
cheap brogans destined for Southern slaves.

Now he was

a

man of

influence sought out for advice by the leading men in New England.
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Wilson was so totally immersed in politics that he left his wife on
their wedding night to deliver

Wilson was

a

a

campaign speech.

state legislator when Daniel Webster delivered his

Seventh of March address upholding the Compromise of 1850 and its fugigive slave bill.

Wilson rose in the Massachusetts House of Representa-

tives to condemn the speech and introduce
to vote for the Wilmot Proviso.

a

resolution instructing Webster

When the resolution was defeated Wilson

defiantly announced to his colleagues:

"I

will go out from this hall

and unite with any party or body of men to drive you from power, rebuke
Daniel Webster and place in his seat

and sentiments of the Commonwealth."

a

Senator true to the principles
For over

decade Wilson moved

a

through the shifting alignments of Massachusetts parties from Whig to
Free Soil

to Know-Nothing

,

until

he at last discovered in the Repub1;

licans the vehicle to banish the influence of slavery from the Bay State.

For Wilson, the Republican party was the party of free labor and
the common man.

honest endeavor.
of the process.

It represented social mobility and material

Not surprisingly, he considered himself

a

reward for

grand example

Wilson's Republicanism opposed the arrogant Southern

aristocracy and the Boston commercial elite, for both despised honest
self-made men.

While Hunker politicians like Caleb Cushing contemptuously

asked if Massachusetts' government was to be "shoemakerized," Wilson

sought the support of those who, in his opinion, were "more intelligent
but less wealthy" than the Boston Whigs.

pressed his contempt for the upper class:

In a letter to Sumner, he ex"I

for one don't want the en-

dorsement of the 'best society' of Boston until
us

I

am

dead— then

are sure of it--for it endorses everything that is dead."

all

of

By 1859

Wilson could relish the political destruction of his old enemies in

Massachusetts and could look forward to the triumph of Republicanism
on the national stage.

Surely this party was too important to let

"a damned old fool" like Brown jeopardize its success

4
.

Wilson had particular reason to fear the results of the Brown
raid.

In May 1858, Hugh Forbes,

an Englishman who had been hired by

Brown as drillmaster for his antislavery "army," approached Wilson on
the Senate floor and excitedly related an almost unintelligible story.
He had fallen out with Brown, was denied his salary, and now wanted
to even the score by exposing Brown's plans for a dramatic attack on

slavery.

Forbes, speaking "in

a

towering passion," incoherently ex-

pressed his grievances against Brown and left Wilson anxious and conWilson then wrote to Samuel Gridley Howe, told him of his

fused.

strange visitor, and asked what Brown was up to.

Howe responded that

Brown would confine his activities to Kansas and that Forbes was un-

balanced and unreliable.

Satisfied, Wilson let the matter slip his

But now the memory of that meeting came rushing back and Wilson

mind.

worried that he would be accused of foreknowledge of the raid.

15

Wilson also recalled that during the previous May he had first met
Brown at

a

dinner with the Bird Club, an influential group of radical

antislavery politicians and businessmen that ate at the Parker House.
Wilson was suspicious of Brown, in part because of the incident of the

preceeding year, but more fundamentally because he disliked those who
let their passions overrule their reason.

As Brown and Wilson sat

side-by-side at the dinner table their conversation was brusque.

"Senator Wilson,
Brown.

I

understand you do not approve of my course," said

Wilson replied curtly:

"I

am opposed to all violations of law
"1

and to violence, believing they lay

a

burden on the antislavery cause.

8
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Wilson was on

a

tour of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania

when he received word of the Brown raid.

These states, with local

races in early November, were crucial for the presidential contest of

1860 and this fact was undoubtedly on Wilson's mind as he completed

long series of speeches.
old man?

a

Would all his effort be ruined by this rash

He could not know, but he was certain that "Brown's invasion

has thrown us, who were in a splendid position, on the defensive

.

.

.

.

If we are defeated next year we owe it to that foolish and insane move-

ment of Brown's.""'

7

Ill

While the Republicans denied any association with Brown, their opponents made every effort to link them with the old Kansas warrior.

Benjamin Franklin Butler opened the barrage in the Massachusetts
Senate.
an

The most flamboyant politician in the state, Butler possessed

instinct for the jugular that made him notorious even in an age of

bare-knuckled politics.

He told his Republican colleagues in the

Senate that they must bear
Harpers Ferry:

a

heavy responsibility for the events at

"Ye are the men who abetted him in Kansas in his attacks

on peaceable citizens there and paraded him as a martyr to freedom.

Upon your head is his blood."

Butler suggested that the Republicans

made their mistake by letting Brown believe that they wer? in earnest
when they talked about fighting for freedom rather than merely posturing
1

for political effect.

Many of the anti -Republicans celebrated when "bushels of letters"
as his
were discovered in the Maryland farmhouse that Brown had used

headquarters.

Though only abolitionists such as Sanborn, Howe, anu
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Gerrit Smith were really implicated by these letters, the anti -Republicans were in no mood to observe such distinctions; they claimed that
this discovery proved that important Republican leaders were privy to

Brown's plans.
party,

a

They insisted that Brown was

a

member of the Republican

man "petted and flattered and used" by their inner circle.

The Boston Post

,

mouthpiece for the Buchanan administration and

a

major

dispenser of federal patronage throughout the Commonwealth, claimed that
Republican luminaries such as Wilson, Banks, and Congressman Anson

Burlingame, had wined and dined Brown on his recent trip to Boston and
had honored him for his militant attacks on slavery.

The Boston Courier

,

voice of the most conservative remnants of Massachusetts Whiggery, re-

minded its readers that Governor Banks had once said he was willing to
"let the Union slide" and that Burlingame had boasted that the Republicans,

when they came to office, would "grind the 'Slave Senate' between the
upper and nether millstones of our power."
cording to the anti -Republi cans
tree" of Republican agitation.

"Brown Republicans."

,

Thus Brown's fanaticism, ac-

was but "the evil fruit of the evil
The "Black Republicans" had become the

Their irresponsibility had led to an inevitable
19

result:

"The knife of the black man at the throat of the white man."

On one point Massachusetts conservatives agreed with their bitterest

Brown was not insane.

enemies, the abolitionists:

For if the abolition-

criminal.
ists needed a sane martyr, the anti-Republicans needed a nane

They argued that the insanity plea was

a

mere attempt by Republicans tc

collected by
cover up their responsibility, and that the affidavits

defense lawyers proved only

a

tendency to insanity in Brown's family,

but nothing about the old man himself.

They claimed that the affidavits'

description of Brown sounded like that of any abolitionist:

hones;,
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benevolent, mild mannered on all subjects except slavery with which
he was completely absorbed and totally unreasonable.

If Brown were

insane, conservatives argued, so was one quarter of Massachusetts and
three quarters of its clergy.

20

Much of the anti -Republican propaganda was aimed at those con-

servatives in the Commonwealth— basical ly former Whigs--who had drifted
into the Republican party.

"Good will come out of this if it serves

to open the eyes of tens of thousands of well-meaning men,"

declared.

the Post

These men must be made to realize the danger which abolition-

ism posed to all property.

What if Southern politicians and clergymen

advocated that free traders burn the mills at Lowell and divide the

property of the owners among the operatives?
rented
.

a

farm near Lowell, and used it as

.

incite the workers to revolution?

a

What if

a

Southerner had

base to seize a factory and

21

Urging Massachusetts property owners to empathize with Virginians
had its limitations, however.

Though strong class lines existed in the

Bay State, the bourgeoisie was reluctant to acknowledge them.

The image

of an open society based on free and happy labor was important even to

conservative Republicans.
a

To admit that Massachusetts workers represented

potential source of discontent and instability would be to concede

good deal of the proslavery argument.

a

Though Republicans, who were

usually of native stock, had little affection for the Irish laborer in
their midst, few would admit that these workers were

a

potential target

for revolutionary activity.

Two anti-Republican tickets contested the 1859 election.
to the Democrats, an "Opposition Party" was

servative Americans.

T.iey

In

addition

formed by old Whigs and con-

met on October 19, to nominate former Governor
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George Nathan Briggs for his old office.

Many wealthy and influential

men were in this movement—men who had once controlled the Common-

wealth, but whose day of political power had passed.
Faneuil Hall to denounce both major parties.

guilty of kindling

They found the Democrats

fire in Kansas which "created confusion and dis-

a

traction everywhere.

They gathered in

"

In traditional

Whiggish fashion they complained

about Democratic opposition to measures which would "expand the re-

sources and encourage and protect the industry of the country."
these old Whigs saw the Republicans as no less an evil:

contrary to the Constitution, were

a

But

their policies,

threat to the Union.

These "old

fog!es"--as the Republicans called them---could nevertheless perceive
some fundamental

contradictions in their upstart opponents.

They noted

that Republicans claimed to be the friend of the Negro in one state

while, through exclusion bills, denied them "the liberty of breathing
its air" in another;

and that Republicans condemned alien influences

in one section while they "pandered to the worst passions of the

foreign element" in another.

The Opposition hoped to convince conserva-

tive Republicans that the struggle over the expansion of slavery into the

territories was essentially over, that the whole issue was now an ab22

straction capable of exciting only fanatics like Brown.
Some Massachusetts Whigs wanted to join with the Democrats and form
a

united opposition to the Republicans.

A few already had supported

Buchanan in 1856 as the only way to prevent Fremont's election and its

presumably disastrous consequences.

Moreover, the Massachusetts Demo-

cratic party itself had been changing.

Having abandoned many radical

in
economic positions, it was not so offensive to conservative Whigs as

the past.

And the solid connections many Democrats enjoyed with Southern
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commercial interests were an enticement to the Boston business community.

But when the Democrats nominated Benjamin Butler for gover-

nor, fusion became impossible.

Butler's political base was among the

factory workers of his native Lowell; and although he was an immensely
successful

lawyer with extensive holdings in New England textile mills,

he continually attacked the vested economic interests of the Common-

weal th--especially the banks.

Even an intense dislike of the Republicans,

compounded by the shock of Harpers Ferry, could not induce an old Whig
to support a man like Butler.

23

While the Opposition stayed close to moderate an ti slavery respectability, the Democrats embraced the proslavery hunkerism of the Buchanan

administration.

The real objective of Massachusetts Democrats, after

all, was not in winning state elections— at best

very long shot—but

a

in staying in the good graces of the President and enjoying the federal

payroll.

Benjamin Hallett,

a

to hide his proslavery views.

leader of the state party, made no effort
In

a

speech at Lowell, the center of the

New England textile industry, Hallett asserted that the Republican party
was based on twin follies:

South.

enmity to foreign labor and hatred of the

New Englanders should recognize that the Republican party was

attacking the basis of their prosperity; for it was Southern cotton and
foreign labor that kept Lowell alive.

He reminded his audience that

Massachusetts built her mills, her ships, her houses, and her cities
out of slave cotton.

She was as responsible for the employment of

thousands of slaves as if she owned them herself.
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concerned
The Democrats' major contention was that Republicans,
man at home.
with distant and exotic problems, ignored the common white
this:
Butler argued the Republican obsession with Kansas proved

"We

.

flew into

fever because

a

a

few men were killed out in Kansas.

We

subscribed Sharps Rifles, we threatened dissolution of the Union,

...

we put our handkerchiefs to our eyes and turned our eyes up

and showed the whites of them in holy horror."

But for every white

man who died in Kansas, Butler claimed that twelve died in the un-

sanitary almshouses of Massachusetts.

In

Governor Banks' latest

executive message there were five pages on Kansas and five lines on
the problems of Massachusetts' poor.

"Is it not time to have an ad-

ministration of the government that will devote five lines to Kansas
and five pages to our own home institutions?" asked Butler.

The pug-

nacious Democrat denied that New Englanders should be concerned with
the expansion of slavery into the territories, any more than Southern-

ers should worry if Massachusetts settlers brought their pigs into

Kansas
On October nineteenth, shortly after Harpers Ferry, Massachusetts'

legislature repealed the last of the Commonwealth's discriminatory
Over the previous two decades, Massachusetts had removed

black laws.
laws

that had condoned segregation in schools and public transporta-

tion and which had forbidden miscegenation.

Now the Republican-dominated

legislature repealed the law which prohibited blacks from joining the
.,.

state mi

li

.
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tia.

Though Massachusetts had relatively few blacks, there was enough

anti-Negro feeling in the state to make this an attractive issue to
the Democrats.

Butler,

a

general

in the militia, objected strenuously

to serving alongside "the blackest Negro that came out of Guinea,"

and warned that the morale of his men would suffer from the forced

integration.

Anyone who did not agree, Butler said, "had better exhibit

-
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his taste in that line by taking to himself a black wife."
to the Boston Post

,

there could be but one purpose in enrolling blacks

in the militia at this time:

lage.

According

to aid future John Browns burn and pil-

Massachusetts Republicans, the Democrats argued, would never

use a black militiaman to curb internal disorders; for any law they

enforced would become so odious it could never be maintained.

A

black militia could only serve unconstitutional purposes such as

assisting in an insurrection of Southern slaves.
the image of Negroes with guns would bring

a

Democrats hoped that

sharp reaction at the

polls.

IV

The Republicans conducted

a

quiet campaign.

From their perspective,

it was best that little interest be generated in this election.

If

Massachusetts voters did not become alarmed over the sectional crisis
or if their negrophobia did not get out of hand, they would vote as
they had in the past elections and return Banks and a Republican legis-

lature to Beacon Hill.
the militia bill

Some Republicans—Banks among

them— had opposed

arguing that, since the Supreme Court had ruled that

Negroes were not citizens, it was unconstitutional to admit them to the
militia.

Furthermore, they felt the bill needlessly handed their opOther Republicans like William S. Robinson--

ponents an effective issue.

who wrote the "Warrington" columns for the Springfield Republ ican- -mini
"Surely the least we can do

mized the issue by ridiculing the militia:
for our downcast brethren is to give them

a

chance to amuse themselves

in that harmless way that is so agreeable to General

noted that Butler had been

a

Butler."

Robinson

sponsor of Irish companies and suggested
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that most people in Massachusetts would sooner trust their lives and

property to Negroes than to Irish.

28

Nativism proved another problem for the party.

Some Massachusetts

Republicans still referred to themselves as "American Republicans" and

wanted to pursue

a

vigorously anti-alien position.

Thus, the friends

of Micah Dyer, a candidate for the state senate from Boston, promoted

him as

man who had kept the public schools "pure" and free from

a

"superstition

and bigoted invasion"— a reference to the long struggle

over which version of the Bible was to be used in the Boston public
schools.

But other Republicans wanted to minimize this appeal; their

eyes were on the large German vote in the West.

29

Butler's comparison of slaves with livestock gave the Republicans
an opportunity to go on the offensive and to instruct the voters on

slavery's degrading effects on white men.

If there was no difference

between property in pigs and property in men, one could accept the claim

laboring men--white as well as black— ought to be held as slaves.

that all

30

This was a subject Republicans preferred to John Brown.
At the November election, Republicans retained solid control of the

state.

Although the Democrats had increased their delegation in the

House by twenty and in the Senate by three, they were still

minority.

Banks'

tiny

1858 majority slipped to 8,000, but his percentage of

the vote actually increased.

Republicans were relieved at the results

and felt they had weathered the storm unleashed by Brown.

Transcript put it:

a

As the Evening

"There will be less harping upon Harpers Ferry

as the elections will be over for a year.

,.31

.

.

.
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CHAPTER

IV

THE PURITAN WARRIOR

John Brown was not banished from the public mind merely because the elections had passed; his Puritan heroism made him

figure not easily forgotten in Massachusetts.

a

Among those most

deeply affected by the old man was the anti slavery lawyer and Re-

publican politician, John Albion Andrew.

Andrew had been

Maine boy of modest circumstances who, in

a

the tradition of many ambitious adolescents of northern New England,

had set off to Boston to forge a career.

achusetts in search of

tutor who would instruct him in the myster-

law, he carried with him a commitment to social

ies of the common

reform.

a

When he arrived in Mass-

Although he established

a

reputation as

a

lawyer of uncom-

mon integrity and more than average skill, Andrew never forgot the
ills that plagued his society and spent far too many hours in his

philanthropic activities to become one of Boston's wealthy attorneys.
To Andrew the law was

a

moral force rather than

a

tool of commerce.

He regularly visited local prisons and listened to the stories of

poor men and women who had been convicted without legal advice.

In-

variably he would prefer to help them— often without fee—and pass
by the more lucrative, if less socially purposeful, cases that appealed
to his colleagues

J

Andrew was among the Massachusetts Republicans with

abolitionist camp.

He was

a

a

foot in the

devoted friend of James Freeman Clarke,

with the
the radical minister who, like Emerson and Parker, had clashed

conservative forces that dominated New England Uni tarianism.

Andre* was,

in fact, a

member of Clarke's Church of the Disciples,

congrega-

a

tion that attracted reformers and dissenters of every stripe.

Andrew spoke from the same platform as Parker and Phillips, and
joined the "Anti-Manhunting League" to prevent the capture of

fugitive slaves in Boston.
ists'

But while Andrew shared the abolition-

passionate dislike of slavery, he retained

a

respect for law

and the Constitution that made him temperamentally distinct from
them.

Unlike the majority of Massachusetts abolitionists who waged

their war on slavery outside of the political process, Andrew saw
in the Republican party a vehicle for progress.

Andrew served

a

2

term in the Massachusetts legislature, in

which he earned his reputation by matching wits with Caleb Cushing,

Attorney-General in the Pierce administration, who made
presence in

a

a

formidable

legislative body of farmers and small-town lawyers.

Andrew took the lead in replying to his attacks on Massachusetts'
Personal Liberty Law, denying it was

a

violation of the Constitution,

while deftly ignoring Cushing's charge that the law was

direction of Negro social equality.

a

step in the

By 1859 Andrew had become an im-

portant member of the radical wing of Massachusetts Republicanism,

a

close ally of Charles Sumner, and a charter member of the influential
Bird Club.

Radical

Republicans considered Andrew an excellent candi-

date for statewide office.^

Andrew was also the friend and attorney of Samuel Gridley Howe
and through him became closely involved in the Brown defense.

He

might have gone to Virginia and defended Brown personally had he not
felt that an antislavery lawyer from Massachusetts would infuriate
a

Southern jury.

Unlike some of Brown's friends, Andrew was more

.
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interested in preserving the old man's life than in presenting an

ideologically pure case, and he reportedly had hired Benjamin Butler
to defend Brown, until

travel.

Butler injured his ankle and was unable to

He then contacted Maryland Republican Montgomery Blair, who

though declining to serve in the case, recommended Samuel Chilton

of Washington.

Andrew also corresponded with George Hoyt, an Athol,

Massachusetts, lawyer who was in Virginia to defend Brown, and urged
him to pursue an insanity plea.

Andrew wrote,

as

It would be a difficult tactic,

Brown would deny he was insane.

along with Andrew's advice:

Hoyt agreed to go

"Whether he is insane or not, we ought

to try on the garment."^

Andrew also chaired

a

committee that included such radicals as

Howe, Emerson, and Samuel Sewell, whose task it was to raise funds for

Brown's defense.

They approached

a

broad range of individuals and even

met with favorable responses from

a

few conservatives.

Some Republican

politicians, however, were wary of association with the cause.
Francis Adams replied that, while he had

a

Charles

strong sympathy for Brown

and his family, he thought it best for him to start his term in Congress

"unencumbered" by any association with Harpers Ferry.

He confide'd to

his diary his fears that Brown's attorneys were unsympathetic to the

antislavery cause and that they might use their information to embarrass
donors

How much did Andrew know about his friends' involvement in the

Harpers Ferry raid?
As

This is

a

difficult question to answer with certainty.

attorney for Howe and Sanborn, Andrew had to convince the public that

his clients were not criminally implicated with Brown.

In

this role he

sent letters to several Boston newspapers denying that Howe had supplied
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Brown with arms.

Howe may have wished to save his friend from the

embarrassment of politically sensitive information, and in one
letter he told Andrew that the Kansas Committee had given Brown
rifles on condition that they be used in Kansas alone.

Sanborn

maintained in his memoirs that he had refrained from telling Andrew
the "full particulars of the case."

6

But the nature of Andrew's advice to his two worried clients

indicated that he was aware of their predicament.
hypothetical example of

a

'

man in Maine who gives a cannon to someone

who then uses it illegally in Texas.
for conspiracy but only in Maine.

vinced Sanborn, after

He gave them the

The Maine man could be tried

This thinly veiled advice con-

short trip to Canada, that he could return

a

home and rely on Massachusetts to defend him.

Andrew also came into

the possession of five letters which Higginscn wrote and which ap-

parently contained incriminating information.

Sanborn urged that

Higginson recover them, and Andrew, sensitive to their nature, insisted that Higginson pick them up personally rather than trust them
to the mails.^

Andrew's involvement with those close to Brown complicated his
political career, especially when he ran for governor the following
November.

Had he been

a

mere politician he would have kept his dis-

tance from the entire Harpers Ferry affair.

But Andrew was also

a

romantic perfectionist who was deeply touched by the old man's heroism.

In his

younger days Andrew had written that "a few bullet holes

through the bodies of reformers, though they destroy mortal life,
are only so many sky lights for the truth to shine through."
in

Now,

Brown, he saw the practical application of this abstraction.

Andrew had always believed it was in the struggle against evil
that
men raised themselves to moral heights.

How could a man of such

sentiments refuse to rally to one who, in the face of such odds and
at such sacrifice, had fought the sin which stained the national

character?

The heroism of men like Brown would destroy slavery--

that "unnatural thing"— which stood as an obstacle to human progress.

Andrew believed that Harpers Ferry was one of the great events of his
age; he felt compelled to play his part in the unfolding of history. 8

Andrew's emotional commitment to Brown was not without other difficulties.

Always an advocate of non-violence, Andrew reflected on the

day of Brown's execution that he had never fired

blow in his life.

Harpers Ferry.

a

gun nor struck

a

But Brown the martyr transcended the violence of

Andrew made this clear when he spoke before an anti-

slavery audience at Tremont Temple.
the raid was wise or foolish:

"I

He stated he did not know whether

only know that whether the enterprise

itself was the one or the other, John Brown himself is right ."

9

II

Many came to share Andrew's feelings about Brown's courage and
dignity in the face of death.

As the old man stoically waited for his

execution, public opinion grew more favorable towards him, often divorcing the individual from his deeds.

No doubt an important reason for

this was the coverage given him by the New England press.

He remained

the most compelling news story throughout the autumn of 1859 and editors

hungered for any information they could obtain.

Brown's friends will-

ingly channeled his eloquent letters to friendly journalists.
Brown's sense of drama never failed him in 'his last few weeks.

No

man ever made

a

more convincing martyr.

At his trial he used the

opportunity to speak to an audience far broader than the several
hundred spectators who crowded into the Charlestown courthouse.

After Judge Parker sentenced him to hang, Brown rose and delivered
speech that electrified much of the North.

a

He disavowed any de-

sire to incite murder, treason, or slave insurrection.

All he had

hoped to do was to run slaves off to Canada and awake his fellow
citizens to the unchristian nature of slavery.

He reminded his

audience that the Bible teaches "to remember them that are in bonds
as bound with them,"

and thus, that as a Christian, the sufferings

of the slaves were his personal responsibility.

Erect and unruffled,

he stated that he had no regrets that his blood would be mingled with

that of his sons and with the blood of the millions who perished under
10
s

lave ry.

Among the spectators in the courtroom was Thomas Russell, an anti-

slavery judge from Boston who had once hidden Brown from federal officials.

Russell later wrote an account of Brown's address for the

Boston Travel ler whi ch told of the old man's absolute calmness and selfcontrol and the respect which his courage had won from even his most

bitter enemies.

He emphasized that, as Parker's sentencing had come

earlier than expected, Brown's remarks were neither affected nor pre11

pared.

Rather, they came naturally from an honest, rustic heart.

Brown projected an image as a latter-day Cromwell, the avenger
of

a

Puritan God.

Many New Englanders found him plausible and welcome.

Even though the Victorian mind held that ethical sensibility was the
special gift of women, the ante-bellum Yankee retained an Old Testament

morality which visualized moral enforcement as

a

vigorous and masculine
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task.

In a period when Massachusetts was undergoing profound change,

Brown was a timely figure.

The transformation from

a

rural, agricul-

tural society to an urban, manufacturing one and the introduction of

large numbers of non-Protestant non-Yankees created a fear of moral

laxness among older stock citizens.

Commercial relationships were

replacing personal bonds; the value of
once had been.

a

man's word was not what it

Although the vigorously moral society of the Puritans

had long since vanished, Massachusetts still identified with its

historical past.
In this

time of moral flabbiness when (as the Worcester Transcript

wrote) "we have worshiped God on cushioned seats," John Brown had
special significance.

a

For those who believed that the days of the

Puritan martyrs had long passed, Brown seemed to step out of the pages
of Foxe to confront his generation with a moral example, to exemplify
"the spirit of those old Biblical saints and martyrs who encountered

bonds and death in righteous causes."

of New England Orthodox Tri

ni tari

The Congregationalist , an organ

anism, called Brown a genuine disciple

of Christ "whose acts were without doubt the agency for strengthening
Other writers

the antislavery ranks and dispelling moral apathy."

eagerly compared Brown to John the Baptist, John Hus, and even Joan of
12

Arc.

His address to the court was like Paul's speech before Agrippa.

No one did more to further Brown's reputation as

James Redpath.

In his

series in the Atlas and Bee

,

a

Puritan hero than

Redpath asserted that

Brown and his modern Ironsides were unparalleled successes for rendering

slave property insecure throughout the South.

Brown would teach Mass-

achusetts to emulate Harpers Ferry the next time

after

a

fugitive.

a

slave-hunter came

Redpath recalled stories of camp life in Kansas tnat

would gladden the heart of the sternest Puritan, of how
the old man
gathered his rough followers around him every morning and evening
for prayers, how no food was ever served without

respectful grace,

a

and how no profanity, no man of loose morals was allowed in his
camp.

Brown had captured several proslavery Missourians after his successful

deliverance of slaves.

The prisoners swore profusely at their captors,

and when they continued their blasphemy despite warnings, Brown ordered
them on their knees at gunpoint and demanded that they pray. 13

Boston readers discovared through an interview with Brown's wife
that her husband had never taken tobacco or liquor, that his life had

been one of self-denial, that he had instructed his family:
save money and give it to the poor."

admirer sent John

a

"Let us

Mary Brown related that, when an

fine coat that she recognized he would never wear,

she returned it for a coarse one.

havean effect onasociety

as

These revelations were bound to

concerned with recititude as Massachusetts.

By December, Samuel Bowles' Springfield Republican

had dismissed Brown as

a

madman and

a

,

which in October

fool, was calling him

a

"true

man and a Christian," whose spirit would live on to inspire the North
and whose influence would never be excluded from any planter's mansion

or Negro hut in all Virginia.

14

Many in Massachusetts relished the idea that Brown would trouble
the sleep of Southerners.

Harpers Ferry ignited the anti -Southernism

that had long smoldered in the Commonwealth.

Anti -Southernism had as

its core a genuine revulsion to the ownership of human beings; but by

the 1850's it had developed into a sentiment much broader than simply
anti slavery.

A gap had widened between New England and the South that

made the two sections into virtually separate nations.

Many New
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Englanders saw the South as

a

backward, slothful society whose lack

of industry was almost un-American.

chivalry was

a

Hiding behind the mask of

society lacking fundamental decency.

Slavery, bad

for degrading blacks, was worse for degrading whites; by creating

a

leisure society the South had made itself susceptible to all the sins

of idleness.
brothel

Wendell Phillips' image of slavery as an enormous

did not go ignored.

15

Thus Virginia's difficulty in dislodging Brown's small band was
an occasion to point out the moral failings of the South.

Most people

in Massachusetts believed that, had a similar raid taken place in their

state, a handful of local citizens would have quickly suppressed it.

Massachusetts would have never succumbed to panic and called on federal
troops.

Virginia was

a

sorry sight.

Once she had nurtured some of the

nation's greatest men; now she spawned ruffians and cowards.

Slavery

had exhausted the fertility of her soil and the character of her

people.

Cowardness was inevitable in

a

people who needed to enforce
16

their social institutions with whips, fetters, and coffles.
All

autumn the Massachusetts press delighted in reporting evidence

that the South was gripped with hysteria.

report that the Virginia militia, believing

Their readers smiled at
a

a

Shaker peddler's cart was

an infernal machine, had inspected it from "apple-sauce to pumpkin seed"

before expelling him from the state under armed guard.
Spy told of

a

The Massachusetts

man near Harpers Ferry who, on hearing the whippoorwil Is

of the forest, thought it was the cries of his neighbors being slaughtered by abolitionists and rode into town to raise the militia.

Accord-

ing to Redpath, the South would need diapers before it heard the last
of Brown.

8

Behind this ribaldry was genuine earnestness.

slavery Yankees had found

a

For these anti-

real weakness in their antagonist.

the very least, preached the Reverend A.

L.

At

Stone at the Park Street

Church, Southerners had learned that they best not attempt to expand

slavery.

The Springfield Republican noted that the possibility of

servile insurrection increased daily as the planters, through their
sexual

indiscretions, continued to diffuse more white blood into the

slave population, thus making it more aggresive and intelligent.

Southerners would never be able to keep word of Harpers Ferry from
even the most obscure slave hovel, and formerly submissive slaves

would receive new inspiration by the knowledge that there were white
men willing to die to smash their chains.

The Puritan warrior had

1

apparently enjoyed

a

great victory.

Ill

Harpers Ferry presented
Garrison.

As

a

a

formidable dilemma to William Lloyd

disunionist seeking to end the North's complicity

with human bondage, Garrison saw that Brown had advanced the cause of

unraveling this unholy compact of states.

But how could he endorse

Brown's actions without repudiating his own lifelong pacifism?

Brown

and Garrison had met at Theodore Parker's house in 1857 where, each

convinced he was God's agent to remove the scourge of slavery, they
argued over the questions of violence and non-resistance.

Garrison

had lectured Brown on the ungodliness of force and fortified his position by ample quotations from the New Testament.

But the pietistic

perfectionism of Garrison had little influence on Brown, raised on
the Calvinist belief that man was

a

sinful creature entirely dependent

on God's grace.

For every New Testament evidence that Garrison

could muster, Brown retorted with citations from the Old.

Garrison, at least, came away from the meeting with

a

Though

healthy respect

for Brown's character, there was no way in which these two could
act
19

in unison.

After careful consideration, Garrison made his pronouncement on
Harpers Ferry in the Liberator of October 28.

He reaffirmed his peace

principles and called the raid "well intended but misguided," but he.
.

also attacked the hypocrisy of Brown's proslavery enemies.

"By the

logic of Concord, Lexington, and Bunker Hill," Brown was justified.

Though Garrison emphasized that this was not the logic by which he
lived his own life, he noted that most Americans revered the heroes

of 1775.

If men were justified in resorting to force over so trivial

an issue as a three-penny tax on tea, how much more so were those who,

bound in chains, saw their children marching off to the auction block.

Slavery itself was

a

form of violence; one must choose between the

spirit of Bunker Hill and the servility of the slave plantation.
20

Garrison chose Bunker Hill.
Having determined how best to reconcile an ti slavery with non-

resistance, Garrison was typically intolerant of those who did not
follow his views.

When John Greenleaf Whittier published

a

poem

about Brown which condemned the "folly which seeks through evil good,"
Garrison reminded Whittier that he had glorified the Revolutionary War
heroes in many of his other works.

He noted that, unlike himself,

Whittier participated in elections and thus upheld the Constitution
and its protection of slavery.

Whittier was also struggling with the

conflict Brown had raised between his antislavery and his pacifistic

64
views.

Truly repelled by the violence of Harpers Ferry, he had

seen one of the pikes that Brown had made for use by liberated

slaves.

He blanched and declared:

"It is not a Christian weapon."

But while condemning the Harpers Ferry raid, the Quaker poet saw in
Brown the qualities of love and justice.

It was he who popularized

the apocryphal scene of Brown, on his way to the gallows, kissing
21

the slave child.

Garrison's charge that he had been inconsistent in his pacifism'
stung Whittier deeply.

When he wrote to Garrison, his gentle Quaker

style could not conceal his irritation.

He denied that he had ever

glorified the violence of the Revolution and accused Garrison of
omitting those sections of his poems in which he specifically called
for peace.

The controversy between the two men indicates the narrow

intellectual path on which many non-resistant abolitionists were forced
to walk after Harpers

Ferry.

In

accusing Whittier of

a

double-standard

on non-violence, Garrison may have been projecting a sense of doubt

about his own consistency.

22

Wendell Phillips was less circumspect in his praise of Brown.

In-

vited to lecture at Henry Ward Beecher's Pilgrim Church in Brooklyn,
Phillips delivered "The Lesson of the Hour"--one of his greatest speeches.
There was no question in his mind that bullets were better than fetters.
He denied that Brown could be held accountable for treason as Virginia

had no foundation in law.

No government cculd exist except on the

basis of willing submission by its citizens.

Virginia was but "a

pirate ship," and John Brown "a Lord High Admiral of the Almighty, with
his commission to sink every pirate he meets on God's ocean."

Brown

hang
had twice the right to hang Governor Wise that Governor Wise had to
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John Brown.

Phillips, who had long sought the dismemberment of

"this Sodom of a country of ours," believed the Harpers Ferry raid

had brought disunion closer.

He saw the raid as a vehicle to incite

antipathy to the national government; he reminded his audience that
it was not Virginia militia who had captured Brown, but Federal troops

"with the Vulture of the Union above them"— marines whose salary was

supported by every taxpayer.

23

Brown had so animated the abolitionists that

Parker Pillsbury could revel in the prospect of
"The time is at hand," he wrote
a

a

a

a

non-resistant like

coming Armageddon.

friend, "when mothers will count it

joy to give up their sons in such a conflict as ours,

the slave may have his liberty."

...

so that

Every an ti slavery sermon, act, or

prayer, Pillsbury believed, worked directly for insurrection.

Oliver

Johnson saw Brown's martyrdom as the means of exterminating "proslavery hunker ism" from the North, and James Freeman Clarke felt Brown
had lifted antislavery sentiment to

titude."

a

"loftier and more Christian at-

George Luther Stearns, apparently recovering from the hysteria

of October which had promoted

a

journey to Canada, by March of the follow-

ing year could see the success of Harpers Ferry in political terms:

"It will force the Republican party upward."

24

The abolitionists were aware that it was Brown the martyr who was

valuable to their cause.

Higginson wrote his mother that if Brown were

freed "it would not do half as much good as his being executed."

While

most of the abolitionists did not express themselves so cold-bloodedly,

many undoubtedly realized that the gallows erected in Charlestown,
the
Virginia, were of more value to their cause than many volumes of

25

Liberator.

The Liberator of November fourth reported that among John

Brown's achievements at Harpers Ferry was that he "awakened the

hermit of Concord from his usual state of philosophic indifference."
No other event had so captured Thoreau's imagination.

Brown, the

perfect transcendental hero, had successfully confronted the amoral,
commercial values of mid-century America; Thoreau relished the in-

structive value of Brown's passing.

Life was

a

paradox for Thoreau.

Man had within himself a noble potential but usually never recognized
it.

Some became "serfs of the soil" like the farmers who toiled near

Walden pond; others achieved the sham success of the merchant potentates of Boston.

greatness.

But Brown's death would be an affirmation of his

For in order to die

among the few that had lived.

a

man must first live, and Brown was
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Thoreau read his "Plea for Captain John Brown" in Concord,
Worcester, and Boston.

He probably attracted more attention during

these lectures than at any other time in his life, including the sug-

gestion by the Springfield Republican that he imitate Brown and do
good by rushing to the gallows.

But Thoreau had never been concerned

with popularity; he was out to sear the conscience of Massachusetts.
In his

"Plea" he emphasized a common theme among the abolitionists:

Massachusetts was an accomplice in the sins of slavery.

She was one

of the "confederated overseers" which had pledged itself to keep the

slaves in bondage and return them to their masters should they escape.

Thoreau showed no remorse over the violence of Harpers Ferry.

For once

the Sharps rifle had been used in a righteous cause rather than in the

hunting of Indians or of fugitive slaves.
Brown, he declared to

hi s

Let us not now weep for

audience; it is too early for that.

We can

weep after the slaves are free.

Now let us take our revenge.

No less impressed with Brown was Lydia Maria Child.

of

a

The author

long shelf of sentimental, popular fiction and one of the most

militant women in the anti slavery cause, Child wrote to Governor Wise
asking permission to go to the Charlestown jail and nurse the wounded
Brown.

Aware of the dangers that might face any abolitionist in the

South, Child was nevertheless determined to carry out her "mission of

humanity," until Brown persuaded her that he was recovering and under
the watchful care of a compassionate jailer.

Though the trip was

aborted, Child's correspondence with Wise and with the wife of Virginia

Senator James Mason, became one of the most eloquent and popular defenses of Brown, selling over 300,000 copies.
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The Garrisonians would have been less than human had they not

felt some sense of satisfaction following Harpers Ferry.

of the 1850's had been
ated

a

a

frustrating one for them.

majority of the antislavery movement.

The decade

Garrison had alien-

The ranks of the ideo-

logically pure Garrisonians had dwindled as some of the eld stalwarts
died, while others drifted toward the Republican party.

Few young men

The Liberator limped along with its slim

appeared to refill the ranks.

list of subscribers--mostly Negroes who presumedly needed little in-

struction in the evils of slavery and racism.

Where Garrison had once

provoked controversy, he now found indifference.

It was one

an agitator to be mobbed, but quite another to be ignored.

Brown put the Garrisonians back in the spotlight.

thing for
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Like the Turner

raid which projected Garrison to notoriety almost thirty years earlier,

Brown's exposure of the South'

s

weaknesses made the Garrisonians appear

(depending on one's point of view) like prophets or incendiaries.
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Phillips' lectures were front page news and Garrison spoke in a

Tremont Temple overflowing to the rafters.

Disunion, once merely

the topic of a poorly attended 1857 Worcester conference, now seemed
a

distinct possibility.

arrived.

A crucial moment in the slavery conflict had

The nation could not avoid the confrontation.

IV

On December 2,

fifteen hundred troops were in Charlestown, Virginia,

to assure that the execution of John Brown would proceed without interruption.

The old man faced death as calmly as he had faced the judge

who had sentenced him.

In

Massachusetts the day was an occasion to

express both respect and contempt for the departed warrior.

Bells

tolled in mourning in Saugus, Lynn, Plymouth, and New Bedford, but in

Westfield local Democrats fired cannons to celebrate the hanging.

Ef-

figies of Governor Wise hung in woburn and Natick; while in Concord
a

mock-John Brown swung in front of the Town Hall, with

making Thoreau one of the chief heirs.

a

ribald will

The abolitionists of Concord

wanted to lower the town's flag to half-staff but were dissuaded when
31

they learned that conservatives had planned to forcibly prevent them.
In the Massachusetts

legislature,

a

representative from Nantucket

proposed adjournment in Brown's honor at the hour of the execution.
This brought the angry retort from Richard Spofford of Newburyport that

honoring

a felon

days earlier

a

would disgrace the Commonwealth.

He noted that a few

truly great American, Washington Irving, had died and

that the legislature had taken no notice.

nounced Brown as

a

John Tucker of Boston de-

criminal and said that he and "the coward Howe"

were guilty of disturbing the peace of the Union.

John Griffin of
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Maiden replied, suggesting that his colleagues direct their "Union-

saving speeches" to South Carolina rather than to Massachusetts.

Though some Republicans in the legislature praised Brown's character,
few thought it useful to make such
in his honor.
.

a

provocative gesture as adjourning

A similar motion in the Massachusetts Senate lost by a
32

narrow margin.
On the evening after the execution several thousand persons crowd-

ed into Boston's Tremont Temple for what the press described as the

largest meeting of its kind ever held in the city.
recent martyr rested on the podium, surrounded by

don't know as

die for it."

with

a

I

can better serve the cause

I

love so well

than to

heavy emphasis on the anti slavery statements of noted Virgin-

desk was
a

wreath of ever-

Other posters carried Biblical and political quotations

ians—Washington, Jefferson, and Patrick Henry.

come

a

Conspicuously displayed was the remark by Brown:

green and amaranth.
"I

A portrait of the

a

Above the speaker's

large replica of the great seal of Virginia.

This had be-

favorite device of Brown's admirers because of its insurrect-

ionary appeal:

a

warrior with his foot on the neck of

a

fallen tyrant
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and the motto, SIC SEMPER TYRANNIS.

According to the Liberator
hall.

,

there was no "funeral drapery" in the

The spirit of the meeting was not one of mourning but of "faith,

trust, and the renewed conservation of spirit."

were about to begin,
a

a

As the proceedings

man rushed to the front of the hall and unfurled

banner to the enthusiastic response of the crowd:

"He dies by the

mandate of the Slave Power, yet Still lives by virtue of his heroic
deeds."

Boston witnessed

a

resurgence among the abolitionists as well.

respectable
Never had they reached such an audience, never had so many
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people been touched by their words.
the theme established by Garrison:

The long list of speakers echoed
"Today Virginia has murdered John

Brown; Tonight we witness his resurrection."^

No group was so deeply affected by John Brown as Massachusetts'
blacks.

On the day of the execution hundreds wore black crepe arm
bands and attended

memorial services in their separate churches.

Most black shopkeepers

closed their stores and the Post complained that it was impossible to get
a

haircut or to have one's shoes blacked all day.

In Chelsea a black man

trying to lower the flag to half-staff was chased off by

a

group of objec-
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u-*
ting whites.

But though Brown was deeply respected among blacks, the Harpers Ferry
raid presented some definite embarrassments.
abol

Most whites—and even many

itionists— bel ieved that the black man was less aggressive and less

sensate to oppression than the Anglo-Saxon.

Brown had hoped to disprove

this in Virginia, but the results of the raid had the opposite effect.

Pro-

slavery forces argued that the failure of slaves to rally to Brown's side
proved that blacks were content in their servile role.
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Wendell Phillips discussed this problem in "The Lesson of the Hour."
He noted that in the history of the world only one people had ever cut their

the blacks of San Domingo.

own chains:

Anglo-Saxons who talked of the

black man's cowardice and servility should remember that their ancestors had

endured serfdom for generations.

Nevertheless, Phillips thought that the

redemption of America's blacks would come through the "interference of
wiser, higher, more advance civilization."
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Some blacks were affected by self-doubt following the raid.
L.

Remond.

a

a

Charles

black minister from Salem, expressed deep disappointment that

there was no general uprising in Virginia.

He disagreed with

Phillips, arguing that blacks would have to free
themselves.

He

warned his peers that prayers alone would never break
chains.

Free-

dom was never won without sacrifices like that of
Brown; blacks

should emulate him in the future.
But the Reverend J. Sella Martin,

a

former slave himself, vigor-

ously defended the slaves in the Harpers Ferry region.

At the huge

meeting at Tremont Temple he claimed that because Brown had not shed

willingly the blood of the owners, he was unable to gain the
trust.

slaves'-

The slaves did not act cowardly in declining to rally to Brown;

they were merely showing the distrust of whites that they had learned

through generations of treachery.
the day of

a

black John Brown.
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But Martin too looked forward tc

CHAPTER

V

MASSACHUSETTS FIGHTS THE SENATE

Many powerful men in Massachusetts were disturbed
by the deification of Brown.
of anti slavery.
aniong

Conservative politicians feared the growing appeal
Businessmen grimaced at Boston's tarnished image

their Southern customers.

The Boston Post

Brown's execution, reinforced these concerns.

,

on the day of

It reported that the

Richmond Enquirer had expressed surprise that the conservative men
of New England had not publicly denounced Brown's raid and displayed

their determination to uphold the Constitutional rights of the slaveholding states.

The Virginia paper hinted that commercial reprisal

against Massachusetts business might be in the offering."

1

While antislavery orators were lauding Brown inside Tremont
Temple,

a

crowd of angry anti-abolitionists gathered outside.

There

was talk that night of emulating the Boston mob of 1825 that had put
a

rope around Garrison's neck and dragged him through the streets.

But the crowd, which contained some of those very conservative and

influential men that the Enquirer had referred to, decided to call
for a Union meeting in Faneuil Hall, to be held as soon as arrangements

could be made.

2

It was by no means assured that conservatives would respect the

the rights of abolitionists to hold their meeting.

As radical anti-

slavery views gained acceptance in Massachusetts, conservatives
questioned whether free speech was compatible with

a

stable society.

Certainly Brown's relationship with Massachusetts radicals seemed to
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testify to this tendency:

those oily-tongued agitators had led that

simple farmer to his act of fanaticism.

freedom of speech presumed

a

The Courier suggested that

moral disposition to restrain abuse.

Only

when men were intelligent and self-disciplined was complete freedom in
the public interest.

Conservatives worried that New England was partic-

ularly subject to excesses.

Nehemiah Adams, the orthodox minister of

Boston's Essex Street Church, noted that in the South the soil which
grew the largest sugar cane also supported the largest alligators.

Likewise, New England's rich cultural soil supported more distinguished
men than any other region, but it also produced more charlatans, more

unreasonable and wicked men.

The Courier claimed that freedom from the

Southern code of dueling and from the lynch law was

a

mixed blessing.

Their absence gave license to the most vituperative abolitionists. 3
Some of Massachusetts'

leading citizens signed the handbills which

called on all who "honor and cherish the Constitution" to meet at
Faneuil Hall.

Former governors of several dethroned political persuasions

leant their support:

Democrat Marcus Morton, Know-Nothing Henry Gardner,

and Whigs Levi Lincoln, George N. Briggs, and J. H. Clifford.

Other

prominent supporters included industrialists Nathan and William Appleton.
On the evening of December 8, Faneuil Hall was packed with respectable

and prosperous men, eager to rehabilitate Massachusetts'

reputation.^

This "union-saving" assembly saw a marathon of speeches and resolu-

tions which even Edward Everett found "long and languid."

proposed by George Lunt, editor of the Courier
ed.

,

Resolves were

and were unanimously adopt-

They stated that the purpose of the meeting was to prove that

Massachusetts had been "falsely exhibited

in

the eyes of the nation," and
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that its true nature was sound and conservative.

But most of those

present came to hear Everett make his reappearance
into political life. 5

After the deaths of Daniel Webster and Rufus Choate,
Edward Everett
stood unrivalled as the paragon of Massachusetts conservatism.

His

career had touched virtually all the honors to which the
upper-class

Bostonian might aspire.

At the age of nineteen, he became minister of the

Brattle Street Church, the largest and most fashionable congregation

in

the city, where he instructed the Brahmin class in morality and theology.
He travelled in Europe and conversed with scholars and princes, and when

he then returned to Massachusetts to accept Harvard's chair in Greek it

was with all the proper international connections in hand.

Everett soon

discovered an affinity between academics and politics and made an easy

transformation to the national House of Representatives.

Later he served

as Governor of Massachusetts, Minister to England, President of Harvard,

Secretary of State, and United States Senator.
to the

Everett dedicated his life

preservation of New England culture and the strengthening of the

American Union.

He was convinced that the civilization of upper-class New

England was without peer and believed in the Constitution with the tenacity
of

a

fundamentalist.

Like Webster and Choate before him, Everett used his

golden throat to raise the moral homily and the patriotic address to an art
form.

6

Despite the many troohies of his career, Everett's public life was not

without pain.

The slavery issue, his bete noire

,

hounded him for decades.

Like Webster and other Massachusetts politicians who served in the national

government, Everett found that the demands of his antislavery constituency at
home were incompatible with the strong Southern influence in Washington.

As
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a

young Congressman, Everett had sought to assure his
Southern colleagues

that he was not an untrustworthy radical.

In an emotional

speech he announced that there was "no cause in which
a knapsack on my back"

I

and ill-advised

would sooner buckle

than to put down a slave insurrection in the South.

Domestic slavery, he maintained, was not an "immoral and irreligious
institution."

These words would haunt Everett for years.

7

By 1838, Everett was running for re-election as governor and Massachusetts

was beginning to take an interest in the politics of slavery.

That year he

advocated the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, the end of
the interstate slave trade, and opposed the admission of additional slave

states.

He won the endorsement of the Liberator

Southern friends.

,

but lost many of his

Two years later when President Tyler nominated him to

become Minister to England, Southern Senators bitterly attacked him for his
views on slavery.

W.

R.

King of Alabama claimed that his confirmation could

spell the dissolution of the Union; and the vote on the nomination was an

uncomfortably close one, twenty-three to nineteen.

g

A Senator in 1854, Everett watched with great misgivings as the Democrats

introduced the Kansas-Nebraska Bill.

When the bill came to

a

vote and

Everett was absent, he faced the change of cowardness and unfaithfulness to
his constituents.

A few days

later, he submitted to the Senate a petition

signed by 3000 Protestant ministers, protesting the Nebraska act.
now criticized him for aiding in the prostitution of the clergy.

Democrats

Shortly

afterward, Everett resigned from the Senate, deeply pessimistic over the
future of his country.

Writing to his close friend Robert Winthrop, he

concluded that "there is no course left for men of moderate counsels between
the extremists at both ends of the scale."

g
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After his retirement, Everett dedicated
himself to raising money for
the purchase and restoration of Washington's
home at Mount Vernon.

seemed

a

It

fitting task For his eloquence, asking his
countrymen, North and

South, to open their purses for

a

patriotic cause.

Until

the attack at

Harpers Ferry, Everett believed that his public
career was over.

But John

Brown's raid convinced him that his beloved
Constitution was in mortal
danger, and he once again was willing to enter the
public life he had left

with such bitterness five years earlier.^

Everett was in

a

black humor when he moved to the Faneuil Hall podium.

He was convinced that leading Republicans had prior
knowledge of Brown's

plans, and that they were exploiting the South'

political advantage.

s

hysterical response for

He felt his country was on the edge of a precipice

and that Brown's adventure was but "the precursor of

Soon the country would be in

a

a

final catastrophe."

state when "houses will be attacked, their

owners mobbed, statues knocked over, and other lawless outrages become the

order of the day."
only

a

For Everett, the radical antislavery spirit was not

danger to peace between the sections, but

order of Massachusetts society J

threat to the internal

1

Everett's Faneuil Hall speech was

of Cotton Mather.

a

a

jeremiad worthy of the best efforts

He warned his audience not to be complacent, not to

believe that their society was healthy merely because commerce and industry

continued to run normally.

He noted that French stocks were never higher

than on the eve of the Revolution of 1848, that the theaters of Paris were

packed during the height of the Reign of Terror.
moves with

a

inner cancer.

"The great social machine

momentum that cannot be suddenly stopped," but may conceal an
And what would either side accomplish by tearing apart the

s
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fabric of the Union?

Would the South find her social institutions
more

secure outside the Union?

To antislavery men he asked whether
disunion

would not merely aggravate every evil which
they deplored in slavery?

would not this division debase us in the eyes
of the world?

And

Would we not

have to submit to the dictation from European
powers in our affairs? 12

Everett asked his audience to remember the horrors of
the Haitian
insurrection:

the midnight burnings, the merciless tortures, the
white

babies impaled on pikes, and "other abominations
not to be named by

Christian lips."

Southern whites, Everett reminded his audience, are our

compatriots; they worship the same Bible that we do.

Yet Brown sought to

turn their homeland into another Haiti by placing New England pikes
in the

hands of "an ignorant subject race."

And what if the abolitionists were

successful in ending slavery by other than Haitian means?

Would Massachusetts

be willing to welcome two or three hundred thousand emancipated Negroes? 13

Everett sat down, succeeded at the podium by Caleb Cushing--one of the
few men in Massachusetts who could follow him without embarrassment. Cushing
was one of the most learned men of his generation,

essayist.

a

brilliant linguist and

Even the abolitionists agreed on this point, thinking it criminal

that such talents should be used to the detriment of human liberty.
had once supported

essay as

a

a

moderate antislavery position.

Cushing

His first publishable

young man was on Haiti, and he submitted it to the North

American Review

,

then edited by Edward Everett.

It was a somewhat compas-

sionate article which suggested that blacks were capable of moral and intellectual development.

But Everett thought it too strong for the Revi ew'

Southern readers and asked Cushing to rewrite it, noting that publishers
"must submit to the servitude of public opinion."

Later, as

a

member of

6
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the American Colonization Society, Cushing
attacked slavery for promoting

idleness and "vicious indulgence."

When he served in the House of

Representatives in the 1830's, he was

strong supporter of John Quincy Adams'

a

fight against the proslavery Gag Rule, and by
the 1838 election he even had

won the endorsement of the Liberty party. 14
The turning point in Cushing's political life occurred in
1841, after
the death of President William Henry Harrison.

vetoed the charter for
entire Whig party.
new President,

a

a

"His Accidentcy," John Tyler,

third National Bank and alienated virtually the

Cushing was one of

a

few Northern Whigs who supported the

move that brought him into close contact with Southern poli-

ticians and that exposed him to the Southern viewpoint.

impact on him.
Democrat.

Read out of the

This was

a

This had an enormous

Massachusetts Whig party, Cushing became

a

great advantage; for, unlike Everett, Cushing would

never find himself caught between the proslavery requirements of national
politics and the an ti slavery demands of Massachusetts.

He virtually turned

his back on his home state and forged a career of power and influence as one

of the nation's most notorious "doughfaces."
Central

America.

to Cushing's outlook was his

15

faith in the destiny of white

His militant expansionism lead him to further his political identi-

fication with the South.

Under one Southern President, he served as Minister

to China and worked to increase the penetration of American trade into Asia.

Under another Southern President, he fought the Mexicans as

volunteers.

a

general of

The Massachusetts legislature had refused to appropriate funds

to send men to the Mexican War, claiming that it was a conspiracy to grab

lands for slavery; but Cushing joined with other private citizens and paid for
the equipment of his men out of his own pocket.

1
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For Cushing, Negro slavery was merely part
of a larger master plan

for white domination of the world.

Indians and Orientals were also

inferior and must submit to the white race which
was "the consummate
impersonation of intellect in man and beauty in woman."

The white man's

duty was "to Christianize and to civilize, to
command and to be obeyed,
to conquer and to reign."

No section of the country and certainly no state

could check this inevitable tendency.

Massachusetts was trying to be

a

"drag or brake" on the wheel of history, but Cushing warned
his fellow

Yankees that they must decide whether they would lead or be led.

It was

impossible to deflect history from its ultimate purpose. 17
During the turbulent years of the Kansas conflict, Cushing 's prophesy
had the ring of truth.

As Pierce's Attorney-General, Cushing was, next to

Jefferson Davis, the most powerful man in the national administration.

He

was shaping the course of events while Massachusetts' other prominent men,

denied appointments because of their anti slavery views, were merely spectators.
He helped author the Administration's Kansas policy and wrote a legal opinion

later to emerge under Taney's signature as the Dred Scott decision.

In

addition, he controlled the' Democratic party in Massachusetts with its
jo

attendant federal patronage.
As Cushing spoke at Faneuil Hall, he was a man alienated from his home

state.

He had worked so closely with Southerners that he had come to accept

their viewpoint—even to the point of justifying secession.

If Southerners

could not live within the Union in security, it was their right--even their

duty— to withdraw.

And if disunion came, would Northerners march into the

South and attempt to destroy her peculiar institution?

over the sea of faces and asked:

Cushing looked out

If this is attempted are there not men who

will seize the abolitionist traitors by che throat?

Yes, his audience cried
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enthusiastically.

If there is war, Cashing continued, it will
not be along

the Mason and Dixon's line but within New
England, and it was be waged

between those who love the Constitution and those who
call it

a

covenant with

19

Hell.

II

Republicans varied in their reaction to the Faneuil Hall Union meeting.
Some conservative Republicans, genuinely concerned over the prospects
of

sectional conflict, had attended the assembly as
ciliation.

a

gesture of national recon-

They believed that the party cause in 1860 would be served by

demonstrating that even

a

state as strongly Republican as Massachusetts

"still steps to the music of the Union."

But the most vocal Republicans

ridiculed those who "poured out their wailings like
Faneuil Hall.

host of Jeremiahs" at

a

They alleged that organizers of the meeting had circulated

lists of its supporters in the South and that Massachusetts merchants, fear-

ing to lose an important part of their trade, had quickly fallen in line.

Thus, those who had so loudly proclaimed their love of the Union were in

reality declaring their love for their pocketbooks.

Henry Wilson denounced

the meeting on the floor of the Senate and claimed that its supporters did

not "weigh a feather's weight in my state."
the fact that Boston had recently elected

of the compromisers.

a

Proof of this, he claimed, was
Republican mayor in repudiation

20

Though Wilson taunted the "Union-savers," he and the other Massachusetts

Congressmen agreed that the winter was

a

time for tact and moderation.

Even

Charles Sumner, recently returned from Europe and his agonizing search for

health, saw the wisdom of this policy.

Their eyes were on the upcoming

^
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presidential election and the conservative voter
who, though incensed at
the Democratic administration, might fear
that a Republican victory could

lead to a national

disaster.

Now was the time to convince the timid that

there was an important distinction between the radical
abolitionist and
the solid Republican.

21

Of particular concern to Republicans was the organization of
the House
of Representatives where the party held
seats.

a

plurality but not

majority of

a

Southern Democrats justified their intransigent opposition to John

Sherman, the Republican candidate for Speaker, on the grounds that he
had

endorsed Hilton Helper's inflammatory appeal to the non-slave holding South,
The Impending Crisis

Republicans believed this was part of

.

a

Democratic

strategy to convince the country that Republicans were unfit to govern.
Wilson was conciliatory and defensive on the issue.

He said that Sherman and

the other Republicans who had been listed in Helper's preface had never seen
the book but had endorsed only an extract that contained statistics on slavery,

Through patience and moderation the Republicans were able to elect William

Pennington,

a

moderate from New Jersey.

But there was

William

back home.

a

good deal of unhappiness among the radical Republicans
S.

Robinson wrote in his "Warrington" column that the

behavior of the Massachusetts delegation proved that Congressmen lost both
their manhood and their senses once they took office.

Frank Bird worried

that the public might believe that the only forceful men in public life were
on the side of slavery.

But though the policy of silence caused friction at

home, the delegation felt that, in the long run, it would preserve Republican
unity.

The example of the Democrats proved it:

they had talked about

slavery without inhibition and in the process had widened the divisions in
the party.

3
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Abolitionists made life for Henry Wilson difficult that
winter.
Mississippi Senator Albert G. Brown attacked Wilson for having
appeared

with disunionist Henry Wright at

a

Natick meeting that had endorsed the

right of slaves to revolt and the duty of Northerners to assist
them.

Wilson was quick to explain the circumstances.
was

a

He informed Brown that it

Mew England custom to tolerate all shades of opinion and that persons

of all views commonly attended Natick meetings.

He pointed out that the

Democratic postmaster of the town who was "as sound on the slavery question as
the Senator from Mississippi" was also present.

Wilson further maintained

that Wright had been talking about moral resistance to slavery not armed

resistance.

Wilson was incensed over the incident.

He believed that Wright had

maneuvered him into an embarrassing position and wanted it to appear that
Wilson endorsed violent attacks on the South.

Wilson wrote Wright and ac-

cused him of an act of ''personal

In

unkindness."

this letter, intended for

public attention, Wilson declared that if Massachusetts were to abandon
peaceful and constitutional reform to adopt Wright's policy of insurrection,
he would vacate his seat in the Senate.

Wilson was also disturbed at Lysander Spooner who had planned to publish
a letter that Seward had written five years earlier praising Soooner's book.

Wilson wrote John Andrew and asked him to use his influence to change Spooner's
mind.

He feared that Seward's Southern enemies would use the letter to

increase their attacks on the leading candidate for the Republican presidential

nomination.

To Wilson this was but another example of how the abolitionists

helped the slavery forces abuse antisl avery statesmen.
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In an

especially vituperative speech in January, Wendell Phillips

had called Wilson
a

a

man whose soul could be "made out of the sweepings of

caucus room." This attack prompted Wilson to write

a

long and revealing

letter to James Freeman Clarke in which he spoke of the pain
inflicted by
his impatient constituents.

Our antislavery people at home, he wrote, do

not understand what we must endure year after year in Washington.

speak at home "surrounded by sympathetic throngs."

They

We face a hostile

majority lead by men of great talent and walk through streets and live in
hotels filled with men who "pour upon our heads bitter curses."

We must

moderate our language because many of the men who stand by our Republican
principles come from "dark sections of the country" like Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, and Illinois, where people are coming to our position but coming
slowly.

"If we sometimes explain

a

word or act, or fail to speak all our

hearts send to our lips, because we want to aid our true friends who have

districts five or ten years behind us

.

.

.

our friends at home see nothing

in our action but timidity."

One additional

threat hung over the Republicans.

Shortly after the

Harpers Ferry raid, Virginia Senator John Mason had demanded an investigation
to look into the source of Brown's support.

Republicans, not wanting to

appear as if they had anything to hide, reluctantly went along with Mason,

but were fearful that the committee's Democratic majority might attempt
portray Republicans as the secret sponsors of abolitionist violence.

worried that they could "cast

a

drag-net over the North."

to

Wilson

Knowing the impetu-

ous qualities of his antislavery constituents, Wilson was concerned about what
the committee might uncover.

28
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III

The Republicans were not alone in fearing the probings
of the Mason
Committee.

Conservative industrialist Amos A. Lawrence found himself

suspected of complicity with Brown and likely to be called before
the
Mason Committee.

These accusations stemmed from Lawrence's service as

treasurer of the New England Emigrant Aid Society in the mid 1850's, at
a time

when many conservative New Englanders had become indignant at the

national government's proslavery policy in Kansas.

thought that his an ti slavery activity was

a

By 1859, Lawrence

closed chapter of his life.

He had resigned the post, the experience of working with the radicals of
the Massachusetts Kansas Committee leaving him convinced that they were an

untrustworthy and dangerous group.

Furthermore, the Kansas troubles had

subsided and Lawrence was now concerned with building

a

conservative alterna-

tive to both the Republicans and the Democrats.

But Lawrence knew that trouble was ahead when reports identified the

Emigrant Aid Society as the source of Brown's arms.

He was reminded that

he had once called Brown "the Miles Standish of Kansas" and had sent him

sizable sums for his personal use.

Now Lawrence heard Southern politicians

denounce him as "the cotton speculator who employed Brown to do his work."
This was truly unfortunate for Lawrence as he was both a purchaser of

Southern cotton and

a

leading supplier to its textile market.

As a leader

of conservative businessmen, it was unseemly to be identified with a dangerous radical like Brown.

To blunt these accusations, Lawrence now dedicated

his energies to proving to the South that he and Massachusetts were dependably

conservati ve.

30
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Shortly after Brown's capture, Lawrence wrote to
Governor Wise,

warning him that it was imperative that Brown receive
he become a hero in the North.

a

fair trial

lest

If he were executed under any other condi-

tion, "an army of martyrs would spring from his blood to
emulate his activities."

Lawrence added that the people of Massachusetts respected Brown
not

because they approved of his violence but because of his piety and
bravery;
he asked Wise to do all he could to avoid any additional
conflict between

North and South.

And, of course, he emphasized that the aid he had given

Brown was merely out of respect for his past sufferings and that he had
no

knowledge of plans to attack Virginia. 31
The Union meeting at Faneuil Hall was precisely the kind of demonstration

that Lawrence believed was needed to prove that "the dreams of the philanthropists" did not govern Massachusetts.

He had hoped to use the meeting as a

forum to demonstrate his own political soundness.
duce

a

Lawrence planned to intro-

resolution that called on Governor Banks to offer the Massachusetts

militia to any Southern state faced with an armed attack against its institutions.

Though preempted by Banks' assertion that the offer had already been

made, Lawrence was enormously pleased by the proceedings at Faneuil Hall.

"Massachusetts folks are peculiar," he wrote; "but on the great question of
the Union they are sound."

3?

Lawrence's first objective was to avoid testifying before the Mason
Committee.

He wrote to Jefferson Davis, a member of the committee, whom he

had known from Davis'

1859 trip to Boston.

Lawrence told Davis that the

Senate had been "duped by vile fellows" to believe that he was involved in
the Harpers Ferry project and expressed his aversion to testifying.
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Apparently the appeal was successful, for the committee
never called
Lawrence to Washington.

But the affair taught Lawrence

a

lesson in

prudence that he would not soon forget. 33

IV

Although the Mason Conmittee treated Lawrence gently, its members

were not so charitable towards those of
suasion.

a

more definite antislavery per-

The conflict between the committee and those whom it wished to

question would engage Massachusetts' attention for several months, and

would increase an already widespread distrust of the federal government.
State's rights was an argument that could be used on both sides of Mason
and Dixon's line.

As long as Washington was in the hands of the "Slave

Power," many in Massachusetts would challenge the right of federal authorities to intrude in local

affairs.

Even before the Mason Committee began its proceedings, some Massachusetts

Republicans feared that one of Brown's raiders might be turned over to the
federal judiciary for trial.

This would allow the District Court of Virginia

to "ransack the country from Maine to Georgia," nominally seeking evidence

against the defendant, but actually hoping to tyrannize the antislavery men
of the North.

Howe was particularly alarmed that, in such

extradited to Virginia where his life would be
hang abolitionists on sight.

in

a

case, he could be

the hands of men pledged to

Howe shrewdly played on Yankee suspicions in

a

letter which he wrote to the Boston newspapers from his Canadian sanctuary.
He warned that among the statutes of the Federal
as are the claws

in fact,

of the cat in

a

velvet paw."

Unio.i

were weapons "concealed

They seemed harmless, but were

instruments that compelled the Morth to uphold slavery.

A Southern
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judge, on the basis of any white man's testimony,
could force a

Massachusetts citizen to appear before
certain fate.

a

Southern court to meet an un-

Howe asked the readers of Boston papers if their
state was

"so trammelled by the bonds of the Union" that
it could not protect its
34
citizens.
The appeal struck a sensitive nerve.

declared it

a

disgrace that

a

The Worcester Transcript

distinguished individual like Howe was not safe

in his own home from a "mob of Virginia slaveholders
and slavebreeders.

Massachusetts House passed

a bill

"

The

granting the writ of habeas corpus to

anyone arrested by federal authorities.

Though the state Senate revised its

language to remove the specific challenge to the national government, the new
law made clear the state's distrust of the federal judiciary. 35
By February, the Mason Committee was conducting its investigation, and

Howe--large'ly on the advice of Andrew—decided he could safely go to

Washington and testify.

Andrew's advice may have been influenced by pressure

from Republican politicians such as Henry Wilson.

Wilson, who blamed Howe

for the subpoena he himself had received from the committee, was indignant

that Howe had initially refused to testify.

Wilson believed that such action

only played into the South's hand by making charges of conspiracy more credible.

35
The Mason Committee posed its questions so loosely that Howe could de-

ceive its members without actually lying to them.

The interrogation of

Wilson was equally unrevealing, though in this case because Wilson had nothing
to reveal.

Andrew, questioned because of his role in the Brown defense, testi-

fied under protest.

He claimed that the proceedings had no legislative
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purpose but were an exercise in political
harassment.

But both Republicans

were careful to emphasize that, while they
admired Brown's character, they

deplored his attack on the residents of Virginia.
tried to question were not so cooperative.

Others whom the committee

John Brown, Jr. and James Redpath

dropped out of sight; while Frank Sanborn and Thaddeus
Hyatt directly challenged the Senate's authority. 37

Sanborn, after

a

hasty trip to Canada, returned to his Concord home to

wait for the Senate's next move.

But Hyatt,

a

New Yorker who had been the

president of the National Kansas Committee, went to Washington
to confront
the Senators on their own territory.

His lawyer, Andrew, prepared an elaborate

argument for the case which he showed to Sumner suggesting that it "will

enable

a

good debator to shake the Senate and stir the country."

Sumner

drew on this material and delivered an impassioned Senate speech condemning
the committee's behavior as

a

violation of the separation of powers.

He com-

pared the behavior of his colleagues to that of the Jesuits "at the period of

their most hateful supremacy.

1,38

Hyatt's object was to dramatize the contention that the Senate was

of the Slave Power.

a

tool

He was not unhappy when the Senate found him guilty of

contempt and threw him into jail.
was moved by Hyatt's plight.

At least one Massachusetts Congressman

Charles Francis Adams visited this latest of

anti slavery martyrs; and, while he concluded that Hyatt was "a natural

enthusiast" whose "logical facilities do not keep up with his moral sensibilities," he was

appalled that the Senate chose to "wage war" on such

ly harmless individual.

Surely this was evidence that the Senate was tending

toward Star Chamber proceedings.

Massachusetts.

an essential-

But Hyatt's plight did not stir

Sumner's abolitionist friends complained that Reoublican

.
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politicians were not eager to have his speech on
Hyatt's case publicized
and that the Boston papers had ignored it.

Only when the arm of the

Senate reached into Massachusetts itself would the Bay
State be aroused. 39

V

Frank Sanborn was in his Concord home on the evening of April
third,

sitting at his desk with his slippers on.

discovered
employment.

a

Answering

a

knock at the door, he

boy who presented a note that described him as being in need of
As Sanborn began to read the letter, a tall

grey-haired man

rushed through the open door, placed handcuffs on Sanborn's wrists-, and

whistled to four associates lurking in the bushes.
one of the men.

"I

"By what authority?" replied Sanborn.

arrest you," cried
"By the authority of

the United States Senate," responded the figure who identified himself as a

federal marshal and read an arrest warrant issued by the Senate's Sergeant-

40
at- arms

Sanborn was in no mood to go without

a fight.

He wrestled with his cap-

tors until

they lifted him off the ground and carried him to

carriage.

The noise of the struggle alerted his sister who, after rousing

the neighbors, grabbed one of the federal
to release Sanborn.

that the national
own.

a

waiting

agents by the beard and forced him

The entire village of Concord sprang to life at the news

government had come into their midst to seize one of their

Sanborn's pupils ran from door to door carrying the disturbing news,

church bells sounded, and soon
federal

authorities.

a

crowd of townsfolk arrived to confront the

Man of all political views came with clenched fists to

protect their neighbor.

A group of Concord ladies climbed into the marshal's

carriage to prevent him from carrying his captive off to Washington.

Even
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George Haywood, known as "an old ultra-conservative
hunker," was so enraged at this "kidnapping" that he hit one of the
marshal's assistants.

Judge Ebenezer Hoar of the the Massachusetts Supreme Court,
who lived
only a hundred yards from the scene of the commotion,
quickly issued

of habeas corpus

.

a

writ

When the federal agents refused to obey the order to sur-

render their prisoner, the Concord deputy sheriff formed

a

posse from the

crowd, snatched Sanborn from his captors and chased them halfway back
to

Boston.

Sanborn, recognizing the drama of the moment, turned to his rescuers,

held his handcuffs over his head and exclaimed:

"Citizens, look and see what

the United States Senate have done for me!"
In the

Massachusetts legislature the next day, the Sanborn arrest was

the topic of debate.

John Griffin compared Concord's rescue of Sanborn to

the events of April 19, 1775.

The British officers who marched on Concord

that day were supported by an outside authority but it was those who resisted

who are now revered as patriots.

John Eldridge of Canton rejoiced that "the

whole power of the government was not able to take an unarmed man out of
Concord."

And Concord's representative offered

a

resolution that directed the

state's attorney-general to represent Sanborn when he appeared in court on his

writ of habeas corpus

.

The House supported the resolution by

a

wide margin.

41

Sanborn's lawyer was John Andrew, who rarely missed an opportunity to
strike
a

a

legal blow against slavery.

In his argument to the court, largely

repeat of his brief in the Hyatt case, Andrew warned th?t the powers claimed

by the Senate were greater than those that had been exercised under British
rule,

Andrew argued that the Senate had no right to compel witnesses to testi-

fy, no power to arrest except in specific cases such as impeachment trials.

The court, under the leadership of conservative Lemuel Shaw, chose to avoid

a

91

direct challenge to federal authority.

It ruled that the Senate's warrant

empowered only the Sergeant-at-arms to arrest Sanborn
and that this authority
could not be transferred.

42

Whatever the basis of the decision, Sanborn was

a

free man; the Senate

would soon decide that it was not worth the effort to pursue him any
longer.
Sanborn returned home

a

hero, cheered by

by the Concord Artillery Corps.

a

crowd of eight hundred and saluted

Concord citizens were proud that day, be-

lieving themselves the true heirs of the eighteenth-century minuteman.
Emerson recorded that he had overheard

a

man say a house in Concord was worth

more than one elsewhere because Concord people were willing to protect one
another.

Only two men in town had supported the arrest— the postmaster and

an official

of the Boston Customs

House— and both of tnem were tainted with

the corruption of federal patronage. 43

This was

satisfying, if symbolic, victory for many chauvinistic

a

Massachusetts citizens.

Friends of Sanborn commemorated the occasion by pre-

senting his brave sister with

a

Colt revolver engraved with the Pine Tree flag.

Charles Sumner condemned his colleagues in the Senate for trying to kidnap "a

quiet citizen engaged in the instruction of youth" and arranged to send

warning should the Senate again try to arrest Sanborn.

a

coded

But the Boston Post

observed this anti federal sentiment with foreboding; it was nothing but the

celebration of

a

victory over the Constitution.

From the Post

's

point of view,

the Sanborn affair demonstrated that Massachusetts Republicans looked at

Washington as

a

foreign power.

office, the Post's

While Buchanan and his Southern allies were in

comments held more than

a

grain of truth.

44
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CHAPTER

VI

THE ELECTION OF 1860

In the early months

of 1860, Massachusetts Republicans anxiously
sur-

veyed the political skies for storm clouds that might
upset their campaign

for the presidency.

While Harpers Ferry was undoubtedly the most unsettling

episode for election-oriented Republicans, it by no means stood alone.
real

A

concern was that volatile issues could split the fragile coalition which

constituted their party.
Many Massachusetts Whigs had joined the Republican party when- they perceived that it would become the focus of power in the Commonwealth.

They

sought to influence the direction of the new orgniazation and, hopefully, to
make it resemble the old Whig party whose passing they still mourned.

Charles

Hale, the editor and publisher of the Boston Advertiser and member of an old
Boston family with impeccable conservative connections, was the foremost

representative of this faction.

He had fought the Coalition of 1850 and the

Know-Nothings, thinking them irresponsible radicals, and came over to the
Republicans only after the Kansas conflict left him with no other viable
political home.

He used the A dvertiser 's

influence to encourage those of

similar inclination to join the Republican ranks and to act as
to radical

tendencies within the party.

a

counterweight

Hale's efforts culminated in his

election as Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives.
fought extension of the state's Personal Liberty Law and led

a

There he

divisive attack

on plans to build a statue of Horace Mann on the StatP House grounds.^
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But the conservatives were not alone in seeking
to alter the direction

of Massachusetts Republicanism.

The radicals, who considered themselves to

be the true and original Republicans, chafed at the
timidity of many of their

colleagues.

They looked at Governor Banks as an unscrupulous trimner
and

resented Hale's conservative imprint on the legislature.

worried lest their efforts to construct
merely as old and sour Whig wine in

a

a new political

organization end

new Republican bottle.

legislature convened in January, the radicals enjoyed

replacing Hale as Speaker and electing

Most of all they

a

a

When the 1860

stunning victory by

more thoroughly antislavery replace-

ment.^

Hoping to pursue their success, the radicals proposed
Personal
soil

a

a

fugitive to his

But despite the pronounced antislavery leaning of the new legislature,

majority of the representatives was dubious of taking such

step in an election year.

posed law

strong new

Liberty Law which would free any slave setting foot on Massachusetts

and impose heavy penalties on those trying to return

master.

a

a

a

provocative

More pragmatic Republicans substituted for the pro-

series of antislavery resolutions culled from the early addresses

of Caleb Cushing and Edward Everett.

Through this clever stroke they avoided

legislation that would invite the charge of nullification and embarrassed two
political opponents by resurrecting sentiments they preferred forgotten.

Another threat to the unity of the Republicans lay in nativism.

3

The

American wing of the Massachusetts party was still powerful; the previous year

nativists had succeeded in attaching the "Two-Year Amendment" to the

Massachusetts Constitution.

This amendment required that foreign-born citizens

wait two years after naturalization before becoming eligible

to vote.

Though

this act was far less stringent than the twenty-one year waiting period the
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Know-Nothings had demanded earlier, immigrant
voters in Massachusetts and

elsewhere resented it as unjust and insulting.

Benjamin Butler recognized

the potential of this issue and told his
Irish constituents that Republicans

supported unrestricted Negro voting while placing
impediments on the white
immigrant.

Even in distant Illinois

a

provincial politician named Abraham

4
Lincoln recognized the danger of the Massachusetts
statute.

Massachusetts radicals also were attuned to the danger.
had written

a

Republicans.

E.

L.

Pierce

pamphlet which he hoped would attract the self-interest of
It was true, he wrote, that foreign-born voters in the Northeast

generally supported the Democrats and were often friendly toward slavery;
but
in the

West— where

the coming election would be settled— the immigrants were

of substantial German and Scandinavian stock and voted for the Republicans.
Pierce argued that, by offending immigrant voters, Massachusetts Republicans

hurt their party's chances for the presidency and diminished the influence of
their own spokesmen in national affairs.

Pierce's arguments reflected the

thinking of many Republican leaders, including Henry Wilson, himself
Know-Nothing.

a

former

These leaders did not expect that Republicans would change

their attitude toward the Irish, for among the Massachusetts middle class dislike of the Irish was too deeply seated to be easily altered.

They only asked

that these sentiments be subject to greater discretion and that they be kept

out of politics.

But

a

substantial faction of Massachusetts Republicans were

unwilling to renounce or even mute their nativism.

were still an influential element in the party.

These "American Republicans"

Claiming Governor Banks as

one of their own, they had in the Boston Atlas and Bee
voice.

a

strident and effective

And when the national party repudiated state legislation that restrict-

ed voting by the foreign-born, the Atlas and Bee angrily replied that
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Republicans ought to remember that more than half
their victories were due
to nativist help.

In

Massachusetts the figure was undoubtedly higher. 5

Wary of the social and political implications
of the transformation of
Massachusetts industry, Republicans found new reasons to be
concerned in the

early months of 1860.

crumbled into
a

a

In January, the huge Pemberton mill at Lawrence

pile of ruins when the poorly laid foundation gave way.

As

raging fire swept through the rubble, over one hundred persons
died—almost

all of them Irish laborers.

For days Massachusetts newspapers carried accounts

of rescue teams sifting through the debris uncovering mutilated
bodies.
industrial

tragedy of this magnitude had ever occurred in New England, and

there was widespread shock at the negligence that could permit such
tragedy.

No

a

massive

The Pilot spoke for more than merely its church when it condemned

the soulless and speculating proprietors who hid behind the shield of incor-

poration.

It demanded that the mill

owners be indicted for manslaughter.

Many Republicans inclined to the Pilot 's sentiments.

6

After all, the

party had been built in large measure on opposition to the mill-owning class.
But Republicans recognized that
well

as

a

its ethical consequences.

tragedy such as this had its political as
For example, the Democratic Worcester Bay

State asked why Lydia Maria Child--who was so eager to rush and comfort the

Harpers Ferry raiders
mill hands.

— had

not gone to Lawrence to assist the wounded Irish

Perhaps, the paper suggested, it was because there was among

the victims no "fragrant, intellectual, ideal Negro."

Though Child was no

Republican, the argument that anti slavery enthusiasts were more concerned

with black men than with whites touched
that might open

a

a

tender subject for Republicans, one

Pandora's box of resentments.''
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An article in the New York Herald helped
put Republicans on the defen-

sive.

James Gordon Bennett's inflammatory pro-Southern
organ claimed the

Pemberton disaster demonstrated again that black
slaves fared better than

Northern working men.

him from dangers.

Since

a

slave was valuable his master would shield

But Northern mill owners insured only their property
and

cared nothing about the lives of their employees.

The Atlas and Bee

,

though

long a vigorous antagonist of the "silver spoon and white
cravat aristocrats,"

quickly defended New England institutions faced with outside criticism.

This

position was similar to the response of those Southerners who were
discomforted
by slavery but who defended their region against abuse by Northernabolitionists.

Citing the schools, libraries, and churches built with corporate funds,

the Atlas and Bee argued that Massachusetts capitalists treated their employees

with

a

"liberality unequaled elsewhere." 8

Later in the winter thousands of Lynn shoemakers went on strike, dis-

tressed by their dwindling incomes and the new methods of production that

threatened their artisan status.
demands for

a

They refused to pick up their tools until

stable wage scale were met.

For weeks Lynn was the scene of

mass rallies and processions as the shoemakers achieved

seldom seen in the industries of antebellum New England.

a

sense of solidarity

Strikers roughly

handled those few who defied the strike by attempting to send shoes to market.
When worse violence threatened, Stephen Phillips, Massachusetts' Republican

attorney-general, sent

a

force of Boston police to restore order.

As the strike spread to other shoemaking centers in the Commonwealth,

Republicans recognized the potential dangers of the situation.

The shoemakers

were among the most stalwart supporters of Republicanism and an essential part
of the governing coalition of the Commonwealth.

Now the cobblers were in
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deadly earnest, striking in defense of their
very way of life.
Republicans failed to support them on such

shoemakers retaliate and deal the party

a

The situation was rife with paradox.

defend their middle-class self-image.

a

If the

crucial matter, would the

severe blow?
The shoemakers were acting to

But in the minds of many Republicans,

the tactics which the cobblers had chosen
disqualified them from middle-

class status.

The shoemakers now revealed themselves as dependent on
others

for their livelihood and as disturbers of the public peace.

The bourgeois

sensibilities of most Massachusetts Republicans simply would not admit
the

necessity for strikes.

Though the Massachusetts middle class (like its

peers in most periods and locales) was highly class-conscious itself,
it was

deeply apprehensive when other segments of society recognized the reality of
9

,

cl ass.

The Springfield Republican expressed such sentiments.

It denounced the

strike leaders as demagogues and accused them of seeking to turn the conflict
to proslavery politics.

The paper expressed great sympathy for the workers

and noted the forces that had transformed their occupation:
a trade

...

as shoes are now made."

"It is no longer

But striking was no solution; those

who wanted to escape poverty and dependency should leave shoemaking and
settle in the virgin lands of the West.

®

Democrats were quick to see the possibilities in the Lynn conflict.
Again they argued that the black slave with "sufficient food, clothing, and

a

patch of land for cultivation" was better off than the wage slave of the North
The reason for the shoe industry's problems, they argued, was antislavery

agitation.

The Post quoted a Virginia legislator's appeal

shoes made by "bloody propagandists of antislavery."

against wearing

It argued that

recent
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John Brown meetings in the shoe towns and
widespread belief that Henry

Wilson was the archetypical Yankee cobbler
caused

Massachusetts shoes.

a

Southern boycott of

The Boston Herald also found a lesson in the
strike:

"Let our mechanics vote for men in Congress who care
as much for white men
as they do for niggers and they will

decent wages.

not often be compelled to strike for

'*

But even though Republicans remained cool to the strike, shoemakers

remained impervious to Democratic arguments.

The cobblers refused comparison

with Southern slaves; they remained convinced that their problems lay with
New England capitalists rather than with antislavery orators.

tained their vision that

a

And they re-

nation governed by Republicans would be invested

with virtue and would reward honest labor.

But Republicans could not know in

March that the shoemakers would remain loyal to the party of free labor in

November; and the Lynn strike serve as another cautionary note in the early
months of the presidential campaign.
As Massachusetts Republicans began to elect delegates to the Chicago

convention, events in Rhode Island raised additional concern.

There

coali-

a

tion of Whigs, Americans, and Democrats nominated a conservative Republican

William Sprauge for governor.

This coalition gained

a

substantial victory

by convincing a majority of the voters that the Republican nominee, Seth

Padelford, was

a

dangerous radical.

Here was an ominous precedent in

neighboring Republican state that might be repeated

in Massachusetts.

a

Republi-

cans knew that Amos Lawrence--wi th great resources at his disposal --was at-

tempting

a

similar arrangement in the Bay State.

Southern threats to boycott

Massachusetts commerce seemed timed to promote such
appeared that names of "constitutional"

a

combination, as stories

and "unconstitutional" merchants
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would circulate in Southern newspapers.

Charles Francis Adams was one who

saw a developing plot of "intimidating
the moneyed interests among us and

persuading them to exert themselves to secure
the triumph of the slave candidate."

12

A substantial majority of Massachusetts Republicans
supported William

Seward as the logical choice for the presidential
nomination.
party's foremost spokesman and

a

He was the

man of broad experience and talents.

even among the radicals, dedication to Seward's cause was
thin.

But

Shortly

before the Republicans met in Chicago, old Whigs and Americans had
convened
as

the "Constitutional

Union" party and nominated John Bell of Tennessee.

Now conservatives who might find Seward's "irrepressible conflict" unpalatable
had an alternative.

Even the tumultuous Democratic convention in Charleston

that had split the party in two, raised questions about the wisdom of nominating a controversial candidate.

Could there be, some Republicans asked,

a

plot to stalemate the election and place selection of the President in the
13
hands of the Senate?
The correspondence of two thoroughly antislavery Republ icans---E.

L.

Pierce

and Charles Francis Adams— indicated the drift of thought on the eve of the

convention.

Pierce, a delegate from Adams' district, wrote that he would pre-

fer to vote for Seward if he were "as available" as any other candidate.

But

after condemning those who would sell out Republican principles and nominate
John McLean or Simon Cameron, he emphasized that the party should select the

man most likely to win in November.

"No one man owns the party," Pierce de-

clared; "it has done more for its leaders, more than they have done for it."

Adams,

a

^

personal friend of Seward, was distressed by the intrigues he

saw organizing against the New York Senator.

But he also was upset by reports

of the scandals involving Seward's Albany cronies.

He replied to Pierce with
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a

lecture on the grave responsibility which
delegates to Chicago carried,

solemnizing that
meaningless.
in America.

a

victory not based on Republican principles
would be

Seward was still his choice as the most competent
statesman
"And yet," he added, "I am no partisan of his,
nor shall

ready to sacrifice the probabilities of

notions of abstract propriety."
depth of his frustrations:

a

be

I

victory merely to indulge my

In a final

flourish, Adams revealed the

"It is to be regretted that we have not some

popular young military man to stand in the gap just now."

Of the other

Massachusetts radicals, Wilson was actively working against Seward,
while
Sumner restricted his activities to urging Republicans to select
"an old
and constant servant of the cause."

15

Many moderate and conservative Massachusetts Republicans hoped to
channel disillusionment with Seward's candidacy into a presidential bid for

Governor Banks.

Congressmen Dawes and Burlingame, Boston Journal editor

Charles 0. Rogers, Charles Hale, Samuel Bowles, all hoped to make the Massachusetts governor

a

credible candidate at Chicago.

Their strategy was to hold

the Massachusetts delegation for Seward in the early balloting and await

deadlock.

Then they would urge Banks as

their debt from Seward's allies.

Samuel

a

a

compromise candidate and collect

Bowles wrote Banks of the plan:

"Let us look on calmly and see the murders, and pray that the blood of the

martyrs shall be the seed of your church."

Banks'

friends sought to present

him as one Republican whose election would not alarm the Sou^h unduly.

W.

0.

Bartlett urged Banks to remind the delegates that after his election as

Speaker of the House, South Carolina's largest slave owner escorted him to the
chair.

And the Springfield Republican argued that Banks' Democratic antece-

dents would attract many voters who would otherwise support Douglas and that
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his nomination would answer the charge
that the Republican party was merely
16
"Old Whiggery

resuscitated."

But Banks' presidential hopes were short-lived.

Radicals who had

little sympathy with their governor dominated
the state and district conventions that elected delegates for Chicago.

These radicals remembered Banks'

attempt to turn the issue from slavery to the Pacific
railroad during the
Fremont campaign, and noted his increasingly friendly
relations with Massachusetts'

commercial interests.

They also recalled his abortive attempt

1858 to edge Sumner into retirement and replace him in the Senate.

recently Banks earned their enmity for his second veto of
blacks to enroll in the state militia.

a

in

More

bill allowing

Frank Bird wrote a stinging rebuke in

which he compared Banks' veto to Missouri and Arkansas' recent expulsion
of
free blacks.

All were based, he wrote, on the faulty premise that it was "a

right of the majority to proscribe

...

the minority."

Bird also accused

the Governor of forcing the legislature to adopt the Two-Year

Law— "the anti-

American, undemocratic, odious, Know-Nothing amendment," Bird called it.
Bird's charge was somewhat overstated; but nevertheless, Banks' association
with the Know-Nothings eliminated him from serious consideration by
so intent on wooing the German vote.

a

party

The governor's friends accused Henry

Wilson of leading the "Lager beer Germans" against him, but foreign-born
voters needed little encouragement to oppose Banks' nomination.

1

^

A large majority of the Massachusetts delegation stood by Seward during
the three rounds of balloting, although four members did support Lincoln as

early as the first ballot.

More might have voted for Lincoln had they not

felt bound to honor their constituents' preference for Seward.

Massachusetts Republicans felt Lincoln was

a

But all

candidate they could accept
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even if some like John Murray Forbes worried
about a repetition of the
log cabin and hard cider campaign of
Harrison.

As for

Banks-he set

his

sights lower, but received only a scattering
of votes for the vice-

presidency.

The Chicago delegates found. in another New
Englander with

a

Democratic background-Maine's Hamilton Hamlin-a
candidate untouched by
Know-Nothingism. 18

II

Amos Lawrence was one man who worried Massachusetts Republicans

throughout the winter and spring of 1860.

Still repenting his association

with John Brown, Lawrence was actively soliciting his wealthy
acquaintances
to support the organization of a new conservative party.

He hoped to build

upon the enthusiasm of the Union meetings that had followed Harpers Ferry

and to exploit the divisions within the Republican party.
can National

When the Republi-

Committee issued its call to the Chicago convention, Lawrence

noted its rejection of nativism; he saw this as an opportunity to split the
Banks Americans away from the Republican party.

Looking further at the

Chicago call, Lawrence noted that "it contains nothing about the manufacturing
and producing interests of the country."

could be roused by such an oversight.

Certainly America's businessmen

Lawrence hoped to create

ized, anti-radical Union party that would nominate

a

a

well-organ-

Border State moderate.

He believed that such an organization could strengthen the hand of conserva-

tive Republicans and that they would lead their party to accept the Union

candidate.

Lawrence was certain that John

J.

Crittenden could sweep the

nation and Massachusetts with it, and he worked hard to convince the Kentucky

Senator to accept the nomination.

19

'
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But Lawrence found that conservative
Republicans were unreceptive
to his plans.

Many blamed the Fillmore ticket of
1856 for the election

of Buchanan and did not want the
Democrats to profit from another conservative movement.

As one Boston businessman wrote,
the Constitutional

Union

party could only serve to play into the
hands of the administration's

"nigger drivers."

Pragmatists, these conservatives sensed success
in the

Republicans but only failure in the Unionist
20
movement.

Lawrence was further disappointed when the
Constitutional Union convention in Baltimore chose John Bell of Tennessee
as its presidential candi-

date and Edward Everett for vice-president.

Everett's response to this

dubious honor further demoralized the Union effort in
Massachusetts.

Everett had hoped for the presidential nomination; and when
it went to Bell,
Everett wired his agent at the convention, George

Hi

to withdraw his name from any further consideration.

Hard of

the Courier

,

But the order miscar-

ried; and the convention, believing Everett's illustrious name would
be

helpful

to their cause, placed it on the ticket.

Everett was furious,

believing the nomination an insult since he was placed behind
(Everett was sixty-six; Bell, sixty-three.)

a

younger man.

Everett agreed to the nomination

only when he recognized that it might be more embarrassing to reject it, and
the chore proved as distasteful

as he had imagined.

Southern fireaters resur

rected Everett's youthful speeches against slavery and condemned him for havi

sent his son to

a

school that had

a

Negro pupil.

By autumn he was weary of

accusations that he supported "amalgamation, political equality, and all the
horrors of abil

i

tionism.

The Massachusetts Union party--consi sting of old Whigs and conservative

Americans—found its notable men equally hesitant to stand for governor.
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Though William Appleton offered John Clifford

a

campaign chest of twenty

thousand dollars if he would run, the former
governor declined.

Only

after several others had refused to accept the
nomination did Amos Lawrence

grudgingly agree to become the candidate.

This disinclination of leading

conservatives to re-enter poll tics-"overfastidiousness"
the Courier called

it-would seriously hamper

the Bell-Everett cause in Massachusetts.

The

Courier reminded conservatives that they had most at stake in
the preservation of the Union and that, possessing wealth and education,
they carried

grave public responsibility.

If these natural

role they invited demagogues to fill the gap.

warned, "a lower range of thoughts and

a

a

leaders abdicated their proper
As a result, the Courier

lower range of human propensities"

would govern, leading inevitably to anarchy and "the man on horseback.

1,22

The managers of the Massachusetts Union campaign showed that they never

understood why the Whig party had disintegrated in the crucible of recent
events.

Their orators defended protectionism and the Southern trade without

understanding how narrow and antique this appeared in 1860.
Federalists, the Bell-Everetts lauded their lack of

a

Sounding like

platform.

Platforms,

they argued, debased political morals and brought into office the unworthy
and the unreliable.

As in the days of Washington and Adams, voters ought to

select the most virtuous men and let them judge matters of substance.

The

Unionists argued that they would stand on the Constitution pure and simple
and let their opponents-- like demagogues—woo the masses with promises and

policies.

23

This Olympian attitude opened the Bell-Everetts to penetrating Republican

criticism.

Whose Constitution did they stand on?

and Webster's or Taney's or Breckinridge's?

Wilson asked.

Was

it

Clay

Andrew attacked the conservatives
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for their simplistic belief that by merely
declaring loyalty to the Union
the conflict over slavery would disappear.

It was an insult to the popular

mind, Andrew declared, when party leaders
taught that great issues should
OA

not be debated in public.
Republican ridicule of the Bell-Everett ticket bit
deep.
Re P ub1ican called

away in a box."

^

The Springfield

"worthy to be printed on gilt-edged satin paper and
laid

The Atlas and Bee compared attempts to resurrect the Whig

party to William Miller's prophecy of the end of the world.

But despite the

ridicule and the Unionist organizational problems, the
Republicans still

recognized the Bel 1-Everetts as a potential threat in the November
25
election.

Ill

Massachusetts Democrats travelled comfortably to their party's convention
in Charleston on a boat specially chartered for the occasion.

They brought

a

brass band to help them pass time on their cruise South and to entertain the

delegates who would assemble in Institute Hall to select
date.

a

presidential candi-

But when the band stopped playing and the business of politics took over,

little harmony prevailed among the Massachusetts delegates.
It was not the Massachusetts Democrats who were in a quarrelsome mood.

As a minority party, they recognized that their only chance for success lay in

maintaining their own unity while they hoped for divisions among their opponents.
But they were inevitably drawn into the bitter struggle between the friends of
Stephen A. Douglas and those of President Buchanan.

administration's efforts to make Kansas

a

Douglas had opposed the

slave state and had steadfastly

maintained his allegiance to popular sovereignty.

In

return, the administra-

tion had waged a persistent campaign to defeat Douglas for re-election to the
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Senate; and, when this failed, Buchanan's allies
in the Senate had stripped

him of his chairmanship of the Committee on the
Territories.

determined to be avenged; and with the support of

Douglas was

vast majority of Northern

a

Democrats he set out to win the Democratic presidential
nomination. 26
The local conventions that selected the Massachusetts delegates
ex-

pressed their overwhelming support of Douglas and expected their
representatives to vote for him in Charleston.

But these delegates found themselves

between the conflicting demands of their constituents and of their
patron,
Buchanan.

It is not surprising that a majority of them chose the latter; for

Massachusetts voters rare]y elevated

a

Democrat to

a

lofty position.

A

Massachusetts Democratic politician set his sights on the Post Office and the
Customs House.

And Emerson's harsh remarks about federal office holders of

the period was not far off the mark.

They were sneaks, he wrote, "who read

the administration paper every day and loudly defend the last measure of the

Government."

On

the first ballot at Charleston, only eleven of the twenty-

four Massachusetts delegates supported Illinois'

"Little Giant."

The rest

cast their votes for Virginia Senator Robert Hunter and for Jefferson Davis.

Delegates from eight Southern states seceded from the convention after

failing to get a platform favorable to

a

slave code for the territories.

After fifty-seven bitterly deadlocked ballots, the Democrats adjourned to

meet in June at Baltimore.

Again many of the Southern delegates withdraw;

but this time they were joined by a number of Northerners.

Among them was

majority of the Massachusetts delegation, including its leading figuresCaleb Cushing, Benjamin Butler, Benjamin Hallett, and George Loring.

The

Massachusetts seceders maintained that they had left because of the convention's refusal to seat Hallett.

(Butler added another argument—he could

a

27

.
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not sit in a body where the African
slave trade was openly advocated.

Douglas supporters in the hall laughed
raucously at Butler's sudden

scruples)
But these arguments were insufficient to
explain why the Massachusetts

delegates-alone among New England Democrats-joined
the anti-Douglas convention.

A more plausible explanation concerns the
influence of Caleb Cashing,

whose loyalty to the administration was reenforced
by his ambition for
seat on the Supreme Court.

a

Shortly before the Baltimore convention the

administration had informed Cushing that his appointment
to the Court was
likely, should an expected vacancy materialize.

Here was

a

tangible prize

28
that a lame duck administration might tender to a faithful
servant.

Cushing had presided at Charleston and at the original Baltimore
Convention; now he became the president of the seceders.

His lieutenant, George

Loring, nominated Vice-President John Breckinridge for the presidency with
the promise that Massachusetts "will stand by the South in her struggle for

constitutional rights."

On the evening of June 23, the rival

Democratic

gatherings chose two separate presidential candidates— Breckinridge and

Douglas— leaving many office holders and voters with

a

painful decision.

Cushing helped the office holders in Massachusetts make up their minds.
His correspondence for the summer of 1860 was filled with reports on the

loyalty of federal appointees to the Breckinridge candidacy.

wavered found themselves quickly unemployed.

Those who

Butler also enthusiastically

endorsed this policy, maintaining that the removal of Douglas supporters
"would do us more good in organizing than anything else."

newspapers endorsed Breckinridge:
held a federal office.

30

Six Massachusetts

in each case either its editor or publisher
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The Boston Post was the leading Breckinridge
organ.

Its campaign

rhetoric took it far from the loco-foco
egali tarianism that had once

characterized the Massachusetts Democracy.

Unlike Republican papers which

lauded their candidate's humble origins, the
Post ridiculed Lincoln as
common rail splitter.

a

In justifying slavery it cited the "same
immutable

laws" that made some men kings and others
subjects, some rich and others
poor.

"Such social distinctions are the lot of mankind
and doubtless permitted

by Providence for the good of society."

Attitudes like this placed the Post

and its allies well beyond the tolerance of most
Massachusetts Democrats.

Delegates who failed to support Douglas at the conventions
returned to hostile
local constituencies.

Democratic meetings throughout the Commonwealth de-

nounced the Breckinridge men as doughfaces who had bowed to
Southern extremism.
When Butler tried at

a

Lowell meeting to explain his recent actions, angry

Douglas supporters shouted him down.

31

Massachusetts' Douglas Democrats were so intent on attacking the

Breckinridge wing of their own party that they had little energy left to
assault the Republicans.

The Boston Herald

,

a

penny-paper whose daily circu-

lation of 50,000 made it the most widely read newspaper in New England, de-

nounced the Vice-President as the candidate of the slave code and disunion.
The Pi lot

,

which labeled Buchanan as desperate and vindictive, warmly em-

braced Douglas as an old friend of the Irish.
Irish was evident

when— avowedly

mother—he stopped for speeches

Douglas' popularity among the

on his way to Vermont to visit his aged
in Boston and Worcester.

Though the charge

by administration Democrats that Douglas was leading his followers into the

"pit of Abolitionism" was obviously far fetched, there was little doubt that
the Douglas Democrats would not suDport the Breckinridge stand on slavery.

32
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IV

"There is

a

crack in the Democratic Party," the Springfield
Republican

crowed, "and there is a nigger in that crack, and
the nigger cannot be got

out of it."
.

.

Asserting that the Republicans would put "the nigger question

where the interests of the white man of this country demand," the

.

Republican assured its readers that their party was united on important
matters.

But although Massachusetts Republicans attempted to keep their

differences from public view, radicals and moderates continued their struggle
to shape the direction of the party.

33

The strain between the party's factions increased when, on June fourth,

Charles Sumner rose in the Senate to give his first major address in over

four years.

"The Barbarism of Slavery," as Sumner called his speech, was

a

comprehensive indictment of the Southern institution designed to place the
Republican party on

a

firm antislavery footing.

Sumner argued that the

presidential campaign, like the struggle against slavery itself, was no

"holiday battle," but rather "a solemn battle between Right and Wrong,

between Good and Evil."

Such

a

battle could not be fought with rosewater.

Sumner was confident that the Republican voters of the North were more' enlightered than many of their political leaders; now was the time to ensure
that

a

Republican victory meant more than merely

a

change in place-seekers.

He suspected the motives of many of those entrenched within the party organiza-

tions—men who "use principles

as counters by which they keep tally."

that the Republicans lost than that their ideals became prostituted.

Better

34

"Barbarous in origin, barbarous in law, barbarous in spirit, barbarous

wherever

it shows itself, Slavery must breed Barbarians."

Sumner spoke
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passionately as Southern Senators sat
glowering.
Republican moderates.

Such rhetoric worried

Would it invite another violent Southern
response

that could upset well-laid political
strategy?

The uncompromising language

obscured the fact that the substance of Sumner's
speech was well within the
bounds of acceptable Republicanism, for its
primary thrust was a paean to
free labor.

Sumner's arguments were familiar.

Unlike the free institutions

of the North which promoted prosperity for all
men, slavery-based on the

appropriation of all the toil of its victims-enforced
ignorance, immorality
and

a

contempt for the dignity of labor.

The South enjoyed

a

substantial

advantage over the North in navigable rivers, in climate, in
arable land;
but its development had fallen far behind,

"Slavery plays the part of the

Harpy, and defiles the choicest banquet," Sumner declared.

Though the popu-

lation of the two sections had been nearly equal in 1790, the
North now had

twice the inhabitants.

Massachusetts alone, despite its small size, con-

tained more real property than Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida,
and Texas

combined.

The slave states lagged in all areas of education but

were most conspicuously negligent in providing public education for the common
man.

A Northern Negro was more likely to receive education than

Southern white.

poor

35

Outside of Sumner's own circle, Republican leaders
unenthusiastic about the speech.

in

Massachusetts were

The Springfield Republican

its eloquence, doubted the address'

liberty."

a

,

though admitting

"present usefulness to the cause of

An acquaintance of Charles Francis Adams wondered if Sumner might

not have overdone his medicine considering "the delicacy of the patient's

stomach."

And Adams, himself, though he refused to judge Sumner by the standard

of ordinary politicians, wondered about the expediency of the speech.

Sumner

Ill

was depressed by this lack of support, and
perceived an effort to read

him out of the party.

"I

expect very little and ask nothing," he wrote

Pierce; "but it seems hard that there is not

a

single paper in Boston-

if in Massachusetts—which does by me as papers
in other states do by their

Senators."

36

But Sumner's friends were determined that the speech
have the impact its

orator intended.

Thaddeus Hyatt, Frank Bird,and E.

L.

Pierce mailed out

thousands of copies of the address, especially to rural areas of
New England
and the upper Mid-West where Sumner was popular.

Bird, though he held no

political office, enjoyed strong influence in the legislature which he used
to obtain a resolution praising Sumner for his "thorough, truthful, and
com-

prehensive examination of slavery."

The radicals mentioned Wilson in the

resolution as well; Pierce explained to Sumner that this would induce the

junior Senator "to maintain cordial support for you."

By mid-summer popular

response throughout the rural North was strongly favorable to "The Barbarism

of Slavery," and Sumner was convinced he had enjoyed

a

great triumph.

Massachusetts' radicals longed to be rid of Governor Banks and replace
him with one of their own.

opportune time for such

a

But they doubted that a presidential year was an

divisive intra-party contest.

"Warrington" lamented that Massachusetts had never had

governor; Banks, he said, grudgingly yielded to the
the state without ever sympathizing with it.

In a July column,
a

genuine antislavery

antislavery sentiment of

"Warrington" suggested that John

Andrew would be an ideal governor but that 1861 should be the year to fight
over the control of the Massachusetts Republican party.
But during the sumner Banks decided to accept

a

38

lucrative position with

the Illinois Central Railroad rather than to seek re-election.

The governor
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wanted to keep his decision secret until
the eve of the state convention,
hoping that he could retain control over
the party and hand the gubernatorial

nomination to Henry Dawes, the moderate
Congressman from Berkshire County.
C.

Russell Train, an eastern Massachusetts
Congressman privy to the plan,

advised Dawes to run:

"Andrew will be urged by the Plug uglies; but
his

nomination in my opinion would strengthen the
Bell ringers by the thousands."
William Claflin,

a

state Senator and chairman of the Republican State
Commit-

tee, heard of Banks' plans and immediately went
to Sumner.

jumped from his chair exclaiming:

"Give me my boots.

the next governor of Massachusetts."

The Senator

John Andrew must be

Soon Sumner and other members of the

Bird Club were out convincing the delegates to the state
convention of

Andrew's virtues.

Their success, despite opposition from the major Republi-

can newspapers is testimony to the influence of radical antislavery at the

grass-roots level of the party.
his opponents 330.

At the convention Andrew gained 723 votes,

The radicals were ecstatic.

Not only had they placed

one who shared their ideals within reach of the governor's chair, they had
on

delivered a rebuke to the "little joker" Banks.
Initially, the moderates- conplained about Andrew's victory.

Samuel

Bowles, who had been active in promoting Dawes, wrote that the Republicans'

enemies would make much of Andrew's "John Brown sympathies and speeches, his

Garrisonian affiliations,

.

.

.

his Negro-training predil ictions.

"

The

nomination, Bowles thought, should have gone to someone who had remained

a

Whig until the formation of the new Republican organization; for this im-

portant element in the party was seriously under-represented in important
offices.

The Republ ican

'

s

publisher complained that the old Freesoilers--

"bold, radical, clever and grasping"— now controlled everything of importance.

,
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The anti-Republicans inevitably played
upon the theme of Andrew's
radicalism.

The Pijot accused him of justifying
"the torch of the incendi-

ary whenever there is a colored man who
does not enjoy civil and political

rights equal to

a

white man."

The

C ourier

solemnly predicted that if Andrew

became governor he would appoint Wendell Phillips
to the Supreme Judicial
Court.

And Democrats sang an obscene anti-Negro jingle
that ended:
Tell John Andrew
John Brown's dead.

In the face

of this attack, Republicans thought it best to smooth over

their differences for the duration of the campaign.
Dawes to speak in Andrew's behalf at

a

Henry Wilson persuaded

Boston Rally.

the endorsement of the conservative Boston Journal

,

he were elected he would keep Frank Bird in line.

Andrew, hoping to get
made assurances that if

Out on the stump Andrew

assured the voters that he was radical "not in the sense of destructi
veness
but radical in the honest cause of preserving

.

.

.

the good and the true."

Conservative Republicans likewise saw the virtue in unity.

The Advertiser

was soon making the implausible defense that Andrew was no more an abolitionist than most of the Be 11 -Eve re tts. 42

Republicans of all stripes were anxious to prove that their success would
not result in civil war and that talk of Southern secession was merely for

political effect.

In a

Framingham speech, Sumner listed seven occasions when

slave state politicians had employed the disunion menace:

during the discussion

of the slave trade at the Constitutional Convention, during the Jay Treaty, the

Missouri Compromise, the Nullification crisis, the gag law controversy, the

Wilmot Proviso, and the election of 1856.

Sumner assured his audience that

there was nothing to the threats "which should not be treated with indignant

contempt."

Andrew echoed this theme.

Such little disunionism as existed in
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the South was "stimulated by Northern
speculators in national politics

practicing on Southern apprehensions."

And should disunionists make an

overt move, the South had Union men enough
to drive them into the Gulf of
Mexico without Northern aid. 43
Republicans also sought to blunt the Democratic claim
that they sacrificed the interests of white men in favor of Negroes.

Some Republicans argued

that colonization was the best way to end the Negro
question and suggested
Haiti as

likely destination for American blacks.

a

This policy, they claimed,

would bear rich political fruit by attracting slaveless
Southern whites to the
Republican party.

Other Republicans emphasized their party's policy of allow-

ing each state to regulate its own Negroes without interference
from the outside.

A.

Bullock, a Worcester Republican speaking at Faneuil Hall, turned

M.

the Democratic charges against them.

He argued that Republicans had attempted

to legislate in the interests of the white man.

deavored to obtain

a

homestead bill, or

a

But "whenever we have en-

little encouragement for our domes-

tic industry," he complained, "they have filed before us, every mother's son of

them, bearing

business."

a

Negro upon his back.

They have kept him between us and our

We have had Negro administrations long enough, the Newburyport

Herald wrote; it is time the white man had his chance. 44
Radicals as well emphasized slavery's impact upon whites.

Though they

eschewed the conservatives' racism, they sought to avoid the impression that
their primary concern was with blacks.

Andrew continuously emphasized that

the real question of the campaign was whether "all poor men shall be slaves

or all slaves shall be made free."

Nothing but universal white suffrage had

prevented the frank advocacy of the ownership of white labor; nothing but free
schools and the free press had prevented

a

Dred Scott decision for white men.
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Andrew warned

working-class audience in Boston that, if
the Republicans

a

lost and the slave forces extended their
influence, there might well come
a

Supreme Court decision that, by permitting
slavery in the North, would

ruin the white laboring man.

"The power of the Supreme Court to argue the

colored man out of the Constitution," he advised,
"may argue you out of it
and me out of it

Boston pursued

benefits of

a

a

.

.

.

tomorrow."

similar theme.

Henry Wilson, speaking to artisans in East
He presented himself as an example of the

free labor system, but warned that slavery had "degraded
the

white laboring man of the South and dishonored the white
laboring man of the
North."

45

During the presidential campaign, Charles Francis Adams visited Worcester
to speak at a political

rally.

While there he stayed at the home of John

Curtis, the proprietor of a clothing store and

rather ordinary man inspired Adams to write
of the Massachusetts middle class.

a

a

staunch Republican.

This

glowing testimony to the virtues

Adams noted that Curtis, who lived in his

neat, comfortable house with his intelligent wife and his one daughter, was

quiet and well mannered.

"This is the type of

a

class which are scarcely to

be found outside of New England," the Massachusetts Congressman maintained;

they constitute the great buttress of our Republican organization."
Adams'

46

faith in the middle class' devotion to Republicanism was shared

by most of his colleagues.

For the middle class understood the dignity of free

labor, was jealous of its free institutions and respected the moral influence

of the pulpit and the press.

It suffered neither from the corrupting influences

of great wealth nor from the degradation of poverty and ignorance.

The

Republicans' most enduring nightmare was that their diverse enemies--those on
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either end of the economic spectrum-might
coalesce to provide
front of greed and immorality.

Republicans anticipated

a

a

united

national alliance

of "the Cambridge scholar, the Southern
slave-driver, and the Chicago bully."
On the local

level

they feared the "timid capitalists of Beacon
Street join-

ing hands with the roughs of North Street and
Pig Alley," the ruffled shirts

working with the no-shirts.

The large cities were the most likely place such

an unholy alliance would emerge; for there
lived large numbers of "dependent,

ignorant, vicious classes" as well as "silver spoon
aristocrats."

Republicans

were well aware that they had never carried

Sumner

a

majority in Boston.

commented that the proslavery sentiment of the cities almost
justified

Jefferson's sentiment that they were sores on the body politic. 47

Throughout the summer, Republicans watched as their opponents— especially
those in Boston— attempted to organize a fusion ticket.

Ineffectual divided,

these anti -Republicans had some chance for success if they combined.

Their

historical model was the Coalition of 1850 which had driven the Whigs from

power and had ushered in

a

new era of political life in Massachusetts.

Many

upper-class gentlemen overcame their long-standing distaste for the Democrats
in the face of

what they perceived to be

administration— bad

as it might

ties o^ Republicanism.

of

a

be— was

national emergency.

a
a

The Democratic

known quality, unlike the uncertain-

Edward Everett, in particular, became

coalition with the Democrats; at least "there is

about the Democratic party," he maintained.

a

a

strong supporter

savor of nationality

Noting that the Democrats had

muted their traditional economic radicalism, the Massachusetts business com-

mumty

was receptive to cooperation.

48

Many Democrats reciprocated in their desire for
Pi lot

a

fusion ticket.

The

even offered to join with former Know-Nothings to oppose the Republican
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menace.

"When a house is on fire," its editor
wrote, "all the neighbors,

without distinction of race or faith, rush toward
it,
property."

to save life and

Even after the three anti-Republican parties
selected candidates

for governor in early autumn (Bell-Everetts
crats, Erasmus

D.

,

Amos Lawrence; Douglas Demo-

Beach; Breckinridge Democrats, Benjamin Butler),
there was

hope for agreement on

a

common ticket.

Both Beach and Lawrence were eager

to withdraw in favor of a suitable alternative. 49

But the bitter feud among the Democrats destroyed the
possibility of
common gubernatorial candidate or

a

a

united slate of presidential electors.

Douglas men were enraged by the administration's ruthless purge of
the post
offices and custom

houses.

Caleb Cushing further antagonized them with

speeches that urged the South to resist by any means

Benjamin Butler, believing that

a

a

Lincoln victory.

Republican victory was inevitable, argued

that the primary objection of administration Democrats ought to be the preser-

vation of their organization.

Consequently, he worked to frustrate fusion by

antagonizing potential allies.

One of Butler's prime targets was Amos Lawrence

whom he attacked as John Brown's treasurer.

And when the Boston Herald

for its numerous advertisements by "no cure, no pay" physi

Douglas, Butler dismissed it

ci

— noted

ans--endorsed
50

as

a

"venal

and venereal sheet."

Though the three factions could not agree on state-wide candidates, there
was fusion in several Congressional districts and in many local races.

important combination was in Boston.

In one district,

The most

anti-Republicans sup-

ported Democrat Erastus Bigelow--inventor of the power loom and founder of the

carpet business that still bears his name--to oppose Congressman Alexander Rice.
In the

second Boston district Whig industrialist William Appleton stood against

incumbent Anson Burlingame.

The advocates of fusion argued that Boston would

be judged by the men that it sent to Congress and that her current
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representatives were ill-equipped to work in
the city's interests.

Their

"one idea policy" drove away business
patrons, destroyed the home market,

and provoked non-intercourse movements
in the South.

The Anti-Republi cans

argued that the balance of power in the next
Congress would lay with

Southerners, and that they would be unlikely
to listen to
appeal for assistance to Massachusetts'

industry.

a

Republican's

Appleton's candidacy most

clearly resembled the coalition that Republicans
had long dreaded.

When the

Hera1d recommended this millionaire manufacturer
to its Irish readers, it was

more than many Republicans could bear.

Burlingame,

a

former Know-Nothing

whose political career had addressed itself to the anxieties
of Boston's

native-born middle class, responded with

a

vigorous attack on Appleton's

a

fusion candidate occurred in the

wealth and his low born supporters. 51

Another important contest involving

Worcester Congressional district.

There, the anti -Republicans supported incum-

bent Eli Thayer, referred to by his critics

Massachusetts Republicanism."
Aid Society, had once been

a

as

"the Benedict Arnold of

Thayer, the moving force behind the Emigrant

respected figure among anti slavery circles,

but, once in Congress, he began to support Douglas" popular sovereignty.

He

voted for the admission of Oregon without explicit prohibition of slavery and
CO

opposed a Republican effort to repeal the New Mexico slave code.

Thayer defended his record vigorously, arguing that he was not obligated
to treat the party platform like the Scriptures.

But Worcester County was

the most antislavery region in Massachusetts and its Republicans were deter-

mined to purge themselves of this "King of Squatters Sovereignty."

At their

district convention, only eight of the 146 delegates voted for Thayer's renomination.

The leaders of the Massachusetts Darty, Adams, Sumner, and Wilson,
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came to Worcester to speak against the
apostate.

relished the task as

a

Sumner, especially,

way of purifying the party's ranks.

He warned

the district's voters that Thayer's
record as their representative had

made them "parties to an odious crime" and
urged them to elect the Republican nominee, Goldsmith Bailey. 53

VI

On November sixth, Massachusetts Republicans
enjoyed a landslide triumph.

Lincoln received 106,533 votes, about sixty-three percent
of the ballots cast.
Douglas trailed with 34,370 votes, Bell received 22,332, and
Breckinridge
6,105.

In virtually every area of the Commonwealth, outside
of Boston, the

Republicans received

a

substantial majority of the votes— more than ninety-

percent in some homogeneous rural communities.

Despite predictions that

Andrew's radicalism would antagonize many conservative voters, the Republican

gubernatorial candidate came within two thousand votes of Lincoln and captured sixty-two percent of the vote.

seven percent, but received

a

In

Boston, Lincoln polled only forty-

plurality over each of his opponents.

The

city's mercantile community" generally supported Bell; its Irish remained loyal

to Douglas.

The only compensation for the anti-Republicans was William

Appleton's narrow victory over Burlingame.
In

54

the thirty years prior to 1860, Massachusetts had voted for the winning

candidate in only two presidential elections.

She had been alienated from the

policies of the national government during most of these years and few of her
leading men had served in important federal posts.
Lincoln, Massachusetts'

abrupt turn.

But with the election of

relations with the national government would take an

As a leading Republican state she would have new influence in
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Washington; her antislavery statesmen would now
be eligible for offices
of public trust.

The power of the national government which
previously

had upheld slavery could now be used to
promote the interests of the free

working man.

Massachusetts Republicans were determined that this
opportuni-

ty not be lost.
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CHAPTER VII
CONGRESSMAN ADAMS AND GOVERNOR ANDREW

During the month of November, Massachusetts
Republicans, intoxicated
by their victories, refused to concede
the significance of the events
that were unfolding in the Cotton States.

They were in no frame of mind

to recognize the existence of a real
national

crisis.

Most Republicans

believed the campaign argument that their
party's victory would entail no
threat to the Union.

To accept the premise that the election of

a

Republi-

can president in itself could create political
chaos, would be to question
the very validity of the party and to strip the
election triumph of its

sweetness.
On the evening of November

voted to hold

a

9— the

very day that South Carolina had

secession convention— Massachusetts Republicans crowded

into Boston's Music Hall to celebrate the coming of the new administration.

Henry Wilson was one of the principle speakers, and as he went to the podium
he undoubtedly reflected upon the long years and ceaseless effort he had

committed for this moment. At such
modest nor moderate:

a

time he was disposed to be neither

"Tonight, thanks be to God, we stand with the Slave

Power beneath our feet.

That haughty power which corrupted the Whig party,

strangled the American oarty

,

and used the Democratic party as

crushed to the dust and our heel is upon it."
the paramilitary Boston Wi de-Awakes, gave

a

Charles Slack,

a

a

tool, lies

leader of

speech rife with belligerency.

He warned that, if the Southern "farce" threatened the inauguration of

Lincoln, he and his men would "resume our arms and we will see him triumphant:

borne to his post."

But neither Slack nor any other Republican present that
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evening suggested that anything had
happened-or was likely to happenthat required reaction from their
party.

Anson Burlingame remarked that

the Southern Congressmen resigning
their seats were like men biting off

their own noses:

"There is nothing in the Constitution
1
to prevent this."

With engaging irony, Massachusetts
Republicans glorified the constitutional system that settled conflicts
through elections rather than through

violence.

Speaking in Concord, Sumner asserted that
the past election would

be a lesson to the world:

"It will be good news to Garibaldi in Italy,
good

news to the French now subjected to imperial
powers, good news to English

reformers."

The Republican victory-one "not of the
cartridge but of the

ballot-box"-was another step in the peaceful and orderly
progress of civilization.

Republicans generally believed that Southerners would
accept the

election of Lincoln as legally valid and with it the
Republicans' anti-

extensionist position on slavery.
over slavery would now subside.

Many hoped that sectional antagonisms
As naive as

these hopes appear from the per-

spective of historical hindsight, it should be remembered that
Democrats had

earlier been given to similar expectations.

Pierce and Buchanan had antici-

pated that the antislavery North would accept the Kansas-Nebraska Act and
the Dred Scott decision as the final solution to the territorial question.

2

Given these premises, it is not surprising that during November Republican
leaders urged that Southern hostility be allowed to run its own course.

Temporarily Southerners might be maddened by disappointment, but the fever

would soon dissipate.

At worst secession would be confined to South Carolina,

which would establish itself as
mold.

a

contemptible republic in the Latin American

Republicans believed they had no responsibility save that of avoiding

provocations that could aid the demagogues of disunion.

The Advertiser aptly
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summarized this position:

It rests with the Union-loving men
of the South

itself to hold their section to its duty.

Republicans were certain that

Southern Unionists would rise to the occasion. 3
Massachusetts' anti -Republicans

,

who had warned for months that

a

victory for its adversaries would spell
disaster for the Union, were quick
to perceive the reality of the secession
movement.

justified the South's actions.

Some like Caleb Cushing

In a speech at his native Newburyport,
Cushing

claimed the Republicans were attempting to reduce

a

white-man's country of

co-equal states "to the infernal depths of a black,
red, or yellow consolidated

Republic."

Referring to Wilson's recent speech, Cushing argued that,
though

Massachusetts might be under the heal of abolitionist fanatics,
the South would

rightly resist "until the soil of all sections was drenched with
blood."
for most Massachusetts Democrats, Cushing
had fought at the Charleston convention.

's

But

speech represented the treason they

They blamed Breckinridge men like

Cushing for causing Lincoln's victory and, hence, for the crisis which
the

election had created.

Some of Douglas' Massachusetts supporters

— among

them

the Boston Herald- - were not unhappy to see their most vocal antagonists
depart

from Congress.

4

But the great majority of Democrats and Old Whigs dreaded disunion.

As

November progressed and five Southern states called secession conventions,
conservatives took no pleasure in the vindication of their predictions.

Their

commercial interests, abandonment by their Southern friends, and genuine devotion to the Union, precluded satisfaction.

also felt

a

pang of guilt.

Perhaps these anti-Republicans

They had so long warned of the unconstitutional

abolitionist principles of the "Black Republicans" that they may well have
played

a

role in pushing their Southern friends over the brink of secession.
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Now the Hunkers argued that Lincoln's
views on slavery were essentially

those of the Whigs and that the
Republicans had obscured this fact during
the campaign merely to keep the
radicals in line.

As a Westerner, Lincoln

was as different from Massachusetts
Republicans as Henry Clay was from

William Lloyd Garrison.

Edward Everett was among those taking
this position.

If the South remained in the Union
it would have nothing to fear.

"It is the

standing policy of the Republicans," he
observed, "to be ostentatiously
Constitutional at Washington and save their ultraism
for electioneering use
at home."

5

Massachusetts conservatives urged the South to join
with its Northern
allies and retain control over Congress.
be empty of real power.

In this

way Lincoln's office would

It was especially important that anti -Republicans

retain control of the Senate which could thwart the
appointment of
cabinet.

a

radical

Conservatives argued that, presented with firm Congressional opposi-

tion, Republicans would drop their anti slavery rhetoric in
return for posses-

sion of an intact government.
cans would soon be saying:

According to one Boston merchant, the Republi-

"Damn our principles

,

give us your offices."

Democrats and Unionists hoped that the Republican coalition would fracture
in the crucible of the secession crisis.

To this end the conservative press

emphasized every disagreement which arose among their opponents, every sign
of compromise or hesitation.
existed.

Sometimes they invented differences where none

Thus in mid-November, when Lincoln remarked that Republicans should

hold no harsh feelings against those who voted against him, the Courie r

trumpeted the incident under the banner "Massachusetts Republicanism Thoroughly
Ignored."

The paper argued that to conform to Lincoln's views, Massachusetts

Republicans would have to deny votes to Negroes, forbid intermarriage, segregate
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the public schools, and repeal the
Personal Liberty law. 6

II

The conservative strategy was aided by an
escalating commercial panic

which was engulfing the entire Northeast.

Boston's merchants-timid in the

best of times-had visions of their imminent ruin.
be terminated?

Would the cotton supply

Would Southerners repudiate their debts?

deal directly with Europe?

Would the South

n<
)0W

Like their peers throughout the North, the

Massachusetts commercial community responded to these unsettling
questions by
calling in debts, holding on to hard currency, and refraining
from- new ventures
until

their questions were answered.

As a result, borrowers had to pay from

twelve to eighteen per cent interest as the specie reserve of Boston's
banks

shrank to dangerously low levels.

By December first there was widespread

fear that the Bank of England might suspend specie payments to the United

States, an action that could precipitate
tous panic of 1857.

a

disaster far worse than the calami-

7

Despite these alarming signs, Boston did not suffer from the financial
chaos that affected New York.

The Springfield Republican attributed this to

the fact that there was "more speculation, more recklessness, and more thought-

lessness on Wall Street than on State Street."

But

a

more likely explanation

was that the Massachusetts economy was not so thoroughly dependent on the

Southern trade as New York's.

On the Boston stock market Massachusetts' banks

and railroads lost little value, though few shares were traded.

The stock of

several leading textile companies dropped from fifteen to thirty per cent,
but this decline reDresented fear for the future rather than current distress.
In

December the New England mills were able to purchase huge quantities of

cotton at prices that ware actually lower than they had been the month before.
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Though

a

few mills ran on half or three-quarters
time, there were no major

failures and no widespread unemployment.

Most mills enjoyed heavy orders

from the West and were able to pay
shareholders their regular dividends.

Merchants in the export trade found their
ships filled with Western grain due
to the poor harvests in Europe.

But to the shoe industry, already suffering

from a serious depression, the secession
crisis was a further blew.

The Boston

Commercial Bulletin reoorted that during the
closing weeks of the old year

"scarcely

a

hammer struck" in the Massachusetts shoe towns. 8

Thus conditions varied in the Massachusetts economy
during December.

Certainly business was not as prosperous as in normal times,
but neither was
it in a state of collapse.

The atmosphere was one of apprehension, and this

uncertainty bode ill for Republicans.

Conservatives offered visions of

a

ruined New England— its factories competing with the pauper labor
of Europe,
its ships rotting at their wharves, its streets filled with
unemployed workmen,
all

because of the fanaticism of antislavery agitators.

In a heated address

Caleb Cushing asked his commercial audience:
Have your stocks fallen?
Have you no market?
Do you have to pay two per cent
per month for the use of money?
All

these evils, he suggested, were the result of Republican intransigence over

,

slavery.

9

Such rhetoric brought heavy pressure on Republican Congressmen to compro-

mise with the South.

Henry Gardner, writing to Charles Francis Adams, inac-

curately portrayed the economic situation

in

Boston as worse than 1857 and

warned that the panic would "engulf everyone who owns or owes anything." Another

correspondent warned Adams that soon the value of New England real estate would
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be but one-third its present value.

tight.

Adams, himself, knew that times were

The empty federal treasury was
unable to pay full Congressional

salaries and Adams was hard pressed to
meet his mortgage payment on some
Boston property.

But responding to a mill owner who urged
compromise, Adams

advised that the money panic "is sheer fright
and has no necessary connection

with the political struggle.
any event."

People must eat and drink and wear clothes in

He predicted that the manufacturer would
soon rehire the workers

he had discharged.

Adams'

view of the panic.

But though they might argue that all the economic
diffi-

comments were representative of the Republican

culties stemmed from unscrupulous speculators and that the
"bonds of commerce"

would withstand any crisis, Republicans recognized that if
the economy should
worsen, they would be in serious political jeopardy. 10

At the height of the economic panic, Boston's Garrisonian
abolitionists

scheduled

a

meeting to commemorate the anniversary of John Brown's execution.

Many Bostonians, who feared that they would spend

a cold,

hungry winter of

unemployment, saw the abolitionists as an obvious target to vent their frustrations.

Vehement editorials in the local pro-Southern press encouraged these

antipathies.

The Pilot suggested that Andrew Jackson's threat to hang traitors

had settled the Nullification Crisis.

Would not the silencing of treasonous

abolitionists settle the current difficulty?

Leading Republicans such

Wilson and Andrew recognized the hazard of such

a

as

gathering, declined invita-

tions to attend, and urged its sponsors to cancel their plans.

Massachusetts'

Governor-elect , fearing violence, wrote that the meeting was "uncalled for,
wrong, and in fact
Republican

a

crime in the present aspect of our public affairs."

newspapers had agreed not to report the proceedings.

11
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But the abolitionists continued with
their plans; and on the afternoon of December 3, the John Brown
meeting convened in

Temple.

a

crowded Tremont

Among those in attendance were one
hundred blacks, including

Frederick Douglass and J, Sella Martin,
Boston's foremost Negro cleryman,
and white reformers such as Frank Sanborn,
James Redpath, and Parker

Pillsbury.

Also present were men whose sympathies did
not often lead them

to attend such events:

wealthy Salem merchant, William

C.

Rogers; Watson

Freeman, the marshal who had arrested Sanborn
at Concord; Christopher

Plunkett of the Customs House; and Amos Lawrence.

Merchants, clerks, Irish

laborers-men who were anxious to let the South know that
the Garrisonians
did not speak for Boston-filled

a

substantial majority of the seats. 12

The anti-abolitionists, leading cheers for Virginia's
Governor Wise

while they waited for the proceedings to begin, were apparently
well-organized.

When the Reverend Martin opened the meeting by calling for
Sanborn

to assume the chair,

the "broadcloth rowdies" put forth Richard S.

Lynn businessman, and declared him chairman.

Fay, a

Fay lashed out at the aboli-

tionists and pointing at the blacks in the audience warned that, if the
crisis continued, white men would "hang these gentlemen as high as Haman."
Fay drew from his pocket

a

series of prepared resolutions which declared

sympathy with the South and asserted that Bostonians had too long allowed
demagogues to disturb the peace of the city.

"They have become

a

nuisance,"

he declared, "which in self-defense shall hencetoforward be summarily

abated."

As he spoke the mob roared its approval.

Frederick Douglass elbowed his way to the podium and tried to speak.
know your masters," he shouted to the anti -abolitionists

;

"I

"I

have served the

3
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same masters as yourself."

A counting-house clerk in the
front row cursed

the speaker as a "nigger."

"If

I

were

a

slave-driver and got hold of that

man for five minutes," Douglass
exclaimed hotly,
through his skin than ever got there
before."

"I

would let more light

"He said the naked truth,"

replied Fay, "for the Negro slave-driver
is the most cruel in the world."
Douglass retorted: "Just as
a

Southern slaveholder."

taunted as

a

a

Northern dough-face is more contemptible than

Fighting broke out in the audience as Sanborn,

"white negro," tried to speak.

The manager of the Temple feared

for the safety of the building and summoned
the police, who restored order by

ejecting Sanborn and Douglass.
Later in the day the abolitionists reassembled in
Street.

a

Negro church on Joy

Wendell Phillips remarked how fitting it was that they
should find

refuge there.

He denounced the city government for failing to provide
pro-

tection, but noted that "we abolitionists are accustomed to live
without

government."

a

Lydia Maria Child applauded so passionately that she snapped

her wedding band.

The meeting passed resolutions against the afternoon mob

of "merchants and other well-dressed people," and condemned the Boston
police.
John Brown, Jr., sporting a brace of pistols, urged the abolitionists to

resist their antagonists with force; but when the assembly disbanded the

participants slipped out

a

back door.

For outside the building were

thousand

a

persons, some drunk and throwing bricks, others chasing and beating passing

Negroes, and still others urging that the church be burnt to the ground.
Despite the violence, the Boston police made only one arrest, seizing

a

Negro

boy who had tried to prevent whites from breaking the windows on his house.

1

"The Abolitionists Squelched by the Conservative Masses of Boston Who

Desire to be No Longer Misrepresented."

Under this headline, the Boston Post

130

of December 4 reported the events of
the previous day.

Conservatives ap-

proved of the suppression of the meeting
as proof that the city had no love
for Brown and that it was willing to
defend Southern interests.

In

times of

crisis, they argued, preservation of social
order took precedence over free
speech.

"Violence is often just," the Pilot remarked.

aghast at what had happened.

Republicans were

Such incidents only bolstered Southern predic-

tions that secession would create a breakdown
of law and order in Northern
cities.

This would encourage the South to believe that
the North would be

unable to withstand the challenge of the coming winter.

The abolitionists

would gain by becoming martyrs to the cause of free speech
and the Hunkers
would portray themselves as defenders of the Massachusetts
economy.

Only the

Republicans and their strategy of cooly weathering the political
storm would
lose.

During December, Massachusetts Republicans faced

a

series of municipal

elections which their antagonists sought to turn into referendums on compromise
with the South.

Anti-Republicans hoped conservatives who had supported the

Republicans in the presidential election would regret their votes and repudiate
the party that had caused the current panic.

was

a

A harbinger of their strategy

run-off election for state representative from Middlesex County.

November 6, the contest had ended in

a

On

tie; but in the special election of

November 26, the conservative fusion candidate defeated the Republican, and
captured sixty-two per cent of the vote.

15

Anti -Republicans in Boston agreed on a strong mayoral candidate in Joseph

Wightnan,

a

manufacturer

of "philosophical aDparatus," who was the Democratic

chairman of the city's Board of Alderman.

This fusion arrangement marked an

7
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abrupt departure from the traditional
alignment of Boston municipal politics.
In the past the "Parker House

CTique«~a committee of merchants-chose

candidate to run against the Democratic
organization.

a

But in the current

crisis both factions were willing to put
their differences aside.

As

Wightman noted, it was essential that the
"metropolis of New England" demonstrate to the country that "the great heart of
her citizens is sound and

conservative."

When the Republicans nominated Moses Kimball-a
strong anti-

slavery man who had once voted to deny Daniel
Webster the use of Faneuil

Hall— the issues were clearly
Wightman would be

a

drawn.

The Post declared that a vote for

vote against making Boston "the headquarters of Negro

meetings, a Negro militia, and the advocates of John Brown's raid." 16
The anti-Republican tactic proved successful.

On December 10, Wightman

defeated Kimball handily.

The Republicans, who had received forty-seven

percent of the Boston vote

a

Massachusetts

ci

month earlier, fell to thirty-nine percent.

ties— Worcester, Springfield, New Bedford,

buryport— all of which had given Lincoln
mayors.
as well

The impact of such perennial

a

Other

Lynn, and New-

majority, elected non-Republican

local issues as taxes and "grogshops,"

as the presence in some cities of "Citizens" and Temperance tickets,

make it difficult to draw any clear inference from these elections.

And

Republicans reassured themselves by remembering that their true supporters
lived in the countryside.

But clearly these elections did strengthen the hand

of those seeking to undermine the Republican position.

panic and the recent violence

in

Boston, they added

Massachusetts Congressional delegation
at Washington.

1

in

a

Along with the financial
real burden to the

the early weeks of their new session
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The Republicans who gathered for the
second session of the Thirtysixth Congress labored under conditions
that were unique in the history of

American politics.

Belonging to

the House nor the Senate.

a

minority party, they controlled neither

A hostile administration would control the
execu-

tive branch for another three months.

Forged as a party of dissent, united

more by common antipathies than by common goals,
they had little experience
in positive government.

Nevertheless, because they had made an obscure as-

sociate from the West the president-elect, the nation's
attention turned to
their Congressional caucus for some solution to the sectional
crisis.

Massachusetts' Congressmen, as well as their colleagues from other
states,

were now unsure of the exact nature of events that confronted them.
they witnessing the disintegration of the Republic?

Or were Southerners try-

ing to win by bluff what they could not achieve by the ballot?
a

Were

Were they at

crucial junction in the history of the nation or merely repeating the old

cycle of confrontation and compromise?

certain in December than

Massachusetts Republicans were less

they were immediately after the election, but they

held to certain premises.

They remained suspicious of the South'

s

especially when they read statements like that of Mississippi's A.

who wrote that "secession
but to perpetuate it

.

.

is not

.

motives,
H.

Handy

intended to break up the present government,

Our plan is for the Southern States to withdraw

from the Union for the present, to allow amendments to the Constitution to be

made guaranteeing our rights."

Republicans also hoped that secession would

remain limited to the deep South.

These states would be inherently unstable

outside the protection of the Union as they attempted to contend with their
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large servile populations.

Few Republicans would miss their
hot-blooded

representatives in Congress. 18
From the Massachusetts perspective
the most critical problem was in

Washington rather than in Charleston.

Henry Adams, who had accompanied

his Congressman father to the
capital, reported the conditions to his

brother in Boston.

The people of the city were in a state
of panic, be-

lieving that either Southerners would
attack or the slaves would revolt.
"In any contingency," young Adams wrote,
"they feel

or murdered."

sure of being ruined

Massachusetts Republicans feared that in such an
atmosphere

their tender-hearted colleagues might forfeit
the substance of their well-

earned victory.

Likewise, traitors within the Buchanan administration
might

destroy the capacity of the government before Lincoln's
inauguration.

19

The Massachusetts Congressional delegation was
proud of its own firmness.

Eli

Thayer would plead for compromise, but his colleagues no
longer

considered him

a

member of their party.

Alexander Rice might wobble under

pressure from his Boston merchant constituency; but on the whole
Massachusetts'

Congressmen were concerned with their colleagues from other states.

With

the exception of Republicans from Vermont and Wisconsin, few
appeared to pos-

sess the Puritan steadfastness necessary for the occasion.

terrible state here," Henry Dawes wrote his wife.
the knees and there is
all

to pieces before

a

"Things are in

"Our people are shaking at

great danger that the Republican party will split

the fourth of March."

He expressed his contempt for

those who chattered their teeth and shook in their boots, but assumed his

wife that "with the toothache and corns
either."

I

find it very difficult to do

The problem with his weak-kneed associates, Dawes concluded, was

that they lacked character.

20

a
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Republicans listened with ears of stone when
Buchanan delivered his
address on the sectional crisis.

The aging President denied the legality

of secession but disavowed any authority
to prevent it.

The Republicans

were far more interested in the intentions
of their president-elect; and
until

they received some indication of his views,
most were content to agree

on a policy of "respectful and fraternal
silence."

But this policy of si-

lence left public attention free to focus on
those who urged compromise.
On December 11, John J.

Kentuckyian, Henry

CI

Cri

ttenden-hoping to fill the place of his fellow

ay— proposed

a

comprehensive program for peace which

demanded that Republicans abandon the central tenants of
their Chicago platform.

Senator Crittenden urged

a

perpetual guarantee for slavery in the

South, the repeal of all personal liberty laws, and Congressional
approval

of human bondage in all territories south of the Missouri Compromise
line,

presently held or "hereafter acquired."

House of Representatives Eli

In the

Thayer resurrected the old panacea of popular soveriegnty.

He urged that

no more territories be acquired and that those presently held be allowed
to

deal with slavery as they wished.

Finally, in

a

December 17 letter to

Thurlow Weed (reported five days later in the Mew York Tribune
known his opposition to Crittenden's proposals.

)

Lincoln made

This strengthened the hand

of those opposed to concessions, but still left Republicans without
program.
crisis:

Congress had established two forums to seek
a

committee of thirteen in the Senate and

in the House.

a

a

a

positive

resolution to the

committee of thirty-three

But when these two bodies convened in mid-December, their
21

Republican members remained divided and leaderless.

Massachusetts Republicans were delighted when Speaker of the House
Pennington chose Charles Francis Adams to be the Commonweal

th 's

representative
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on the Conrnittee of Thirty-three,
the House's vehicle for sectional
mediation.

They were certain that unlike Eli
Thayer (who had lobbied for the

appointment) Adams would remain true to
Republican principles.

His anti-

slavery credentials were impressive; along
with Wilson and Sumner he was
an acknowledged leader of the Massachusetts
party.

He had been in the thick

of the anti-Texas fight, had edited
the antislavery Whi£, and had been the

Free-Soil nominee for vice-president in 1848.

But though Adams was popu-

larly identified with the radical wing of the
party-largely because of
his close relationship with Sumner-his
reputation as

undeserved.

"I

wish

I

"but it is impossible.

radical was largely

a

could be an entire abolitionist," he once wrote,
My mind will not come down to the point."

Adams

was attracted to antislavery not by the plight of the
slave, but by attacks
on the civil

liberties of white men.

The mobbing of Garrison, the murder

of Elijah Lovejoy, and the silencing of his own father
sade all had great impact on him.

dedicated conservative.

in

the petition cru-

But, on most social issues, Adams was

a

He had fought against the abolition of both capital

punishment and imprisonment for debt.

He was suspicious of the Coalition of

1850 and opposed the loco-foco constitution of 1853.

And he inherited from

his father a tenacious nationalism that was notably absent from most of the

Massachusetts radicals.

22

Adams never forgot the presidential blood that flowed in his veins.

A

childhood at St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, an adolescence

in

House, left Ihim with

He disciplined

a

sense of distance from the common man.

himself with standards of probity difficult to imagine

in

the White

the age of Watergate

But he was bitterly frustrated that he had not done more to uphold the Adams
name.

During the 1840's and 1850's his antislavery views precluded

a

federal
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appointment; at the same time he was
reluctant to appear too grasping in
the pursuit of elective office.

Nevertheless, he did serve five terms in

the Massachusetts legislature and
accepted the Free Soil vice-presidential

nomination as an honor which placed him
"somewhat near the level of mv
fathers."

2?
0

During most of the

1

850

1

s

Adams withdrew from politics to devote
his

attention to his grandfather's papers.
him the nomination for Congress.

In

1858, local Republicans offered

He accepted and won the election easily.

But the fifty- two year old freshman Congressman
was not happy in a capital

which he described as an "abomination of desolation."
expressed his frustrations in his journal:

"I

feel

In April

as if

ought to be more

I

useful and yet the opening to such an effort does not
appear.

more was expected of me than to be
into

a

a

silent member and yet

1860, he

I

I

feel

as

£
i

cannot enter

miserable scramble for the floor to talk about little things."

Adams

saw his appointment to the Committee of Thirty-three as an
outstanding oppor-

tunity to make his mark.

With some justification, he believed himself to be

one of the most able members of the House and hoped that through the committee
he could give the floundering Republicans the leadership they needed.

24

Initially, Adams' response to the secession movement had been indistin-

quishable from many of his colleagues.

"Let them secede from Congress long

enough to enable the Republicans to establish their authority in the federal

government," he wrote, "and the whole game is played."

Even after the commit-

tee had begun its work, Adams retained his belief that the crisis was manu-

factured merely to frighten the North and that the South would soon accept the

legitimacy of the Lincoln government.

He was adamantly opposed to

a

constitu-

tional amendment that would guarantee the perpetual existence of slavery.
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"To sanction such a change," Adams
wrote, "in this, the nineteenth century,
in the face of the civilized world
would be a degree of moral

which

I

would not accept even at the cost of the
Union."

degradation

Furthermore, he

believed that any retreat from the Chicago
platform would only encourage
further confrontations in the future.
Adams* first concern with his fellow Republican
committee members was

that they might prove to be excessively pliable.

eight of the Republicans supported

a

He strongly dissented when

resolution calling upon Congress to

grant concessions "promptly and cheerfully" to the South
whether or not their

grievances were just.

This was rhetoric to be sure, but for Adams it was

rhetoric that would only encourage the secessionists further.

opposed a series of measures— similar to Crittenden

l

s— put

Adams likewise

forward by

Representatives Rust of Arkansas and Nelson of Tennessee.
But Adams came to see the importance of preventing Southern unity.

The

Cotton States alone would be incapable of self-government; but with the support
of the upper

South— especially Virginia, Maryland, and Kentucky— an independent

slave-holding confederacy would be

a

formidable antagonist.

Adams consulted

closely with William Seward* during the early weeks of the secession crisis and
they both agreed that it was essential to keep the Border States within the
Union until after Lincoln's inauguration.

They hoped that, once the new

president was safely in office, the crisis would subside as Southerners recog-

mzed that

26

he had no aggressive intentions.

On December 20, Henry Winter Davis, a Marylander with Know-Nothing ante-

cedents, offered

a

proposal to the committee which

— in

Adams' words

—

"gravelled" the other Southern members like "a cannon shot clear through the
line."

Davis proposed to avoid the territorial question entirely by admitting
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New Mexico to irrmediate statehood.

This would grant to the South all
the

territory south of the Missouri Compromise
line which they had demanded,

but would not open land "hereafter
acquired" to slavery.

Adams was cool to

the plan at first, but after conferring
with John S. Watts,

lived in New Mexico for several years, he
saw its merits.

him that New Mexico was totally unsuited
for slave
ists, aware of this, would refuse the offer.

a

judge who had

Watts convinced

labor and that secession-

Thus, Davis' proposal would fit

neatly into the Seward-Adams strategy of dividing
the South, and would expose
the fact that the secessionists were not interested
in the territorial ques-

tion but were after political power.

It could serve as the Republican answer

to the Crittenden compromise, allowing the party
to appear conciliatory with-

out sacrificing the substance of the Chicago platform.

On December 29, as

the most distinguished Republican cn the committee, Adams
formally sponsored
the proposal.

He received the backing of eight of the committee's fourteen

Republicans.

More significantly, two representatives from the slave states

supported him, laying the way for the breach
Adams had hoped.

in the

Southern ranks for which

u

Adams would achieve his tactical victory at

a

heavy psychological price.

Although a few of his Massachusetts colleagues supported him (notably Wilson,
Train, Delano, and Rice) most of Adams' friends were shocked that he would

endorse such

a

concession.

Frank Bird bluntly accused him of selling out

Republican principles and warned him of the isolation he would bring upon
himself.

"Of all your truest friends," he wrote, "there is not one, with

possibly the exception of Andrew, who does not condemn the proposition to
admit New Mexico with

a

constitution allowing slavery."

E.

L.

Pierce was

even more unkind as he expressed his contempt for trimmers and reminded Adams
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of an incident from his grandfather's
life.
days of John Adams'

It had been one of the great

life when, during his stay
in Philadelphia, John

Dickinson-who had lacked the courage
to support independence-turned
to
avoid looking him in the eyes.

-An Adams never won fame in
making compro-

mises," Pierce cruelly taunted. 28
For Adams the most painful
criticism of all came from his son,
Charles

Francis, Jr.

The younger Adams was bewildered
by what appeared to him as

an abrupt reversal of his father's
antislavery stance.

As he walked the

streets of Boston he saw dark expressions
on the faces of his friends and
heard them curtly wonder if it were
possible to send

a

firm man to Congress.

He and his brother John engaged Faneuil
Hall and planned to denounce his

father's position unless an explanation was
quickly forthcoming.

He pleadingly

asked his father if he, too, were going down
Webster's unhappy path.

Was

Henry Winter Davis some kind of sorcerer that he
could convince an Adams
to support

a

measure that struck at the very vitals of Republican
doctrine?

The son warned his father against pursuing
cast me off from you."

compromise "which must wholly

Adams was able to convince his son of the wisdom

behind the strategy, but not without

you have faith even as

a

a

a

strain on the family ties.

"I

see

grain of mustard seed," Adams wrote his son.

"I

regret this more for your own sake than for mine."

29

Adams wrote numerous letters in an attempt to justify his course to

friends at home.

He explained his attempt to buy time for Lincoln and his

hope of exposing the hypocrisy of the South.

He argued that Southern hostility

to the New Mexico plan proved that it offered them nothing they did not have

by the Compromise of 1850.

He chided his correspondents for not recognizing

that true statesmen did not stand equally stiff on great issues and little
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points and assured then that his

comment

to the plan was temporary and

that he would abandon it once his
objective of dividing the South was
achieved.
But Adams' ultimate argument was
to lay his reputation on the
line.

As he told one Massachusetts radical:

"it will be necessary for

my friends to trust me, on the strength
of my former life."
allowed a tone of self- ity to emerge.
P
he wrote,

To another he

"It is a matter of regret to me,

"that after twenty years of service in
support of the principles

of freedom, the larger part of the time
at the sacrifice of all expectations
of mere political advancement, any of my
friends should entertain doubts of

my fidelity."

Despite his best efforts, Adams changed few minds
with these appeals.
During the early winter his support came almost
exclusively from conservative

Republicans like the editor of the Advertiser and-to Adams'
embarrassmentfrom Bell-Everetts.
a

But with the exception of William S. Robinson, who wrote

friendly article in the Springfield Republican

,

and John Andrew whose

support regained private, the Massachusetts radicals continued their
feverish
attack on Adams and his New Mexico proposal.

On one level

it is difficult

to understand the bitterness of the radicals' response, for Adams'
objectives

were essentially the same as theirs.

For example, in a letter to Charles

Sumner, William Claflin, the president of the Massachusetts Senate, denounced

Adams for abandoning Republican principle.

He asserted that he would prefer

to see the dissolution of the Union before yielding to the South'

Then he summed up the feelings of his radical associates:

s

demands.

"They would like to

save Virginia, Missouri, and Maryland, but do not care for the rest."

Of

course, this distinction between the upper and the lower South was precisely
at the heart of Adams'

strategy.

But the radicals' rage at Adams went deeper

than a mere difference over tactics.
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The Massachusetts radicals shared
many of the traits of the Garrisonians.

Moral perfectionists, they wereinflexible when they believed

matters of sin were involved.

Their first commitment was to the
extirpation

of inmorality rather than to the
governing of

a

pluralistic society.

They

differed from the Garrisonians in that
they were willing to seek political
remedies to moral ills; for the most
part, they were not pacifists.

Further-

more their keystone was not the immediate
abolition of slavery, but barring
its extension to the West with an eye
to its eventual extinction.

But having

seized on the territorial question as their
fundamental principle, the radicals adhered to it with

a

tenacity worthy of the most militant abolitionist.

The November election had been the radicals'
great vindication.

They

refused the contention that the source of the Republican
victory had been
complex and varied; for them it was
slavery.

a

simple referendum on the extension of

Lincoln's triumph, in Sumner's words, meant simply that all the
out-

lying territories, "so immense in extent, and destined to
the support of unknown millions, shall be consecrated to Freedom, so that the
vast outstretched
soil shall

never know the footprint of

a

slave."

Thus when

radicals considered one of their own—offered to make
this territory into

a

the

large section of

slave state, they attacked him not as one who had made

an error in political judgment but as an apostate.
a

a

Adams— whom

"I

have never experienced

more painful wrench than that caused by the intelligence that Mr. Adams

proposes to surrender New Mexico to slavery," wrote
Sumner.

a

Northampton woman to

"For God's sake send me something contradictory."

the Senator in a similar vein:
do about Adams,

I

should feel

"If ever
I

I

E.

had occasion to feel

L.

Pierce wrote

about you as

had lost the use of my faculties."

Adams'

I
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argument that he neither wanted nor
expected the South to accept his proposal

did not help him with the radicals.

They argued that it was morally

32
debilitating to make an offer one was not
willing to accept.

One casualty of the secession winter
was the old friendship between Adams
and Sumner.

The bachelor Senator dined with the Adams family
on Sundays and

emjoyed their civilized companionship.

But as the political divisions grew,

the once-pleasant conversations became
heated.

Adams was annoyed with Sumner's

intransigence as Sumner was with Adams' conciliation.

The Massachusetts

Congressman began to speculate that the Brooks attack
had affected Sumner's
ability to reason, and observed that the Senator
appeared to welcome the rush
to civil war with

a

"grim satisfaction."

course," he wrote, "the more
real

I

"The more

I

see of Sumner's political

become convinced of his inability to act

part on this great stage of human affairs."

proposed modification in the Fugitive Slave Law.

a

The two men clashed over

a

Adams urged the change but

Sumner would accept nothing less than total repeal of the obnoxious statute.
This added to Adams' suspicions.

"He seldom studies the relation of measures,"

the Massachusetts Congressman wrote.

bill

is

"The question here is not how good the

in itself, but how it compares with the present Fugitive Slave Law."

On January 12, Seward gave a speech which, though short on specific proposals,

was heavy with conciliatory phrases and extravagant praise for the Union.
Adams liked the speech; not unexpectedly, Sumner did not.
the Senator's harangue against it. Adams lost his patience.

exclaimed, "you don't know what you're talking about.

After listening to
"Sumner," he

Yours is the very kind

of stiff-necked obstinacy that will break you down if you

persevere."

lations between the two old friends were never again the same.

33

Re-
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As Massachusetts radicals began
to regard Adams as a fallen angel,

they looked toward their new governor,
John Andrew, as a source of unim-

peachable firmness.
a

letter to Sumner.

E.

L.

Pierce expressed these parallel sentiments
in

He grieved over Adams' apostasy but
rejoiced in

Andrew's inauguration.

"A man was wanted for the hour," Pierce
wrote, "and

God sent him."

But Adams and Andrew were in closer harmony
than Pierce or
the other Sumne rites realized. 34

Shortly after the November election, Andrew had
suffered

a

stroke of

apoplexy, the disease that would end his life
prematurely in 1866.

But

following a painful, primitive operation known as
"plugging," the indomitable Andrew was on his feet and eager to play his
role

national drama.

in

the unfolding

He hurried to Washington to confer with the Massachusetts

delegation and discover the drift of events and found the city
seething in
rumors and fears.

The men he talked with told of armed men drilling in the

suburbs and government employees who boasted openly that Lincoln
would never
be inaugurated.

Many Republicans believed that high officials in the

Buchanan administration— especially Secretary of War,

John B. Floyd— were

sabotaging the ability of the government to defend the capital. 35

Andrew sought out James Mason, the Virginian whose Senate committee
had recently interrogated him on the Harpers Ferry raid, in order to measure
the South's commitment to secession.

Mason told him bluntly chat Southerners

would never live under an antislavery national government and that the dissolution of the Union was inevitable.

Perhaps, the Senator suggested, the country

could be reconstructed, but only when the Northern states agreed to accept
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slavery within their own borders.

For Andrew this was confirmation
not

only of the reality of disunion but also
of the imminence of war.

realization led him to appreciate the wisdom
of Adams

1

This

strategy of accom-

modating the Border States; for surely if
they remained loyal, the fate of
the Cotton States was sealed.

Though Andrew did not publically endorse the

New Mexico proposal, he and Adams came to

a

confidential working arrangement

that would soon prove important. 36
One issue on Andrew's mind was the Personal Liberty
Law, the Massachu-

setts statute that impeded the recovery of fugitive
slaves.

Massachusetts

conservatives were agitating for its repeal and Andrew wanted
Adams' views
on the response which Republicans ought to give.

Andrew received the answer

he had wanted, for Adams believed that the laws were of
small

importance in

the sectional dispute and that the state should hold the line on
the issue.

When Andrew returned to Boston he was enraged to discover that Banks was

planning to deliver an unprecedented valedictory address in which he would
sum up the achievements of his administration and offer advice on the national
crisis.

Many of Banks'

conservative friends had urged him to use this oppor-

tunity to force his successor's hand.

When the outgoing governor spoke on

January 3, he urged the legislature to repeal the Personal Liberty Law which
he denounced as unwise and unconstitutional.

37

But Banks, off to make his fortune in Chicago, was unlikely to influence

Andrew.

In the previous

few days, President Buchanan, to the surprise of most

Republicans, had showed his resolution by upholding Major Anderson's move to
Fort Sumter and by reconstructing his cabinet with solid Unionists.

If a

doughface like the "Old Public Functionary" could muster some courage, Andrew
felt he could do no less.

After completing the routine portion of his January
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inaugural address, the new governor turned
to the matters which his audience
had come to hear.

He referred sarcastically to Banks'

veto of the Negro

militia bill, and warmly defended the Personal
Liberty Law.

He denied that

the Massachusetts statute was subject to the
opinions of other states: "It
is a naked question of right between
private persons, and of duty between the

Commonwealth and its subjects."

Massachusetts, he declared, was blameless

for the events which were shaking the Union.

The sole source for the crisis

was the reactionary elements in the South who would
not accept defeat in an

honest election.

"Those who declare they will not live peacefully within

the Union," he warned darkly, "do not mean to live peaceably
out of it." 38
On the same day that he delivered his inaugural

an alarming letter from Adams.

warned the new governor of

a

address, Andrew received

Written at the request of Seward, the letter

turn in the crisis.

"It is beyond a doubt,"

Adams wrote, "that the revolutionists have determined to take forcible pos-

session of the Government at Washington before the fourth of March, and perhaps within thirty days."

The Congressman urged that Massachusetts immediately

ready its militia to defend the capital and that on January 8-- the anniversary
of the Battle of New Orleans—the state fire one hundred guns in honor of

Andrew Jackson and the latest national hero, Major Anderson.

Adams explained

that this demonstration could serve to rally the patriotism of all parties.

But Adams also warned that these requests not be traced to him or to anyone
in Washington

lest Maryland and Virginia interpret them as aggressive acts.

"The proceedings should emanate spontaneously from the States, and not be

traced to suggestions from this quarter," he urged.

Andrew would strictly respect Adams' request for confidentiality.

As a

result, the two men, though in active collaboration, would appear to be on
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very separate courses.

Radicals considered Andrew "firm,"
conservatives

felt he was "incendiary;" likewise observers
labeled' Adams "statesmanlike"
or "vacillating" according to their
politics.

their classifications were.
setts ready for war.

Few knew how inappropriate

Andrew immediately set to work making Massachu-

He sent couriers through a raging snowstorm
to inform

the other New England governors of the threat
to the capital
to join with Massachusetts in preparing their
militias.

and urged them

He issued orders

for the military salute, telling his friends that it
was necessary to get the
people "accustomed to the smell of gunpowder." 40
Sharp entrepreneurs recognized that

creasing militancy.
Boston paper:

profit might be made in the in-

a

"CIVIL WAR IMPENDING," read the advertisement in one

"Are you familiar with the use of arms?

If not you can be

taught at the Rifle and Pistol Gallery over Morgan's Billiard Room at
Bowdoin

Square."

The Boston fencing club turned from foils and epees to

military drill.

At the same time there was

a

class in

considerable fear that the

a

state might be left without sufficient arms.

Many believed that the Secretary

of War had emptied the armory at Springfield and sent the muskets to the
South.

On January 8, popular belligerency increased when South Carolina

artillerymen fired on the Star of the West
enforce Fort Sumter.

,

a

federal steamer sent to re-

Many believed war had begun.

"Now let the laws against

treason be enforced," exclaimed the Haverhill Gazette
have denced, let them pay for the music."

.

"The secessionists

41

Andrew shared the assumption that war had begun and immediately offered
the services of the Massachusetts militia to Winfield Scott, the highest

ranking general in the United States army.

Scott rejected the offer, calling

it premature and adding that he was embarrassed to have such

a

proposal come
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to him rather than to the President.

But Andrew pursued his objective
of

preparing Massachusetts for any emergency.

He was assisted in this end by

the state's Adjutant General, William
Schouler, the editor of the Atlas and

Bee and an important political figure
in his own right.
days of the Banks' administration,
Schouler had drafted

During the waning
plan by which the

a

state's active militia (numbering about
5,500 men) would become the nucleus

of an army that would suppress rebellion.

This plan became the heart of

proclamation issued by Andrew, known as General
Order Number Four.

a

Under its

provisions each militia officer was to examine
his roll and determine the
number of men he had available for active duty.

If his company was below

strength he was to fill the vacancies; he was not
to grant discharges.
was to drill and uniform his men and ready them
for

There was some opposition to Andrew's order.
first step toward

a

He
42

a

call by the President.

The Courier called it the

military despotism; the paper claimed that Andrew's real

motive was to purge the militia of those who differed with him
and use it to
silence opposition in Massachusetts' cities.

One militia company, the Salem

Light Artillery, refused to comply with the directive, arguing that it
was
illegal to coerce

a

state to remain in the Union.

But for the most part the

militia hastened to respond, and Massachusetts became one of the first
Northern states to prepare itself for war.

43

Five days after he issued General Order Number Four, Andrew sent
to the Massachusetts legislature indicating that he wished to make

cant presentation.

In

a

a

message

signifi-

1859 when Theodore Parker departed for Italy, knowing

that he would never return home, he left an old musket
of the State House for safekeeping.

in

a

fireproof room

The weapon had belonged to his grandfather,

.
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captain of the Minutemen that had
fought the British at Concord bridge;
it had fired one of the first American
shots in the War of Independence.

Parker had willed the relic to the
Commonwealth and asked that it be
placed in the Senate Chamber as

a

symbol of the state's heroic past.

recognized the symbolism that the musket held
at
men were readying themselves as "Minutemen

a

Andrew

moment when Massachusetts

of '61" to save the nation's

capi tal

Andrew later confessed that, as he drafted his
address to the session
of the legislature which would accept the musket,
his feelings overwhelmed
him:

"I

sat down, yielded to a perfect tempest of emotions,
and wept as

had not done for years."

I

One spectator reported that cold chills ran over

him as Andrew exhorted his audience to be faithful to
Massachusetts traditions
"And if in any degenerate hour Massachusetts should falter
or quail," the

Governor exclaimed, "may some weird hand beat the old drum that hangs
beneath
the root-tree of the Senate, give aim to this arm which spoke for
liberty on
the morning of the 19th of April,

'75, and may it march before the conquering

hosts of rekindled patriotism and reinvigorated purpose."
his speech,

As he finished

Andrew— who until recently had considered himself

raised the musket and kissed its barrel.

44

a

pacifist—
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CHAPTER VIII
THE ABOLITIONISTS' VICTORY

Andrew's emotional presentation of the
Parker heirloom reflected

a

mutuality of sentiment between Massachusetts'
radical Republicans and
abolitionists that too often has been
overlooked.

Historians-following

the arguments of Republicans who
feared identification with unpopular

agitators-have emphasized the differences between
the two groups, often
to the point of obscuring their true
relationship.

To be sure the

Garrisonians were disunionists who refused to vote
because they believed
that, by participating in an election under the
Constitution, they would

acknowledge its authority over them.

They were suspicious that all politi-

cians, even those of the Liberty, Free Soil and Republican
parties, were

tainted by the institutions within which they contended.
true that even the most radical

It is equally

Republican reminded his constituency—at

least at election time—that he was not an abolitionist.

But disagreement— even violent disagreement— is not necessarily
that the parties involved do not hold many values in common.

Republicans argued vigorously among themselves.

a

sign

Certainly

And few quarrels were con-

ducted with the vituperation that marked those within the abolitionist

movement itself.

Indeed, it may be argued that, under certain circumstances,

the bitterness of a controversy increases as the opinions of participants

converge.
In

their calmer moments, both the radical Republicans and the abolition-

ists recognized that they were working for similar goals and that the work

of each was indispensable.

Charles Follen aptly described this relationship
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in a letter to Sumner.

"While you are seeking this (the advancement
of

anti-slavery principles) partly through the
medium of politics, we
Abolitionists are working for it by direct
instruction and appeal.

honor and value your position and

I

Both groups agreed that slavery was

entire nation.

They also shared

a

feel
a

"I

sure that you appreciate ours."

moral and economic disaster for the

mutual distaste for large cities, the

Catholic church, and conmercial greed.
camp.

We

Some Republicans had

am a Republican who is also an abolitionist,"

a

foot in each

declared Frank

Bird who chaired the 1857 disunion convention at Worcester.

"Liberty first

and Union afterwards, if need be," he declared; "Or Liberty
out of the
Union and over the Constitution, if it must be."

Sumner had many friends

such as Howe, Stearns, and the Childs who were active abolitionists; and

Andrew's legal work kept him in close contact with all elements of the

antislavery cause.

On many occasions radical Republicans and abolitionists

shared the platform at public meetings.

1

Garrison saw the rise of the Republicans as
was turning against slavery.

a

sign that popular opinion

During the 1850's he increasingly reprinted

the addresses of leading Republican politicians as if to demonstrate his

approval.

"If there were no moral barrier to our voting and we had

a

mil-

lion ballots to bestow," he wrote during the Fremont campaign, "we should

cast them all for the Republican candidate."
ditional

Such sentiments created ad-

friction within the already badly fragmented abolitionist movement.

Abbey Kelley Foster criticized Garrison for becoming "Republicanized
even chided Wendell Phillips for being soft on Republicanism.

Foster and her husband Stephen formed the nucleus of

a

:l

and

By 1860

political antislavery
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movement that sought to oppose the Republicans
at the polls.
came of their efforts; though it must
have been

a

Little

strange experience for

Garrison to be critiziced by political
abolitionists as

a

compromiser.

For his part, Garrison accused the Fosters
of being "unjustly severe" on
the Republicans, and disapproved of any
project that might siphon off
votes.

2

In

a

letter to Parker Pillsbury, Garrison wrote that
the Republicans

were "the hope of the country.".

By this he meant neither their political

leadership nor their principle of non-extension.

But he expressed confi-

dence in the party's following which he believed embodied
"the intelligence,
virtue, moral sentiments, and political antislavery feeling
of the North."

Garrison argued that the party was but

a

manifestation of the impact that

he and his allies had made upon Northern sentiment.

The genius of the

people would continue to rise until Republican politicians adopted abolitionism or were turned aside for men who had.
retained his belief that the Constitution was
the blood of human bondage."

Still
a

a

disunionist, Garrison

document "saturated with

As the election of 1860 approached, he became

convinced that an apocalyptic moment was at hand.

While the issue was os-

tensibly the further extension of slavery, there was in fact
struggle which "must ripen into more decisive action."

a

greater

The South was grow-

ing more desperate, more savage, more criminal; "all of this," Garrison

believed, "is

a

sign that the end is rapidly approaching."

The Republicans

would win the presidential election, the Union would dissolve, and slavery-no longer shielded by the Consti tution—would perish.

Garrison was parti-

cularly encouraged by the nomination of Andrew who represented "the highest
phase of political antislavery feeling as yet developed."

3
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Lydia Maria Child also placed great faith in a Republican victory.
"If you will enclose the monster," she wrote Sumner, "we will kill him."

Her criticism of the party was in the same vein as that of the radical
Republicans.

Thus, she was enraged when moderates failed to rally to Sumner

after his "Barbarism of Slavery" address.
very much like Sumner's.

And her estimate of Wilson was

"He has borne brave and able testament to the

truth," Child wrote, but he was forever "looking into the immediate effect
on some party, or some measure, not to the ultimate and universal effect

on the character and motives of the country."

rage at Adams'

She would later share Sumner's

apostasy.

Wendell Phillips was more vocal in his criticism of Republicans than

either Garrison or Child.

He even chided Sumner and Wilson although he

recognized them as "the very best specimens of the Republican mind."
they ever avowed their purpose to seek, as
of slavery?"

a

"Have

distinctive end, the abolition

Phillips argued that the abolitionist's mission was still

what it had been thirty years earlier--to create

a

climate of public opin-

ion in which public men could openly call for the end of slavery.

"We

have not emancipated William H. Seward, much less the black slave," said

Phillips, incensed at the New York Senator's comment that John Brown was
rightly hanged.

He did not believe that Seward actually meant what he had

said but rather that his presidential ambition had required it.
Phillips' goal
truth.

It was

to create an environment in which Seward could speak the

Phillips read Lincoln's nomination as

pre-convention temporizing.

a

repudiation of Seward's

Lincoln, he believed, was not necessarily

"better" than Seward, though he was "cleaner."

But when Phillips discovered

that Lincoln had once proposed an emancipation bill for the District of

Columbia which included

a

provision for the return of fugitive slaves, he
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indignantly labeled the Republican
candidate the "Slave Hound of Illinois."
Lincoln, he argued, would be willing
to hunt slaves "so long as the
Union,
5
the party, and the White race seem
to need it."

At one point before the 1860 election,
Phillips had argued that it

would be better for the antislavery cause
if Lincoln lost.

The Republicans,

he suggested, who agitated when they
were out of power, would be more likely
to compromise when they were in office.

Phillips was jubilant.
a

"For

the.

But after Lincoln's victory,

first time in history the slave has chosen

President of the United States," he told an audience
in Tremont Temple.

He retained his low opinion of Lincoln whom
he now described as a "pawn on

the political

chessboard."

But "with fair effort," he declared, "we may

soon change him for a knight, bishop, or queen, and sweep
the board."

Lincoln will appear to govern, Phillips predicted, but he will
only reign;

"Lincoln is in place

,

Garrison in power ."

Phillips was also enthusiastic

over the Massachusetts election, and here he had high praise for the
Republican victor.

For the first time in memory, he declared, the governor of

Massachusetts will be

a

"frank, true, wholesouled, honest MAN."

The Massachusetts abolitionists clearly believed that the Republican

victory was their victory as well.
sation of political offices.

Garrison felt free to ask Andrew to find

clerkship in the Customs House for
his nephew would like

a

This conviction extended to the dispen-

a

friend, and Phillips told Sumner that

consulate in Chile.

appointment himself in Portugal.

a

David Lee Child wanted an

In addition abolitionists offered political

advice which often mirrored that of Sumner's own political circle.

Garrison,

for example, displayed the same shock and disappointment at Adams for his
New Mexico plan, and Howe expressed his regret when Andrew decided to send
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a

delegation to the Washington peace convention.

Liberty Law was threatened, Phillips went
before
and delivered

a

long, eloquent defense.

When the Personal
a

legislative committee

The Massachusetts abolitionists

now considered themselves as men with
access to those in power.

7

II

Many years after the Civil War, Oliver Johnson,
Garrison's close associate on the Liberator
cession crisis.

It was

,

reminisced about the turbulent days of the se-

the moral

influence of the Garrisonians

,

he asserted,

that prevented the Republicans from bending under the pressure
of the moment
and submitting to the South'

s

demands.

In explaining the nature of this

influence, Johnson recalled that in the early days of the movement
he and
his colleagues wondered why the antislavery men who were elected
to Congress

found it difficult to "keep their footing" once they went to Washington.
They finally recognized that "popular idolatry of the Constitution" was
the cause.

Between what the Constitution required in the way of the pro-

tection of slavery and what it forbade in the way of opposition, there was

very little ground on which an antislavery man could stand.

"Under such

conditions," Johnson maintained,
Congress became a sepulcher, where free souls could hardly
draw a breath of life.
If Sumner, and Wilson, and Chase and
Hale did breath and do noble work there, it was only because
they found a way to break through the web which the Constitution
wove around them
That they were able to do this may have
been owing largely to the influence of the Garrisonian movement
in diminishing popular reverence for the Constitution.

....

Many conservatives would have agreed with Johnson's evaluation.
Caleb Cushing spoke of

a

When

band of "drunken mutineers" who had seized the

Massachusetts ship of state, he was referring not merely to those who had
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won elective office but also to those whom he believed
lay behind their
success.

Conservatives feared the impact of radical agitation on those

basic pillars of orderly society-respect for the Constitution
and love
for the American Union.

This fear was one of the motive forces behind

their disruption of the John Brown meeting at Tremont Temple.
Though indignant at the violation of their civil liberties, the ab-

olitionists considered the Tremont riot

a

great victory.

"The storm seems

to howl more fearfully than ever," wrote Maria Wescott Chapman, "but it is
a

comfort to have it raging where the North can see and understand."

From

the earliest days of their movement, the abolitionists recognized that the

issue of free speech was their strongest card.

Northern whites who had

been slow to comprehend the brutality of Negro slavery had more readily

understood the Congressional gag laws or the murder of Elijah Lovejoy.

The

Liberator thanked the rioters for demonstrating so clearly "the incompatibility of the slaveholding spirit, as well at the North as in the South,

with the freedom of speech and Republican institutions."

The riot occa-

sioned Phillips to make one of his most eloquent comments on the nature of
a free

government.

he declared.

"Governments exist to protect the rights of minorities,"

"The loved and the rich need no protection

....

The com-

munity which dares not protect the humblest and most hated member in the
free utterance of his opinions

...

Phillips finished this address

a

hostile streets to his home.

is only a gang of slaves."

When

phalanx of friends escorted him through

g

The secession winter was an exhilarating season for the Massachusetts

abolitionists.

Thirty years had passed since the Liberator had first

opened its doors--thirty years of struggle against overwhelming odds.

This
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small band of moral reformers had fought
the forces of organized religion,

and political authority, the wealth and
respectability of the commercial

interests, and (in Garrison's words) "the universal
brutality and ruffianism of the country."

Garrison reflected that, during these thirty years,

he and his associates had been the targets of
popular scorn and violence

and were branded heretics and fanatics.

They had been mobbed, misrepresented,

injured in business, cut off from all preferments.
Union had declared them outlaws.

Half the states in the

But now their work was vindicated.

Union which had upheld slavery was disintegrating.

In the chaos

ensue the South itself would abolish slavery and humbly beg
North in

a

free society.

to

The

that would

rejoin the

"At last the covenant with death is annulled,

and the agreement with hell broken," Garrison exclaimed.

"Hail

the ap-

proaching jubilee, ye million who are wearing the galling cnain of slavery;
for, assuredly, the day of your redemption draws nigh." 10
But concern for personal safety tempered the jubilation.
ists heard rumors of

a

Abolition-

secret organization, pledged to preserve the Union

by silencing an ti slavery agitators.

They saw in the advertising columns

of the Courie r drawings of bundled sticks which were said to call conspirators to meet.

Certainly the Courier was leading

against Wendell Phillips.

a

campaign of vilification

Its editors had always detested Phillips as a

traitor to his class, as one who squandered his Ciceronean talents on base
ends.

His speeches, the paper declared, were like tripe and onions served

on a silver platter.

The Unionists asked Bostonians to view the abolition-

ists from the Southern perspective.

What if Roman priests incited the

Irish to poison the families they served?

What if Southern incendiaries
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urged workers to burn factories or raid
banks?

And on the day before

the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society
was to hold its annual meeting,
the Courier warned that, unless city
officials halted the licentious

gathering, embittered citizens would take the
regulation upon themselves. 11

Garrison's concerns increased when he heard that
clairvoyant Mary Ann
Johnson had foreseen

plot to murder Phillips.

a

The editor of the

Liberator took the warning seriously and questioned her
husband, Oliver,
to the time and place the assault would occur.

as

Howe and Pierce formed a

bodyguard~"voluntary police," they called it-which followed the embattled
orator through the streets and slept before his door.

matory speech it took
on Exeter street.

a

After one inflam-

posse of a hundred men to get Phillips to his home

Phillips began to carry

asked him if he would use it if
former replied, "just as

a

revolver and one friend

mob burst into his house.

would shoot

I

a

a

mad dog or

a

Yes, the re-

wild bull."

12

Mobs disrupted abolitionist meetings in several towns during the se-

cession winter.

In Westfield,

Massachusetts, anti-abolitionists put

pepper on the meeting-house stove to drive out agitator

C.

C.

Burleigh;

later they burned the building to the ground to ensure that he would not
return.

In Philadelphia,

the mayor told George W.

not speak safely in his city.

Curtis that he could

Mobs prevented abolitionists from speaking

in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and in Syracuse, Auburn, and Albany, New York.

The new mayor of Boston, Joseph Wightman, virtually invited the city's

anti-abolitionists to attack the January meeting of the Massachusetts

Anti-Slavery Society.

In a

letter that was reproduced in the Boston news-

papers, Wightman refused the abolitionists' request for police protection
and informed the superintendent of the Tremont Temple that he and the

4
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officers of the Anti-Slavery Society would be
held responsible for any

disturbance.^
A motley group filled the Temple on January
24, 1861:

Breckinridge

men and Negroes, rum sellers and ministers, pickpockets
and ladies, teamsters, Garrisonians, Bell-Everetts, brokers, thieves,
and state officers,

waited with anticipation as the meeting began.

Fearful

for the safety of

the women, the organizers of the meeting had them
enter by

sage.

Young abolitionists with arms guarded the podium.

began the proceedings with

a

a

private pas-

Francis Jackson

letter from the ailing Garrison.

The absent

leader reminded his followers that "the best abolition harvests" came from

meetings that were violently disrupted.

As Jackson read, he was interrupted

by the "broadcloth rowdies" in the audience who shouted "Down with the

nigger" and cheered for South Carolina, John Bell and Charles Francis Adams.
(Sumner's friends would make note of this.

wrote Lydia Maria Child.

"He has earned his

laurels,"

"It is to be hoped that the spirits of his father

and grandfather were not there to listen.")

Some of the rioters in the

gallery threw down cushions while others sang the favorite ballad of the

Massachusetts Hunkers:

1

"Tell John Andrew, John Brown's dead."

James Freeman Clarke and Ralph Waldo Emerson tried to speak over the
tumult; the latter blamed his inability to be heard on the foreign ante-

cedents of the mob.
theme.
he said.

masters'

"I

Edmund Quincy, treasurer of the society, echoed this

guess the Irish boys here will earn their holiday pretty well,"

"Perhaps they are glad to be excused from sweeping out their
shops."

Higginson cried over the disturbance and baited his an-

tagonists as men who would "drag out and persecute the negro because they
do not dare meet a white man."

Only one speaker— Wendell Phil lips— was
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able to finish his prepared
address.

The anti-abolitionists raised
an

enormous howl when he came to the
podium, but Phillips' tactics
showed
him for the master publicist
that he was.
"I remember once, ten
years
ago in Faneuil Hall," he shouted,
"when we stood on the platform
for two
hours and did not utter a word-and
it was the best meeting we ever
held."
Then he pointed to the reporters
in the first row.
"These pencils will
do more to create public opinion
than a hundred thousand mobs.

speak to these pencils,

I

the country in our hands.

speak to a million men.

I

We have the press of

Whether they like us or not, they know that

our speeches sell their papers."

Then he lowered his voice and spoke so

that only the reporters could hear him.
as

While

The mob in the galleries, curious

to what Phillips was saying, yelled at
him to speak louder.

plied and finished his speech without interruption.

He com-

15

But after Phillips finished, the mob reignited,
and silenced the
speakers who came to the podium.

Phillips and his bodyguard slipped out

the back door to ask Governor Andrew to quell

Phillips was confident Andrew would comply.

Lincoln," he told

a

friend; "but Andrew

I

the rioters with militia.

"You know what

know well and

I

mob law will be allowed to rule while Andrew is governor."

would be disappointed.

I

think of

do not believe

But Phillips

Andrew was wary that Mayor Wightman ("a concsntra-

ted mob himself," the governor thought) had refused to act in order
to
trap him in an illegal act.

The governor had just issued General Order

Number Four, and was aware that critics charged it was
urban conservatives.

a

move to suppress

To use the militia now would only lend plausibility

to the accusation; it might cause a bloddy confrontation that could weaken

the state's ability to rescue Washington.

Andrew took

a

copy of the

8
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Massachusetts statutes from his desk and handed
it to Phillips.
me a law that gives me authority to use the
militia without
from the mayor, he asked.

a

Show

request

Phillips argued that protection of free speech

was an inherent power of the governor; but Andrew
only replied, "show
me the

statute."

Temple.

"I will

After the meeting, Phillips angrily returned to Tremont
never again speak to Andrew as long as

claimed bitterly

I

live," he ex-

6
.

Andrew sent two of his aides to urge Wightman to preserve order
at
Tremont Temple.

The mayor warned against any interference in city af-

fairs; but not to appear derelict in his duty, he called in

a

police cap-

tain and, in the presence of Andrew's aides, ordered him to arrest anyone

disrupting the antislavery meeting.

But when the Governor's men left,

the mayor ran after the captain and changed his instructions.

The police

were to break up fights but were not to discourage anyone from harassing
the abolitionists
As

the afternoon progressed the scene in Tremont Temple degenerated

into total chaos.

dium,

J7

Finally Wightman appeared, and as he walked to the po-

anti-abolitionists cheered him enthusiastically.

he had received

clear the hall.

a

He announced that

letter from the trustees of the Temple asking him to

Unhappily for the mayor, one of the trustees was at his

side and promptly branded Wightman's statement

a

lie.

In

truth they had

requested the mayor to protect their property and silence the rioters.
The meeting adjourned for supper; but when the abolitionists returned in
the evening, they found the doors

locked and police barring the way.

Cit-

ing an anonymous threat to murder Phillips, Wightman declared that there
1

would be no more antislavery meeting that day.
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During the next few days the police
raised little objection as
rowdies attacked Negroes and threw rocks
through anti slavery windows.

A crowd milled before Tremont Temple
to prevent the abolitionists from

returning and harassed passers-by with long
hair or beards.
each," explained the Post, "being regarded
as the badge of

pist.")

("Excess in
a

philanthro-

A small band of abolitionists met in
the offices of the Anti-

Slavery Society, but Quincy urged them to adjourn
quickly as "the mob may
get here before we finish."

19

"They might as well think of extinguishing fire with
alcohol," wrote
Lydia Child of the "Orthodox mob" that had disrupted
the antislavery con-

vention.

The mid-winter assaults had assisted the society in its
fund

drives to such an extent that one Republican paper suggested
that they
"could afford to hire the Courier to get up

a

mob every year."

Radical

Republicans now believed that incidents like these made compromise less
likely and that, in particular, this violence would help save the Personal

Liberty Law.

One Massachusetts legislator who had been present at the riot

stated that, though he had never considered himself one before, he was now

willing to be called an abolitionist.

Along with sixty-eight colleagues,

he sponsored a resolution to allow the use of the State House for the anti-

20

slavery convention.
Failure of the police to suppress the rioters ignited the anti-Boston

sentiment of rural Massachusetts.

Nothing could arouse the country folk

like a mob of cotton clerks and Irishmen.

"Boston is always on hand when

there is any mean, dirty Union-saving to be done," the Hampshire Gazet te

indignantly stated, "but she has never disgraced herself more than on the
present occasion."

Rural Yankees had long deplored (and perhaps envied)

163

the drunkenness, gambling, and prostitution
of the city and feared its

impact on their own sons and daughters.
nature of this concern:

Wendell Phillips defined the

"Do you say that the people of the country towns

have no interest in the streets of Boston?

You tempt the virtue, melt

the resolution, and corrupt the morals of the
Commonwealth.

11

Most scan-

dalizing to Boston's critics was the open manner with which
illegal activities were conducted.

Though state law strictly forbade liquor shops,

the Boston police rarely interfered with their business.

The state made

the law, was their attitude; let the state enforce it. 21
In

fact, many Republicans were advocating that the state should enforce

the law in Boston.

Even before the riots,

gued that Massachusetts should adopt

a

a

number of legislators had ar-

metropolitan police system which

would put the Boston police under the direct authority of

a

state agency.

According to one supporter, New York had recently adopted such

a

plan and

had enjoyed great success; "Mulligan is no more the terror of Broadway,"

Given Boston's composi tion--and especially as the Irish population grew—
it was unlikely that Republicans would ever control her government.

Thus

many believed the metropolitan police proposal to be the only way to reform
the Commonwealth's capital.

The January riots—which gave rural legisla-

tors visions of Hunker mobs storming the State House—lent impetus to the
plan.

A legislative committee convened in February to investigate the Boston

police and their behavior during the riots.

Republican members were rumors of

a

Of particular concern to the

national conspiracy which sought to

create such disturbances in order to impair the military capacity of the
North.

"Warrington" warned his readers to be vigilant.

"People generally
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treat the affairs as
a

a

mere outbreak of rowdy young men,"
he wrote.

They are very mistaken.

It was part of the Southern
rebellion.

Northern cities are full of secessionists
and traitors."

The

.

He cited Caleb

Gushing, George B. Loring, and New York
mayor Fernando Wood as being among
the leaders.

John Murray Forbes reported that he had
heard of huge sums

of money collected in the commercial
districts to suppress antislavery.
And George Hayes, the superintendent of
Tremont Temple, warned that Boston

conservatives wanted to forbid any meeting "in advance
of the Crittenden
stripe."

23

The committee investigated a letter, written by a
Boston politician,

that appeared in a Georgia newspaper.

In

it Lucius Slade,

a

provisions

dealer and one of the two Democrats in the state Senate, urged
Georgians
to remain in the Union, promising that abolitionists would
no longer disturb

their institutions.

"A John Brown meeting cannot be held in Boston now

any more than it could be in Atlanta," he asserted.

powerful organization here."

"We have got

a

;

most

Slade assured the Georgians that his associ-

ation of merchants and working men would silence the agitators and return

fugitive slaves even if blood ran in the streets.

The committee also heard

that merchant Richard Fay had pledged his $600,000 fortune for the suppression of the abolitionists and that he had received instructions from Secre-

tary Floyd.

Witnesses alleged that distiller Jonas French had hired sailors

to join the mob and that Representative Cornelius Doherty had directed an

attack on Phillips' house.

These men—along with Amos Lawrence, whom the

abolitionists believed was the real ringleader behind the mob—were summoned
to appear before the investigators.

As with the Harpers

Ferry committee,

Lawrence was able to avoid the summons; but the others reluctantly appeared.

°4
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The committee obtained little information
from these recalcitrant

witnesses.

If a conspiracy existed, none would admit
it.

They testified

that the Courier 's mysterious emblems were but
sticks representing the

thirty-three states of an intact Union.
a

Some acknowledged membership in

secret organization but insisted that its purpose was merely
social.

They described the mob at Tremont Temple as nothing but
"a good natured
crowd."

Despite

a

strong minority dissent, the committee reported against

the metropolitan police bill.

The legislators had little love for the

Boston police, but they retained respect for the tradition of local control over municipal

institutions.

But the investigation had its effect.

One of Andrew's aides wrote that the threat of the bill ("it hangs by

a

hair of Mr. Phillips' head") forced the police to become more respectful
of free speech.

J.

Sella Martin, the Negro minister, believed that the

hearings had prevented a purge of American officers in favor of Irish.

And in April the legislature gave the governor some control over Boston
mobs.

Now he could dispatch the militia on the request of twelve ag,

grieved citizens.

25

Ill

In the aftermath of the anti-abolition riots, Boston's

blacks—some

of whom nursed wounds—reflected upon their status in the Puritan Common-

wealth.

Negroes.

In

some respects, they were among the most fortunate of America's

Unlike their peers in most Northern states, they enjoyed virtual-

ly all the legal

rights of whites.

They could vote, own property, testify

in court, and ride in any railroad car for which they could pay the price of
a

ticket.

In

the twenty years before the Civil War, the legislature had
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taken several steps to uphold Negro
legal equality, including
repeal of
the law against intermarriage and
the banning of segregated schools.
When
in
a

1859, Secretary of State Lewis Cass,
citing the Dred Scott case, denied

passport to

own name.

a

Massachusetts black, the Commonwealth
issued one in its

Increasingly the rights which the state
guaranteed on paper

were transformed into reality.

Massachusetts'

Thus two Worcester barbers in 1860 became
26
first black jurymen.

In part, the favored position which
Massachusetts blacks enjoyed was

due to their small numbers.

The census of 1860 listed only 9,643 blacks

in the entire state, a figure that
represented less than one percent of

the population and that was unlikely to unnerve
white supremacists.

Fur-

thermore, the proportion of blacks in the population
had diminished in

every census Massachusetts had taken since the colonial period.
absence of any widespread fear that blacks would become
in Massachusetts society,

in the removal

areas— of

the evils

But blacks themselves were an important force

of the vestiges of legal segregation.

dom of the Bay State,

dominant force

a

abolitionists and radical Republicans were able

to convince many citizens—especially those in rural

of racial discrimination.

In the

a small

In

the relative free-

but viable community of prosperous and arti-

culate blacks arose to spearhead the struggle for equality.

97

This small group of ministers, proprietors, and professionals spawned

several memorable agitators.

Among the first was Daniel Walker,

a

dealer

in second-hand clothes, who shocked the Union in 1829 with his appeal for

armed resistance to slavery.
v/ho

Less violent was William Nell

also wrote for the Liberator

.

Nell

lead

a

an

accountant

boycott of the Boston public

schools that began in 1849 and lasted until segregation ended several years
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later.

Allied in the same effort was Robert
Morris,

a

one-time errand

boy, who studied with abolitionist
lawyer Ellis Gray Loring, and was

admitted to the Massachusetts bar.

Morris and Sumner challenged the

legality of Boston's segregated schools
before the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial

Court and were instrumental in prodding
the legislature into

action.

Similarly, blacks in the 1840's resisted
the segregation of rail-

way coaches.

Conductors had to enlist the support of white
passengers to

eject Frederick Douglass and Charles Lenox Remond
(the black president of
the Essex Anti -Slavery Society) when they refused
to move to the Jim Crow
car.

The companies finally decided that it was simpler to
discontinue

segregation than to attempt to enforce it.
But it was in resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law that
the militancy

of the Massachusetts Negro found its most significant expression.
the law passed in 1850, some fled to Canada; but

together for self-protection.

a

larger number banded

Springfield, John Brown enlisted forty-

In

four blacks into his League of Gileadites.

They signed an oath and pledged

that they would shoot to kill anyone attempting to return
slavery.

In

Boston, Lewis Hayden

Republican party, was

a

When

,

a

a

fugitive to

clothier with connections to the

leader of the Vigilance Committee which helped many

fugitives escape from bondage.

Perhaps their greatest moment was in 1851

when fifty blacks burst into a Boston courthouse, rescued the fugitive
Shadrach, and whisked him away to Canada.

29

The leaders of the Massachusetts black community showed little inter-

est in the fledgling pan-Africanism of Martin Delany and Henry Highland

Garnett.

J.

B.

Smith,

a

black New Bedford minister, was the leading
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Massachusetts pan-African spokesman;
but when he promoted

a

cotton-

growing colony in Central Africa,
he found more interest
among white
members of the Emigrant Aid Society
than among fellow blacks,
the
outspoken anti-colonizationists was
John S. Rock.
One of the most remarkable men of his times, Rock at
various times taught himself
medicine,

tag

dentistry, and law.

Rock asserted that blacks would
never allow whites to

drive them from the United States.

of the record of the black man

in

He reminded blacks and whites
alike

the American Revolution.

country as well as yours," he argued.

"This is our

"We have won our rights here, not

only by incessant toil but by shedding
our blood in its defense."

Pride

in the Negro's military accomplishments
marked a difference between many

Massachusetts blacks and Garrison.

The blacks might admire and respect

Garrison but they could not accept his views
on non-resistance.
adopted

a

policy of militancy to counteract the popular
stereotype that

they were docile and submissive.

through pride in blackness.

And they sought to engender self-respect

It was the whites,

morally degraded by their complicity
to contrast "the fine,

the full

They

in

slavery.

they argued, that were

Rock asked his brethren

tough muscular system, the rich beautiful color,

broad features of the Negro with the delicate physical organization,

wan color, and lank hair of the Caucasian." 30
But it would be mistaken to suggest that most Massachusetts blacks

were prosperous and self-confident individuals like Rock and Morris, or
that they could avail themselves of the legal

legislature had granted them.

rights which the Massachusetts

Most blacks were inarticulate and impover-

ished, trapped in ghettos which, if smaller, were no less oppressive than
those of the twentieth century.

Ante-bellum Boston knew the far side of
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Beacon Hill-the side away from
the Common-as "Nigger Hill,"
and there
the majority of blacks lived
a precarious existence.
Most worked in

positions that made them dependent
on white patronage and thus
were hesitant to join the vocal minority
in demanding social equality. 31

Oscar Handlin, in Boston's Immigrants,

argued that the city's

blacks enjoyed higher socio-economic
status than the Irish.
on the occupational

He bases this

statistics of the census returns in
which Irish work-

ers almost exclusively list
themselves as laborers, while Negroes
classified

themselves under

a

variety of trades.

But Handlin fails to recognize

that the census reflected the stated
occupation of an individual rather
than his ability to pursue it.

Many blacks undoubtedly faced the experi-

ence of Frederick Douglass who, though

a

skilled caulker, worked as

a

comnon laborer on the wharves of New
Bedford for half the wage of his trade.

And during the decades before the Civil War,
Irish were edging blacks out

of the positions which they once held.

Rock spoke to this point on the

anniversary of the death of Boston's black martyr,
Crispus Attucks.

The

blacks were losing their places, he said, because the
Irish could live on
less than any American.

Once there were black stevedores all along the

Boston wharves, but now there were few left.

A black mechanic was more

likely to find work in Charleston, South Carolina, than in
Charlestown,

Massachusetts; and woe be it to an educated black in Boston.

"The colored

man who educates his son, educates him to suffer," he proclaimed. 32

As the election of 1860 approached, Massachusetts blacks looked at

the Republicans with ambivalent feelings.

On the one hand

they had great

respect for men such as Sumner and Andrew who had worked to end
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discrimination in the Commonwealth.

The legislative record of the
past

decade indicated that antislavery politicians
could also show concern

for blacks at home.

Furthermore, blacks were naturally attracted
to

a

party that was suspicious of its own
antagonists, the Irish immigrants.
But blacks were enraged when Governor Banks
vetoed the bill dropping the

color bar in the militia, and they were well
aware of the racist elements

within the Republican party.

The Liberator copied a specimen of Republi-

can negrophobia in its "Refuge of Oppression"
section.

done with the darkies?"

"What shall be

the Springfield Republican asked; they were not

wanted in the free states and should return to Africa.

Indeed, the editor

remarked, the fact that Negroes were not eager to leave

a

society that re-

fused to accept them as social equals proved they lacked
Anglo-Saxon self33
respect.
Two influential blacks from outside the state called on voters to re-

ject the Republicans.

Frederick Douglass urged Negroes to cast their

ballots for Gerrit Smith's radical abolitionist ticket; and
a

black abolitionist from Illinois, told

a

Ford Douglas,

massive July fourth meeting at

Framingham that Lincoln was no better than John
took a more moderate attitude.

H.

C.

Calhoun.

But John Rock

He freely praised Republicans for thei^

work against the expansion of slavery, but warned that "they only go

against slavery so far as slavery goes against their interests."
gued that there was

a

He ar-

substantial difference between the position of the

New England Republicans and those in the West, though he worried that the

former might lower their antislavery standards in the interest of party
harmony.

A number of blacks were active in the Massachusetts party.

himself, had once placed second in the balloting for the Republican

Rock,

^
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nomination to

a

seat in the state House of Representatives.

would receive

a

position at the State House for his efforts
in behalf of

the Republicans.

Others formed Wide-Awake battalions and
paraded in sup-

port of the Lincoln ticket.

gauged by

Their reception in white cormiunities can
be

reporter's account of a march in Chelsea.

a

Lewis Hayden

They were "hardly

molested," he reported, as mud and brickbats were
thrown on only two or
34
*u
three occasions.
•

Whatever their attitudes before the November election,
blacks, like
white abolitionists, perceived that secession could advance
their cause.
And lacking the paci fistic scruples of the Garrisonians
with enthusiasm to

a

,

they could look

war that might break the shackles of slavery.

War

could be the theater for blacks to demonstrate their courage and to dispute at the point of

bayonet the myth of their docility.

a

Rock had prophesied this moment.

Earlier, John

"Sooner or later," he maintained, "the

clashing of arms will be heard in the country and the black man's services
will be needed."

A force of a million blacks enthusiastically bearing arms,

Rock argued, would be
In

force that white men would be "bound to respect."

a

mid-December, when Union-loving whites held

a

prayer meeting in Tremont,

blacks rushed in and shouted that the nation would have no peace until it
had done justice for all its people.

It was a

warning that few whites

heeded.

But if blacks saw opportunities in the crisis, they were also painfully
aware of the dangers.

The mob spirit which had bloodied Negro heads in

Boston was but one manifestation of

a

more insidious threat.

The compromise

advocated by conservatives struck deeply at the lives of Northern blacks.
Even radical

Republicans and white abolitionists could not appreciate the
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blacks' foreboding.

The Personal Liberty Law might seem a small
thing

to whites who could argue that it was rarely
invoked; but to a black man

it was a guarantee that a slave catcher
would not seize him as a likely

field hand.

The security that blacks felt was not in the
employment of

the law but in its very presence.

When some Republicans suggested that

the law be repealed as a gesture of conciliation to
the South, blacks felt

so much closer to bondage.

Virginia's call for

Washington was similarly ominous:

a

peace conference in

white politicians could meet behind

closed doors and barter away the rights of the black man. 36
In the eyes of Massachusetts blacks the gravest threat was

the pro-

posed Crittenden compromise and the widespread support which it had

gathered in the Commonwealth.

Not only would it expand the domain of

slavery and guarantee its existence in the Southern states, Crittenden's
plan would also require the Northern states to repeal their personal lib-

erty laws and deny blacks the right to vote.

Agitated, Massachusetts

blacks gathered at the Joy Street church to discuss their response.
T.

Downing,

a

substantial

caterer, warned that the compromise was

lude to an effort to deport all free blacks.

George
pre-

a

The North, he feared, "would

sacrifice the whole race of colored people to save the Union."

J.

B.

Smith warned his associates not to rely on whites to deliver them through
the crisis, but to ready themselves for their own defense.

tionally cried out that she hated the white man worse than

One woman emoa

dog.

Those

attending the meeting petitioned the legislature to reject the Crittenden
proposals and grant blacks "the most absolute equality in every respect."
They concluded their appeal in defiance:
the United States by any compulsion!"

37

"We will

never be driven from
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CHAPTER

IX

GOD AND MASSACHUSETTS

During the secession crisis, the Massachusetts
clergy was as deter-

mined as any group within the Commonwealth
to influence the course of
events.

Such participation came naturally; for during
the ante-bellum

years they had pressed their views on temperance,
immigration, slavery,
and all the issues which attracted concern.

Though it is a moot question

whether the clergy molded opinion or merely echoed
the sentiments of those

who owned the pews, it is unquestionably true that their
pronouncements on
public issues are an important source through which to understand
the popu-

lar mind of the nineteenth century.

In the conflicts

over slavery and

disunion, the divisions among the Massachusetts Protestant clergy
reflected
those in society at large.

Characteristic of the polarity that existed in

the Puritan Commonwealth were the views of two Boston ministers, Nehemiah

Adams and James Freeman Clarke.

Their positions indicate the boundaries

within which the debate was conducted.
Salem-born and educated at Harvard and Andover Seminary, Nehemiah
Adams became the pastor of Boston's Essex Street Congregational Church in
1834.

This stern neo-Calvinist ministered to his fashionable parish for

almost half

a

century and became an important figure with the American

Tract Society and the Board of Foreign Missionaries.
reputation for his vigorous attacks on Uni tarianism,
he considered blasphemy against Christ.

He gained a local
a

sect whose doctrine

But in the 1850's Adams discov-

ered the abolitionists as his new foe and acquired

a

notoriety that car-

ried well beyond the provincial interest in his theological disputes.
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Indeed, Adams and many Boston Unitarians
would discover that they shared

many assumptions about the anti slavery
movement.

1

Adams had disliked abolitionists for
their unsettling methods and for
their attack on established religion,
and as early as the 1830's he had

worked to minimize their influence within
the Congregational Church.

But

until he visited the South, Adams had never
expressed affection for the

institution of slavery; in 1854 he had even joined
the clerical opposition
to the Kansas-Nebraska Act.

Shortly afterward, however, he journeyed to

Georgia for his health and discovered in the slave society
many qualities

which— as

a

conservative perplexed by the rapid changes he saw in Boston-

he found attractive.

Slavery,

a

After the trip, he wrote A South -Side View of

book that was widely read and that won him

a

sobriquet that he

carried to his grave.
From the moment that "South-Side" Adams walked off his boat in

Savannah, he was impressed by the order which slavery maintained.

A black

baggage handler came up to the Northern visitor, tipped his hat, and politely asked if he could help.

"What

a

contrast," Adams reflected, "to

that troop at the Albany landing on our Western Railroad."

He noticed that

Savannah's streets were quieter than those of Boston, and attributed this
to a curfew that required blacks to be home by eight o'clock.

Adams en-

thusiastically endorsed this manner of social control and suggested that
the Northern states prevent their working men from "unrestrained and pro-

miscuous roving.'
colored race."

5

Adams described himself as

a

"lover and friend of the

But it is quite clear that he loved the Negro more because

he loved the Irish less.

Believing that every society required

a

mudsill

class to carry out its menial tasks, Adams preferred that it consist of
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Protestant blacks under restraint
than Catholic Irish at liberty.

In

the South, "respectable,
well-dressed, well-behaved colored
men" served
as

laborers, rather than Irish-a
people for whom Adams expressed
his
utter repugnance.
There were no mobs of laborers in
the South, no foreign
paupers lounging at public expense.
Southerners did not suffer from unruly foreigners who moved into
American neighborhoods and assailed the

sensibilities of decent families, forcing
3
them to move.
Adams also noted that the South lacked
the "popular delusions and fanat-

icisms"~spirit rapping, second-adventism, Mormonism,
and of course abolitionism-which he so detested

in his own society.

The North, he wrote,

suffered from "active but unrestrained minds"
which erected folly into
doctrine and held in contempt that which was sacred.
this "spawn of errors"

But the South avoided

largely because of the control which slavery kept

over the lower classes.

How often in the North did one see

master reading the Bible

to his

a

Christian

laborers in order to foster correct beliefs?

Adams disliked some aspects of slavery, especially the
slave trade with
its disruption of families; and he believed that the
Fugitive Slave Law was

overly harsh.

But he argued that for blacks, freedom in Boston was not

necessarily better than slavery in Charleston, and that abuses should not
obscure the positive aspects of slavery.

He blamed the agitation of the

abolitionists for impeding efforts to correct slavery's defects. 4
During the secession crisis, Adams doubled his efforts to combat the

antislavery mcvement.

He reissued A South-Side View of Slavery and hastily

wrote another tract supporting the Southern institution.
The Sable Cloud

,

The new work,

which Adams had the misfortune to publish only days before

the firing on Fort Sumter, omitted his earlier reservations about slavery.
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A novel of sorts, the book
portrayed slaves who wore kid gloves
and

carried red morocco Bibles and an
abolitionist who protested Southern-

bound geese flying over Bunker Hill.

Adams argued that an institution

that made gentle Uncle Toms out of
savage cannibals had the blessing
of
God and that Negroes owed their
services in payment for receiving the

blessings of civilization.

5

From his Essex Street pulpit, Adams warned
of the disaster that would

occur if the Union were dissolved.

The Union, he proclaimed, was the ark

of social order; without it, society would
have little stability.

God lay

behind the authority of the Constitution and
neither the North nor the
South would have peace outside of it.

Adams urged that the North accept

the scriptural truth that slavery was not
sinful and halt the agitation of

abolitionist fanatics.

6

Among those Adams had in mind when he criticized "abolitionist
fanatics"
was his old antagonist, James Freeman Clarke.

Slavery

When A South-Side View of

'

fl

rst appeared, no review was more devastating than that which

Clarke wrote for the

C hristian

Examin er.

Clarke argued that Adams' errors

stemmed from his "Orthodoxism," and that he was

a

prime example of how the

iron armour of dogma could make the heart turn cold and narrow.

He might

know the "difference between tweedle-dum and tweedle-dee in theology,"

Clarke asserted, but he could not understand that it was wrong to hold
in chains.

a

man

Adams was concerned more with the evils of Unitarianism than

with the immorality of slavery; he opposed

a

Christian Union with dissenting

denominations but waxed sentimental over the bonds between North and South.

7

17?

Clarke attended Harvard only

a

ence at Cambridge was not that of
a

heterodox environment.

few years after Adams; but his
experia

beleaguered Orthodox Trinitarian in

As a liberal Unitarian, Clarke
enjoyed the fresh

intellectual tides of the 1820's.

His Harvard acquaintances included

Emerson and Palfrey; his major influence
was William Ellery Channing.
leaving the Divinity School, Clarke took

a

After

post at the Unitarian Church

of Lexington, Kentucky, where he saw
slavery for the first time.

Unlike

Adams, he valued freedom over order and
believed that the essential lesson

of Protestantism was the primacy of private
judgment over church authority.
There was nothing in the system of human bondage
that attracted him;

"1

learned my anti-slavery lessons from slavery itself,"
he later wrote,
ii

"and from the slaveholders around me."

8

While still in Kentucky, Clarke dreamed of returning to
Boston to create a new kind of church, one he hoped would speak "more
to conscience
than to intellect, more to instinctive reason than to speculative
under-

standing."

In

1841, with the help of Channing, he opened his Church of

the Disciples.

Unlike other Boston Unitarian churches, the new society

was organized on the voluntary principle, by contributions rather than the
sale of pews.

Clarke wanted

as the Boston Common.

a

church that was as free and open on Sunday

9

Clarke also wanted his church to be more than merely
tarians.

a

church of Uni-

Opposed to dogmas that separated men, he emphasized the similari-

ties among Christians rather than their differences.
ans to speak from his pulpit,

bellum Boston.

a

He allowed Trinitari-

remarkable gesture for

Clarke was concerned with gathering

a

a

Unitarian in ante-

congregation based on

.
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"a coincidence of practical

purpose" rather than on doctrinal
unity.

The Church of the Disciples
held regular meetings on such
topics as
peace, slavery, prison and
educational reform, inviting lecturers
such

«

Phillips, Andrew, Howe, Mann, and
Samuel May.

Clarke himself op-

posed the Mexican War, helped
fugitive slaves, and admired John

B rown

Though not a Garrisonian-because
he believed in using the political
sys tern
and was temperamentally opposed
to Garrison's di visi veness-Clarke
re-

mained on good terms with the city's
abolitionists.

In addition, he had
(

close ties to the Boston black community
and strongly defended thlem

against their detractors.

Thus it is not surprising that Boston's
leading

Unitarian clergymen-whose parishes included
the city's wealthiest and

most conservative citizens-should consider
Clarke's church to be little
more than a "piratical flag."

10

Like his conservative counterpart Adams,
Clarke actively preached and

pamphletered during the secession crisis.
to stand firm and remain loyal

He exhorted his fellow citizens

to their antislavery principles.

Declaring

that blacks had as much right as anyone to the
protection of the law, he

wrote

a

passionate defense of the Personal Liberty Law.

had demurred at attending the John Brown meeting.

In

December, he

But after that assembly

was disrupted, he eagerly addressed the January meeting of the
Massachusetts

Anti-Slavery Society.

Free speech was

a

cherished right for

who had spent his lifetime fighting dogma.

a

minister

Free speech, Clarke declared—

his voice rising over the clamor of tne anti-abolitionists— was the only

difference between the Austria of the Hapsburgs and Massachusetts.

11
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Clarke strongly advocated that the
Southern states be allowed to
secede peacefully. Nineteenth-century
Christianity, he declared, would
not allow a brothers' war. And
the masses of the Northern people
would
reject the unprincipled demands which
was the price for the continuation

of the Union.

Clarke believed that there was little
basis for accord be-

tween Massachusetts and the states
of the lower South.

The latter had

abandoned the principles of the American
Revolution and had lapsed into
a

hopeless despotism.

He looked forward to the creation
of a new Union

of the Northern states-one which would be
so strong that no one would attack it, so just that it would attack no one
else.

At various times,

Clarke differed on whether the Southern states
needed national consent before
they left the Union and whether they could
retain federal property within

their boundaries.

On at least one occasion he suggested that the
new

slave-holding confederacy be permitted to take Washington.

But during the

crisis Clarke was consistent in his belief that the
Union was dissolved;

greed and timidity had sealed its fate.

Had the North resisted the Slave

Power ten or fifteen years earlier, the nation could have lived

prosperity, and Union.

in

freedom,

Now Northern firmness was equally essential, but

only prosperity and freedom could be reclaimed. 12

II

Though Adams and Clarke were influential figures, neither was representative of his denomination.

For Unitarians tended to be social conservatives,

while Orthodox Congregationalists— along with other evangelical Trini tarians-were generally receptive to social reform.

The various New England denomi-

nations did not separate merely along theological lines; they also drew
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upon different social classes.

One could often tell a man's
religion

by the toughness of his palms.

And when he occupied his pew on
Sunday

morning he did not leave his politics
behind.

But the structure of ante-

bellum Massachusetts Protestantism is
complex and requires further description in order to explain the Commonwealth's
response to the events
of 1861.

13

Rationalism and conservatism dominated Massachusetts
Unitarianism and
made it the religion of the acquisitive commercial
class.
course, dissenters from this path.

There were, of

Emerson and Parker found the Unitarian

creed lifeless and ventured into Transcendentalism.

Others like Clarke,

Higginson, and Samuel May, though theologically less heterodox,
championed radical social reform.

But for the most part Massachusetts Unitarians

were social and political conservatives who expected ministers to conform
to their narrow views.

May, for example, found himself without

for disobeying this unwritten rule.

a

parish

Ante-bellum New England Unitarianism

was often called "Liberal Religion;" but it was liberal only measured against
the hoary doctrines of Calvin rather than against the world in which its

members lived.
The Unitarian parishes of Boston were easily the wealthiest congregations in New England.
as

It was

the Unitarian churches that leading Whigs such

Webster and Everett, and industrialists like the Lowells and the

Appletons attended.

When Harriet Beecher Stowe arrived in Cambridge she

discovered that the Harvard trustees and professors were all Unitarians
and "the elite of wealth

arid

fashion crowded Unitarian churches."

The

ministers were themselves gentlemen, their salaries several times those of
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their peers in other denominations.
ing to the inner circle
of power.

They enjoyed the prestige
of belong-

Octavius Frothingham, whose
father

Nathaniel was among the most noted
of this ministerial group,
wrote that
it required the strength of
a saint to turn one's
back on such privileges
and champion reform.
In the towns and smaller
cities, the Unitarian con-

gregations followed

a

similar, if more modest, pattern.

Their members

consisted of the mobile upper-middle
class-bankers, merchants, and manu-

facturers-men who had the least

to fear from the new industrial

system.

Few laborers, mechanics, or farmers
belonged to their churches. 14

For Massachusetts Unitarians, the
Harvard tracts on moral philosophy
took the place of papal bulls.

Invariably their academics identified God

with the causes of Whiggery and Union.

Although the theology of Unitari-

anism emphasized the primacy of human reason,
the Harvard pnilosophers opposed the freedom of individual conscience on
matters of society.

ordinary course of things," wrote Harvard President
James Walker,

"In the
"I

cannot

help thinking public opinion to be a safer ruler
than the conceit of private judgment."

The "public opinion" that Walker and his associates heeded

was limited to a very narrow base.

15

Massachusetts Trinitarians were often social and political antagonists
of the Unitarians.

Their churches attracted the great majority of the

native-born middle class.

As a result, their politics were Republican and

their sentiments antislavery.

During the ante-bellum period, the theology

of the major Trinitarian denominations— the Methodists, Baptists, and Con-

gregationalists— grew closer until it merged into what was virtually
united evangelical faith.

a

By mid-century, most Congregationalists and
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Baptists had abandoned Calvinsim and now
resembled closely the Arminianism
of the highly successful Methodists.

During the great revival of 1858

the three sects cooperated in the
harvest of souls for Christ.

The spirit

of Christian perfectionism and
millennialism accompanying this great up-

surge in religious activity fostered
great interest in social reform.

Churchmen looked more to ethics and less to
doctrine as they espoused the
cause of the poor, the ignorant, and the
enslaved.

noted 1n Rev'valism an d Social Reform

,

As Timothy Smith has

these evangelical ministers were

well aware that personal sin often had
communal roots.

Their restless en-

thusiasm and their habit of "reducing complex matters
to simple terms"
enabled them to "cut through the dilemmas that held other
Christians back
from the campaign to free Negroes."

In

asserted themselves on public issues in
Revolution.

the 1850's New England clergymen
a

way they had not done since the

16

Of course, there was no unanimity on these issues.

ists— heirs of

The Congregational

-

the original Puritans— were arrayed into Old School and

New School factions.

The Old School retained much of its Calvinism and

the New School enthusiastically embraced the new evangelicalism.

The denom-

ination avoided formal rupture only because its diffusa organization allowed
men of varying opinions to stay within the fold.

tended to follow theological principles.

Parsons Cooke,

and editor of the Old School Boston Recorder
the New School

Attitudes toward reform

,

a

Lynn minister

believed this w?s because

relied on "independent reasoning and philosophical specula-

tion" rather than scrupulously following the Bible.

Cooke argued that, un-

like New School advocates who ignored the Bible when it differed from their
1

theories cf society, Calvinists followed the Scriptures wherever they led.

''
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The Old School argued that Christian
ministers should draw a wide
line between politics and religion.

As Cooke declared, the pulpit
ought

not be turned into "a grand electionary
theater."
allies were inconsistent on this
point.

But Cooke and his

Once they had been active sup-

porters of colonization, and they
continued to promote temperance campaigns.

The reform movements which they
opposed were those they could not

control and which threatened their
notions of social stability.

Thus they

despised the Garrisonians who, with their
anti-clericalism and anti-Sab-

batarianism, divided churches, diverted money
from "Christian programs,"
and espoused such heresies as women's rights.

It was not "promiscuous

combinations" like antislavery societies, Old School
clergymen argued, but
the Gospels as expounded by the ministry that
was "God's chosen instrument

for removing men from all sin." 18
The Old School justified its varying attitudes toward
temperance and

antislavery.

It maintained that drunkenness was a malum in se (a sin
which

in itself denied entrance into heaven), but that
slaveholding was not.

Though Nehemiah Adams' support of slavery was rare even among the Old
School,
some Congregational ists argued that because neither Christ nor his Apostles

preached against slavery that they likewise should remain silent.

The

Christian's duty, they insisted, was to bring both master and slave into
the Church.

God would resolve slavery in His own way.

19

If the Old School was the Congregationalism of Boston and Andover, the

New School flourished in the Massachusetts countryside.

Abolitionist lec-

turers who found the churches of the commercial cities closed to them were

welcomed by rural congregations, many of whom had passed resolutions affirming "no fellowship w.th slaveholders."

Still, Garrisoni anism was

-
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suspect among many antislavery
clergymen, because of the Liberator'
s
stand against participation in the
political process.

The evangelical

clergy, anxious to reassert the
church's temporal influence, strongly

believed in joining politics and
prayer.
odical

The Congregationalism a peri-

reflecting the views of the reform-minded
New School, accused

conservative ministers and Garrisonians
of falling into parallel errors.
Conservatives, who urged silence on slavery,
would strip the church of
its moral

men.

authority and deprive it of

a

great influence over the minds of

Garrisonians, by having Christians reject
political action, would

leave the nation in the hands of infidels.

Let atheism prevail

in the

20
government, warned Lynn minister John Moore, and
our doom is sealed.

New School Congregational ists did not necessarily
accept the doctrine
that slaveholding was an absolute malum in se

.

They argued that there

could be instances where an individual involuntarily
became

remained so through ignorance.

But slavery itself was

a

a

master or

"great dark,

damning sin" which blackened the entire South, and slaveholding
was primae
facie evidence that an individual had set himsel f outsi de Christian
charity-

Tn e Congregationalist denounced all

those who would graft onto the

Bible "wild and wicked theories" whether they be infant damnation, pre-

destination, or the justification of slavery.

Antislavery Congregational

ists admitted that the Apostles had not preached against bondage, but as-

serted that human progress allowed for

a

new approach.

The Apostles lived

in a heathen society and were aliens with no hand in public affairs; nine-

teenth-century Americans lived in

a

voters, and thus "part and parcel of

Christian society, were citizens and
.

.

.

the power that oppresses."

21
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Similar to the New School
Congregational ists in their attitudes
toward
slavery and reform were Massachusetts
Methodists and Baptists. Method1

ism was popular among the skilled
worklngmen of the towns and cities
and

particularly strong among the Commonwealth's
shoemakers.

With its in-

sistence of the availability of
salvation for all men, Methodism had
long
been in the forefront of the reformist
tradition of American Protestantism.
But the antislavery of the Methodist
General Conference waxed and waned

during the early nineteenth century,
and the antipathy between those of

differing views increased until
Southern churches.

1844 when it divided into Northern and

Still, New England Methodists -who were strongly
anti-

slavery- found that even the new Northern church
contained
element that urged compromise as

a

,

The New England Conference, speaking

condemned "church saving" much in the

way that radical Republicans condemned "Union-saving."

unchristian business," the paper asserted.
severs it, God will bless the division.

"If firm adherence to right

22

Edited by Daniel Wise, Zion's Herald became

Herald declared.

"Church saving is

The pure uncompromising character

of primitive Methodism must be preserved."

leadership in secular affairs.

conservative

way to maintain fellowship with co-

religionists in the Border States.
through its organ Zion's Herald

a

a

strong advocate of church

"Political action is moral action," the

The church must take the lead in reforming society lest

"adversaries of Christ" seem more interested in the welfare of mankind.

Gilbert Haven,

a

Boston evangelist who later became

the gauntlet to his fellow ministers:
has become defiled.

a

bishop, threw down

"The temple of our national life

Woe to that priest who is dumb before the defilers."
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Under such leadership New England
Methodism decreed that slaveholding

Placed the master outside Christian
fellowship and denied him the
benefit
23
of Christ's atonement.

Massachusetts

1

Baptists adopted similar positions.

Once the region's

quintessential dissenters, they joined
the mainstream of New England

Protestantism after the disestablishment of
the Congregational Church.

Except for the doctrine of infant baptism,
they became virtually indistinguishable from New School Congregationalists.

Like the New School they

had abandoned the husk of Calvinsim and
joined in the evangelical ferver

of the great revivals.

The organ of Massachusetts Baptists, The
Christian

Watchman and Reflector,

though more cautious than Zion's Herald ,

advocated reform and antislavery.

also

The work of the church, it argued, was

more than merely assisting individuals to salvation; it
included tne creation of

a

world which lived by God's laws.

The Watchman questioned the

efficacy of ending intercourse with slaveholders, but it
recognized that
slavery impeded the creation of "God's Kingdom in America."

By denying

24
the divinity of all men, slavery was an outrage to the sufferings
of Christ.

Ill

The social attitudes of Massachusetts clergymen conditioned their re-

sponses to secession.
the Union with

a

Conservative ministers watched the dissolution of

sense of despair.

They believed that secession, an affront

to law and order, threatened the basic stability of their society.

They

argued that government was an institution with divine sanction and that
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Christians were obligated to submit
to the Constitution as they
were to
follow the precepts of the Bible.
William Stearns, president of Amherst
College, outlined this view in a
sermon delivered on January
4, the
National Fast Day.

God was the supreme magistrate
of every social organi-

zation, Stearns declared:
ment.

Rebellion against

having created mankind, He then
created governa

legally constituted government, was
nothing

less than rebellion against God.

Conservatives like Stearns had obviously

traveled far from the theories of social
compact that had justified the
American Revolution.

25

Other conservatives argued that secession was

of Protestantism.

According to the Recorder

,

a

threat to the survival

only Britain and the United

States stood in the way of papal domination of the
world.
States disintegrated,

a

If the United

coalition between the Pope and other European

Catholic despots would attack Britain.

The consequences of such an event

would be far graver than the continuation of Southern slavery.
er

asked if freedom for

slavery of all mankind.

a

The Record-

few million Africans was worth the spiritual

James WaTker also viewed disunion as

a

threat to

America's spiritual health; But ne believed its source to be internal.
The country, he warned, was "fast becoming

with no common ties to bind us."

without

a

a

conglomeration of all nations

Becoming dangerously heterogeneous and

unity of purpose, .Americans directed their energies toward

material ends and turned their backs upon God's commands.

Disunion, which

would destroy the only national institutions which our people possessed,
would only hasten this tendency.

26

The conservative clergy believed that "church-hating, Bible-hating,

minister-hating abolitionists" lay behind the nation's agony.

According
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to Frederick Dan Huntington,

a

former Unitarian lately ordained
in the

Episcopal Church, unchristian
attitudes toward the South had
angered God.
The conservatives argued that
if agitators were silent and
provocative
statutes like the Personal Liberty
Law repealed, the crisis would
pass.
But although conservative ministers
enthusiastically endorsed compromise,
many would use force to keep
the South within the Union should
conciliation fail.

Indeed, talk of coercion was more
common among conservative

clergymen than among their more radical
counterparts.

'

Parsons Cooke

warned that disunion would destroy the
nation's credit and reminded his
readers of the money that the national
government had paid for Florida and

Louisiana.

It was impossible for the South to leave in
peace:

only carry with you your own property, you go
in such
the house when you vacate."

"You not

way to set fire to

a

Cooke acknowledged that no state could be

made to send representatives to Congress, but he
insisted that the revenues be collected and that federal laws be enforced.

argued

in

a

similar vein.

He compared the Union to a partnership in which

one man contributed a ship, another

fourth capital.

President Stearns

a

warehouse,

a

third

a

shop, and

a

Certainly, he argued, none of them had the right to sud-

denly withdraw his property and bankrupt the firm.
audience for the prospect of war.

Stearns prepared his

God works in mysterious ways, he asserted;

He has used the murderous passions of man to advance His own benevolent

ends.

Every man must prepare to play his role

in the

unfolding drama.

27

While conservatives mourned, reformist ministers rejoiced over the election of Lincoln.

For those who thought in millennial terms, this victory

was clearly a step toward the regeneration of America.

In a

Thanksgiving
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Day sermon in Cambridge, Gilbert
Haven assured his congregation
that
they would see the beginning of
a new Union.
"For years we have been
by-word and a hissing among nations,"
he declared; our name has
been

associated around the world with
chattel slavery.
of our government will inspire the
world.

a

But the transformatiion

Mexico and South America, which

once feared we meant to reduce them
to slaves, will now rush to become
our

disciples.

Europe will imitate us in government
and religion.

And the

prosperous North shall soon bestow its gifts
of energy, culture and piety
to the benighted South.

Haven assured.

"No distant prophecy of millennial glory
is this,"

"The day is right at hand.

It has

already dawned."

28

Despite this prediction, Haven and other reformers
soon recognized that
the nation must ready itself for a severe test.

Haven, for one, was wil-

ling to go to war rather than allow the Union to
dissolve and lose an

opportunity for spiritual advancement.

He asserted that even Jesus advo-

cated the use of force in exceptional circumstances.

Many evangelical

ministers extolled the importance of "Christian manliness" and
lectured
on the possibilities of "Progress by Convulsion."
an

Luther shook Europe like

earthquake, one Congregationalist noted, and only after bloody civil

wars did the English Puritans and the American colonists forge their own
freedom.

Some antislavery churchmen echoed the conservative sentiment

that government was ordained by God, and that Christians were required to

uphold it.

The Watchman and Reflector wrote that secession could lead to

anarchy with counties seceding from states, towns from counties, and wards
from towns.

Better the despotism of Napoleon, the editor asserted, than

the lawlessness of

a

Mexican state.

29
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Yet many antislavery ministers
questioned the wisdom of fighting
to
preserve the Union.
Zachary Eddy told his Northampton
congregation

that, while the laws of nations
would justify

sionists, the law of God forbade it.

which

a

civil war would bring:

a

war against the seces-

He graphically portrayed the evils

the closing of schools and libraries,

the decay of religion, "vice in
its coarsest forms," flowering regions

turned to deserts.

The crisis came from the Lord, Eddy
insisted, and men

should accept it with pious acquiescence.

It was God's design that there

should be more than one republic in the
territory where the United States
now stood; "else why should two dissimilar
and incompatable social systems

—two distinct nationalities indeed—have

been suffered to grow up?"

30

The Massachusetts clergy frequently expressed the
view that North and

South were irreconcilably different.

They asserted that the North repre-

sented piety and virtue, and South sin and degradation.

Some like Gilbert

Haven argued that this disparity gave the North an obligation
to uplift its

Southern brethren.

But others believed that the slave states only contami-

nated the remainder of the Union.

Thus one Plymouth clergyman described

the Southern states as "members already monstrosi ties

,

and never firmly

bound to the real body" which "waste its strength, cripple its energies,
and make it

a

loathsome deformity in the sight of heaven and earth."

Another

minister, speaking in Dorchester, echoed the Garrisonian argument that the
Union was disfigured by its compromises with slavery.

"All

compromise with

wrong, " he preached, "to secure whatever ends, to avert whatever peril,

inexpedient as it is unjustifiable."

is

Separation, though economically diffi-

cult, would be a small price to pay for freedom from complicity in slavery.

31
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Many antislavery clergymen
saw the secession crisis
as retribution
for national sin.
An Orthodox minister
in Watertown warned
his parishloners that God would turn
the nation upside down
to wipe out its corruptions and worldliness.
He noted a connection
between complicity in
slavery and "our atheistic,
code of trade and traffic."
Godless ambition,
lust for place, abuses of
trust, were all becoming
characteristic of
important segments of the
population.
From the perspective of their
small,
rural parishes, evangelical
ministers could clearly see the
bond between
the "Lords of the Lash" and
32
the "Lords of the Loom."

Many of these earnest Protestants
believed that excessive fidelity
to
the Union impeded loyalty to
God.
Nationalism, like materialism, could
become a substitute for religion,
a rival to Christianity.
Most New England
ministers felt more comfortable with
parochial institutions rather than
national ones.

Inter-sectional commerce and distant
politicians dominated

the Union; but on the local

level

the greatest influences were men of
known

piety, family ties, and the parish
church.

more than God," wrote Gail Hamilton,

a

"We have glorified the Union

regular contributor to the Congrega-

'

tiona1l st

-

Charles Beecher denounced those who made
God into the image of

their choosing and would worship any
fetish from
men, he declared, could justify anything.

a

Union to an onion.

Such

They would cast infants into the

33
fire to please Moloch or sell men to please
South Carolina.

During the secession crisis, Henry Ward Beecher-Charles

—spoke frequently

in Boston.

Though minister to

a

'

fcmous brother

Brooklyn parish, he re-

mained New England's most popular preacher and received an
enthusiastic
response when he denied that there was virtue in "Union for
the sake of
Union." "Even squirrels know enough not to hoard nuts
after the meat was
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out," he exclaimed at a well-attended
Boston lecture.

He compared the

original Union to an alabaster box which
contained the precious ointments

of Justice, Humanity, Liberty, and
Rectitude.
l0n
aS
hese P recious qualities are in it, I
1°
love it for
2
?
fh./"?sakes.
their
But when the alabaster box has emptied out
the o ntment
I
do not care what hand breaks the
box-it is good for nothing after
s gdne.
The idea of maintaining the Union for
beggarly
flff
sake of
Union!]
Union for honor, Union for truth, Union
for vigor in
liberty, Union for power in free institutions,
Union for humanity
and greater growth--for that I would
sacrifice almost anything in
life.
But Union without liberty, Union without humanity,
is but the
corpse of my friend, and not his living and
soul-inspired body. Bury
the corpse when the soul has gone out of
it.
Don't keep it to stink
above ground.

1°

Others contended that, while Union meant strength,
strength could be used
for evil as well as for benign ends; strength could
kill as well as give
life.

The Italians were uniting in the cause of liberty; but
Americans had

used the power of their Union to extend slavery and hunt down
helpless
fugiti ves.

The views expressed by these Massachusetts clergymen had

impact on the Commonwealth's Republicans.

a

significant

Indeed, it may be fair to say

that evangelical, reformist Protestantism— with its dislike of commercialism,

Catholicism, and slavery— was inseparable from Massachusetts Republicanism.
These Protestant divines could find no virtue in substantive compromise with
the South because they saw nothing of value for which to compromise.

They

believed that, should the Union disintegrate, New England would fall back
on its greatest

resource— the character of

its p2ople.

Henry Ward Beecher

argued that those who believed New England depended on its factories, banks,
and commerce were mistaken.

Burn down New England's buildings and her

people would rebuild better ones.

with cotton bandages.

35

New England had no need to save the Union

193
III

In its

maintained

teachings on slavery and the Union,
Massachusetts Catholicism
a

staunchly conservative position.

Though not the monolith of

Protestant fears, the ante-bellum
Catholic Church clearly lacked the diversity of New England Protestantism.
If many of its priests and intellectuals were Yankee Catholics, most
of its comnuni cants were Irish.

diocesan censorship was milder than it
would be in

If

later age, the ec-

a

clesiastical organization of the Catholic
Church allowed its leaders to
speak with an authority missing among
Protestant denominations.

And the

Church's rank-and-file-mainly peasants and
their children-displayed an

obedience toward authority quite unlike the independence
of the Protestant
Yankee.

36

It was among middle- and lower-class Protestants
that antagonism toward

Catholics was greatest.

Upper-class Protestants— those who controlled in-

dustry and held to conservative opinions— often found
Catholicism an institution they could tolerate.

They did not compete with the Irish newcomers

for either employment or homes; in many cases they made their
fortunes off
the immigrants'

inexpensive labor.

There were also social affinities be-

tween the commercial elite and the Catholic Church.

Upper-class Bostonians

frequently sent their daughters to Catholic -seminaries for their education.
John Fitzpatrick, Boston's bishop from 1846 to 1866, was

panion of Lodges, Cabots, and Lymans.

a

frequent com-

Upper-class Protestants did not fail

to notice the Church's own social conservatism, for unlike many Protestant

denominations it eschewed agitation for social reform.

Mill owners saw

Catholicism as an important instrument of social control in the developing

d
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industrial cities.

Corporations often assisted in the construction
of

Catholic churches because they attracted labor and
channeled their workers
into acceptable directions.

With its hierarchial organization, its clear

lines of authority, the Catholic Church was
organized much like the fac-

tory itself.

The Catholic emphasis on obedience to authority
was good

socialization for the mills of Lawrence and Lowell. 37
But it was the very qualities that made Catholicism
acceptable to the

upper class that made lower-status Protestants see the Church as
to their way of life.

a

threat

An ti -democratic and anti -reformist, Catholicism

seemed intricately linked to corporate capitalism and slavery.

There would

be no convent-burnings after the infamous Charles town riot of
1834, and the

dramatic success of the Know-Nothings would quickly subside after 1855.
But there remained on the eve of the Civil War deep antagonisms between

Massachusetts' Protestants and Catholics.

38

The Irish Catholics were Massachusetts' most tightly knit ethnic group.

Indeed they intermarried with native Protestants less than did the Common-

wealth's Negroes.

The Irish Catholic birthrate was the highest of any group

in the state; by the 1850's some observers were predicting that Massachusetts

would soon have

a

Catholic majority.

ical presence of the Roman Church.

Yankees increasingly noticed the physDuring Bishop Fitzpatrick's reign the

diocese acquired four Boston churches formerly belonging to Protestant sects,
a

development repeated elsewhere in the state.

"Upon the graves of the Puri-

tans have they layed their corner stones and founded their altars," the New-

buryport Hera!
was now Catholic.

complained, as it observed that the grandest church in town
39
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Catholics continued to see themselves as
an embattled minority.

They

resented the use of the Protestant Bible in
the Commonwealth's schools
and the exclusion of priests from such
public institutions as poor houses
and hospitals.

They protested the absence of their peers on
the Boston

police force and the refusal of the legislature
to grant
less funds-to Holy Cross College.

charter-much

a

And they accused Protestant charitable

organizations of snatching Catholic children and placing
them in homes

where they would be lost forever to their original faith. 40
But if New England Protestants harassed their Catholic
neighbors, Catholics were themselves insensitive to the anxieties which
their presence a-

roused.

Protestant anti-Catholicism produced

a

scurrilous literature of

seduction in the confessional and infanticide in the convent which
Richard

Hofstadter has aptly called "the pornography of the Puritans."

But Massa-

chusetts Catholics showed that they could hate no less passionately.

Pilot— the newspaper of the Boston Irish community— published

anti -Protestant

harangues that equalled the nativists for irrationality and invective.
The publisher of the Pilot

,

The
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Patrick Donahue, was born in County Caven,

Ireland, in 1811 and emigrated to Boston with his laborer father at the age

of ten.

Starting as

a

printer's devil for the Columbian Sentinel

,

Donahue

worked his way through the printing business with the tenacity of such

Protestant successes as Henry Wilson and Nathaniel Banks.

He purchased

Boston's tottering Catholic journal and transformed it into the most popu42

lar Catholic publication in the country.
Both Protestants and Catholics recognized that Donahue's Pi lot- - though

not formally controlled by the see of Boston— spoke for the Commonwealth's
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Catholic cotnnunity.

In his

role as spokesman, Donahue adopted a policy

of contention toward the Protestant majority
rather than conciliation.
He vigorously opposed Catholic assimilation
into Massachusetts' Protestant

culture.

With whom would the Catholics assimilate?

Donahue sarcastically

asked; with the Methodists, one of the three kinds
of Baptists, or perhaps,
"the anti-Bible, anti -marriage, promiscuous intercourse
folks?"

Donahue taunted Protestants where they were most sensitive.

For over

two decades Irish immigrants had been replacing the
native-born in many

areas of low income employment, especially domestic service.

Rural Protes-

tants were displaced by Irish girls who worked for lower wages.

Pilot had its own interpretation for the shift in the work force.

But the

Middle-

class women feared that Protestant girls with their inferior moral training,

would seduce their sons and husbands.

Thus they preferred to employ virtu-

ous Catholic girls who would not offer such temptation.

played upon Protestant fear of Catholic domination.

Donahue also

He exulted in the birth

rate among the Irish and reported that, although the foreign-born were only

twenty percent of the population, they accounted for forty percent of the

marriages.

These statistics, Donahue proclaimed, pointed to the end of

the Anglo-Saxon era in Massachusetts and the beginning of
ty.

a

Catholic majori-

"The reason why Americans of Anglo-Saxon blood do not marry," he con-

tinued, "is an unwillingness to labor for the support of

happiness to be derived from
denial

required."

a

a

family, as the

family will not compensate them for the self-

Protestant women did not appreciate the nobility of giv-

ing birth to an immortal soul; their husbands generally were impaired by

pre-marital debauchery.

44
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For Catholics, American Protestantism
was
chism.

a

kind of theological anar-

They argued that denominational
chaos was merely the inevitable

result of the rejection of the True
Church.

Protestants, the PTIot as-

serted, believed in "the right of every
human being to make
for himself."

a

religion

Catholics saw an intimate connection between
religious

heresy and social reform. "Whenever
you find
Pilot, "you find an anti-hanging man,

a

a

free soiler," wrote the

woman's rights man, an infidel

frequently,

a

bigoted Protestant always,

teetotaler,

a

believer in mesmerism, Rochester rapping, and in every
devil

but the one who will catch him."

a

red Republican, a fanatical

Catholics were well aware that Massa-

chusetts antislavery was heavily laced with nativism.

Knowing that they

shared common antagonists with the South, their politics
gravitated towards

men sympathetic to the Southern cause.
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The American Catholic hierarchy took

a

conservative stand on slavery.

Archbishop Hughes of New York, whose archdiocese included Massachusetts,
clearly stated that slavery, in itself, was not
it was sinful

a sin.

He taught that, wnile

to reduce men to slavery, the Church did not require an owner

to return an enslaved people to its primitive condition.

All the Church

required was that the master treat his property with Christian kindness.
The Pilot argued that the only solution to the dilemma of slavery was for
all Americans to accept the authority of the Catholic Church.

influence the slave would eventually be elevated to freedom.
no indication of how long this process might take.

Through its
Donahue gave
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The hierarchy believed that its teachings on slavery could prevent the

divisions that had plaguad the Protestant denominations.

As a persecuted

minority, Catholics could not affort to fragment their strength.

They
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also hoped that their hostility to abolitionism
would be taken as

patriotic gesture.

a

Like immigrants in other periods of stress,
ante-

bellum Catholics sought to demonstrate through
fierce loyalty to national
institutions that they were as "American" as the
native-born.

After the

Harpers Ferry raid, the Pilot proudly noted that
none of the conspirators

were of Irish ancestry.

Indeed, Brown and his cohorts were all of Puritan

ancestry; they were enemies of the Catholic Church and
men who had helped
to turn New England into a "moral

and political bedlam."

Brown represented

the ultimate Protestant, the reincarnation of a
Puritan Roundhead who de-

fended his fanaticism through the heretical principal of private
interpretation of the Scriptures.

The Pilot argued that Brown was but

a

tool

in

a

British plot to impair the strength of its greatest conmercial rival. 47
But Massachusetts Catholics found themselves in

a

paradoxical situation:

for their unswerving loyalty to national institutions made them even more

unpopular within the state.

Most Massachusetts Protestants had little use

for those who placed devotion to the Union above all else.

A good example

of the Catholics' dilemma occurred during the Anthony Burns affair in 1854.
A company of Catholic militia, thinking they were acting patriotically by

enforcing

a

federal statute, aided in the return of the fugitive slave.

But in the eyes of the Protestant majority, they were acting in behalf of
an authority that was as obnoxious and nearly as alien as themselves.

Anti-

slavery men grew anti-Catholic as they saw Catholics oppose reform and
Catholics grew anti-abolitionist as they saw antislavery men become antiCatholic.
less.

Both sides were caught in

a

cycle of distrust that seemed end-
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Antagonism between Protestants and
Catholics continued unabated during
the secession crisis.
At a Saint Patrick's Day dinner
Hugh O'Brien, the
president of Boston's Charitable Irish
Society, criticized the extremism
of Massachusetts' Protestantism.
Anti-Catholicism and anti-Southernism,
he said, were the Commonwealth's
parallel

evils.

Puritan fanatics could

launch a vulgar inquisition into an
inoffensive convent or a violent raid

against

a

peaceful Southern town.

The Two-Year Amendment and the Personal

Liberty Law were twin blights on
Massachusetts' reputation.

Other Catholics

argued that Massachusetts Protestants had
never been friends of the Union.
The Commonwealth had refused to send
troops outside her boundaries in the

War of 1812 and had flirted with disunion
at the Hartford Convention.

She

had threatened to secede over the annexation
of Texas and had given only

grudging support in the Mexican War.

Irish-Americans agreed that their

own record had been far more loyal. 48

Catholics hoped that their actions during the secession crisis
would

demonstrate their loyalty to the Union.
as one of the few remaining national

Donahue believed that the Church,

institutions, might play an important

role in bringing about a re-united nation.

The Union, he declared, was

one of God's noblest handiworks and true Christians were obligated to work
for its preservation.

In

Fast Day and asked all

citizens to pray for reconciliation.

January, President Buchanan proclaimed

churches scorned the request.

a

National

Many Protestant

(Charles Beecher's congregation called it

"Bull of Excommunication for political adversaries.")

a

But Bishop Fitzpatrick

ordered every parish to celebrate the Mass and pray for the preservation of
the Union.

The Pilot would offer this as proof of the greater patriotism

of the Catholics.

49
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The

Pnot expressed

its sympathy for the Southern position.

The slave

states, it maintained, had been driven
to their desperate act by the con-

tinuing aggression of Northern fanatics.

Donahue continued to argue that

Southern slaves received adequate care and
that they were better kept in

bondage than released to compete with white
working men.

Catholics gave

enthusiastic support to the Crittenden proposals as
an equitable solution
to the sectional

dispute.

But the Pilot had only hostility for secession

and compared it to Satan's rebellion against
God.

peaceful disunion was impossible.

Donahue foresaw that

He predicted that clashes over trade

and fugitive slaves would be inevitable.

Thus he became an advocate of

both compromise and coercion— compromise if it were
possible, but coercion
in preference to the disintegration of the government.

With the seizure

of Fort Moultrie, he believed the South had crossed the Rubicon,
and he

bitterly denounced Buchanan for failing to defend the national flag.
Catholics could have but one course, Donahue maintained; they must "stand
by the Union,

fight for the Union, and die for the Union."
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CHAPTER

X

THE CONSERVATIVE OFFENSIVE

Massachusetts looked to Manrnon as well as
to God during the
secession winter.

But as the division between North
and South

widened, the economic panic-so ominous
in November-appeared to
diminish.

According to the Springfield Republican

,

the news of

South Carolina's secession was received
with "an advance in stocks,

'

a reduction in the rates of interest,
and an improved state of busi-

ness generally."

Though the Republican

's

enthusiasm was somewhat over-

stated, it was true that by mid-January many
stocks were close to their

pre-election values and that banks had returned to
comfortable specie
levels.

Interest rates, though still high, were no longer exorbitant.

1

A few Massachusetts mills slowed production—
not because they lacked

either orders or raw materials, but to avoid being caught
with large

stockpiles should

a

serious depression ensue.

industrial cities

a

few workers were discharged and some were placed on

In

Lowell and the other

an eight-hour day, but the majority of the factory operatives
continued

their long hours of drudgery as if there were no sectional crisis.

At

the same time the mills continued to pay their semi-annual dividends.

By February, the deteriorating political situation actually stimulated
some areas of the Massachusetts economy, as Southern merchants made large

orders of Northern goods to beat an impending Southern tariff.

And those

involved in the manufacture of arms and the outfitting of ships had more

business than they could handle.

2

Some Massachusetts businessmen continued to believe that their financial destruction was imminent.

One such individual was

I.

E.

Carver,

a

202

Bridgewater manufacturer of cotton
gins.

Carver reported that his

long-time Southern customers would no
longer deal with

a man

from

Massachusetts and that he would have
to leave the state to avoid
bankruptcy.
"will

He told Governor Andrew that
merchants like himself

leave the homes and the graves of
their fathers with as much

3
regret as was ever experienced by a
returned Negro."

But by the first of the year such dire
predictions were rare

even among conservatives.
a

Many businessmen recognized that talk
of

depression could easily become a self-fulfilling
prophecy.

Amos

Lawrence was among those who believed that the
worst of the panic was
over.

"There can be no general suffering here at
present," he reported

to Crittenden.

There was a hint of disappointment in Lawrence's
note,

for he warned the Kentucky Senator that the improving
economy would
lessen the pressure for political compromise. 4
The improving economy was indeed a godsend for the
Republicans.
Had Northern cities degenerated into

chaos— as Southerners hoped they

would—the Republican position would have been untenable.

But most

Massachusetts Republicans had believed from the first that the panic
was artificially contrived by speculators anxious to buy up undervalued

stocks and by conservatives seeking to create political mischief.

Re-

publicans condemned papers like the Courier and the Mew York Herald for

publishing stories that were unreasonably alarmist.

Some radical Re-

publicans engaged in economic saber rattling of their own.

They warned

the Boston commercial community that their policy of appeasement would
be considered as giving comfort to the nation's enemies; Westerners

might launch their own boycott of disloyal Bostonians.

legislature defeated

a

bill

When the state

that would allow an increase in the capital
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stock of the Granite Bank, Senator
Whitney implied that the
action was
punishment for State Street's worship
of King Cotton. 5

Republicans argued that even if the
North and South divided permanently that the two sections would
continue to carry on normal commerce.
Trade would transcend both national
boundaries and political antagonism.
Lacking industry, finance, and even
the capacity to feed itself, the
South would have no alternative but to
continue her traditional patterns

of exchange.

She could neither eat nor wear the
cotton she produced.

Republicans, who believe that Southerners
were ignorant of the value of
labor, had little fear that they could
effectively compete in those areas

hitherto monopolized by the North.

In reply to a suggestion that the

South might establish its own cotton mills, the
Atlas and Bee brusquely

replied that "they would no more know what to do
with them then the
6
Hottentots would know how to navigate one of the Cunard
steamers."

But Massachusetts Republicans prepared

a

variety of arguments in

the event that the Southern trade was suspended.

Some asserted that

austerity would be healthy for New Englanders who had become
fat in
prosperity and who had lost contact with their roots.

Venison, salmon,

and cod-fish were excellent foods, and even the old-fashioned
Massachusetts
meal of brown bread and beans was highly nutritious.

According to this

sentiment, New England would lose little if the artificial aristocracy
of money was deflated.

Others argued that Massachusetts had little need

for the Southern trade.

Most of the state's trade was with the West, and

if the port of New Orleans were closed additional commerce would come by
7

rail

to eastern cities.

But the cotton supply did concern Massachusetts.

Southern politi-

cians had long boasted that King Cotton could halt the economy, not only
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of the North, but of the
entire world.

Much as twentieth-century

Americans are enraged by the power
of Arab oil sheiks, ante-bell,
urn
New Englanders resented the
influence which Southerners had
o<
)ver
I

their lives.
problem:

But Massachusetts Republicans had
an answer to the

cotton may be king, they claimed,
but its kingdom was no

longer confined to the South.

During the secession winter, Republi
ican

journals were filled with articles on
the development of cotton culture

around the world.

They warned the South that, by raising
doubts as to

its reliability as a supplier,
it was inviting the development of
rival

producers.

Republicans pointed to India, Egypt, and Latin
America as

potential sources.

But two areas struck their imagination as
both

economically viable and politically attractive.

Charles Francis Adams,

Jr., wrote in the Atlantic that Africa
would make "cotton, and not her

children, her staple export in the future."

ment of Haiti.

Others looked to the develop-

Not only could the Negro republic provide

a

bountiful

supply of cotton, it could also absorb the runaways
who would cross the
Ohio River once secession nullified the Fugitive
Slave Act.

relished the prospect that

a

Republicans

black republic could become the downfall of

the slave-cotton economy of the South.

p

A number of Republicans hoped to eliminate the need for cotton
al-

together.

Their plan for Northern economic independence was based on

fibrilia—a cotton-like substance made of flax.
of this scheme was Stephen Merril Allen,

who had patented
flax a day.

a

a

The principle promoter

former Massachusetts legislator

machine that he claimed could cottonize two tons of

He asserted that New England farmers could grow flax for

four cents per pound, and that his machine could make it into

fiber for an additional four cents.

a

cotton-like

The delivered substance, ready for
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spinning, would be less expensive
than cotton.

By January 1, Allen
had a small factory in
operation demonstrating the
feasibility of
his plan.

Some considered the new process
the most powerful antislavery

weapon short of war.

Charles Winslow wrote his friend
Andrew that

"Southern planters are wholly unaware
of the cloud that is gathering
and
soon to break upon their system of
agriculture and slave labor." Allen
himself saw fibrilia as a national
panacea.
He reasoned that the fundamental cause of the current crisis was
the economic imbalance of the

sections.

The South had become totally dependent
on cotton; the North

had ignored agriculture and turned to
manufacturing.

As a result each

sought to control the national government and
maintain its superiority
at the expense of the other.

Fibrilia would stimulate agriculture in

the North, forcing the South to diversify
its economy and abandon

slavery.

Allen hoped that fibrilia could restore Massachusetts
to
and purer age.

Speaking to

a

a

simpler

group of Massachusetts legislators, he

reminded them of their youth when every home contained

a

spinning wheel.

But now the cottage industries had died and middlemen
stood between pro-

ducer and consumer, consuming the profits and creating an
unwholesome
class system.

Allen argued that flax raised on the New England farm and

fibrilia produced in home manufactories could re-establish the dignity
of the individual producer.

Fibrilia could strike

a

blow against the

two great enemies of free labor—the slaveholder and the mill owner.

Many Republicans—Governor Andrew among them— supported Allen's fibrilia
project.

Congressman Alexander Rice displayed

a

piece of flax cotton in

the House of Representatives and warned his Southern colleagues that
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secession would only hasten its
development.

Even Amos Lawrence,
'

though he obviously had little
desire to turn cloth-making
back
into a cottage industry, was
interested in the fibrilia
process.
Allen's scheme proved to be
infeasible, but for a time it
served
as a Massachusetts'

answer to the dictates of King
Cotton.

11

II

The most perceptive and self-interested
among the Massachusetts

industrialists believed that, despite

a

probable increase in cost and

temporary disruption in shipments, cotton
would continue to find its
way into the New England mills.
Nathan Appleton, who described himself as the largest holder of textile
manufacturing stock in the
country, wrote that if there was cotton in
the world New England money

would get it.

The major concern of Massachusetts
capitalists was not

that they would be ruined but that their
expansionist plans would be

unfulfilled.

For these men the Union represented an
economic empire

with extensive markets, cheap and plentiful raw
materials, and the
promise of greater things to come.

Unlike most small town Republicans

whose limited horizons and provincial concerns rarely
went beyond the
borders of the Commonwealth, commercial men were keenly
aware of the

economic benefits of the Union.

"It is sad to see this powerful glorious

nation," wrote Appleton, "in the midst of unparalled prosperity,
shattering itself into fragments and all out of an impractical

concerned with slavery."

idea, a nonentity

As the political crisis grew deeper, Mass-

achusetts businessmen drew together in an effort to preserve the compact
that offered them so much.

12

On February 5, Massachusetts conservatives filled Faneuil

Hall

to
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testify to their love for the Union.

They were relieved that on the

previous day Virginia had rejected
secession; but they were well aware
that while they were applauding
patriotic addresses in Boston, repre-

sentatives of the six seceded states had
met in Montgomery, Alabama, to
form a Southern confederacy.
The Faneuil Hall gathering proclaimed
that it loved the Union second only
to God.

J.

Thomas Stevenson,

a

merchant-politician, called upon antislavery men
to sacrifice their
reputations for consistency to serve the common
good.

Leverett

Saltonstall described the Union in terms that his
audience was certain
to understand.

population.

United, the nation could support fifty times its
present

It could clothe and feed the world; it had
stores of iron,

lead, silver, gold, and coal that would last
"for untold ages."

American ships could carry the commerce of the entire
globe.

Soon

But

Saltonstall warned that disunion would ruin America's greatness,
for
England would seize upon her rival's troubles to retain her hegemony.
The centrifugal effects of secession would quickly hit the
North.

Pennsylvania would demand

a

tariff and New York free trade; it would

become impossible to maintain
states.

a

union between the Atlantic and Pacific

Soon the nation would fragment into

a

score of impotent republics,

"worse than the petty municipalities of Germany."

And with the Union

would go "our wealtn, our power, our means of doing good." 13
Edward Everett was not present at the Faneuil Hall meeting, but his

absence reflected no indifference to the perils of the moment.

As one

of the foremost exponents of American nationality, Everett was crushed
as he watched the country disintegrate.
in Italy particularly humiliating.

He found the contrast with events

The United States was once an exemplar

of orderly self-government, while Italy had suffered alternately from
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anarchy and tyranny.
ing.

But under Garibaldi and
Cavour, Italy was chang-

"It is humiliating to reflect,"
Everett wrote, "that while the

Italians are healing the wounds
of ages and coming together,
we are so
soon flying asunder." For one
who had long insisted that
the American
Constitution was the glory of the world,
Everett showed little faith
that it would weather the secession
crisis. He regretted that the

United States did not have
the issue by

a

a

parliamentary system which could resolve

change in ministers.

The British, he thought would never

tolerate a minority administration like
Lincoln's for four years.
Privately he suggested that Congress
clothe General Winfield Scott with
dictatorial powers.

In peaceful

times, Everett wrote, there was safety

in a multitude of counsellors, but in
times of danger the country needed
14
"the patriotic energy of one."

Everett felt abandoned by his former Southern
allies who now rushed

headlong into secession.

"Cannot our Southern friends be persuaded to

proceed more deliberately?" he wrote plaintively to
Crittenden; "they
give us no time for healing counsels to take
effect—nor do they con-

sider in what

a

position they place their friends here."

Everett's

feelings were shared by many men with long political and
commercial

dealings with the South.

Men who had risked unpopularity by defending

Southern institutions, who had offered their Southern friends credit,

hospitality, and even their daughter's dowry, could not understand why
their efforts at conciliation were met with indifference and hostility. 15
Some ant i -Republicans became bellicose toward the South.

This was

particularly true of Douglas Democrats who still carried the political
scars of the Charleston convention.

Wrapping themselves in the mantle

of Jackson, these Democrats often outdid Republicans in their demands
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for enforcement of federal laws.

position.

Benjamin Butler also adopted this

Though he had supported Jefferson
Davis for the presidential

nomination, he now urged Buchanan
to treat as traitors the commissioners
sent by South Carolina to Washington.

Butler later met these men, who

told him that if Massachusetts sent
troops to quell secession he would

need twice as many to put down rebellion
at home.

Butler bluntly re-

plied that if Massachusetts troops
marched south they would not leave

single traitor behind-"unless he is hanging
on

a

tree."

a

16

However, many Massachusetts conservatives
feared coercion as much as

they feared disunion.

Their vision of the Union was incompatible with

any compulsion to remain within the
fraternity of states.

nation based on the will of the governed rule

military force?

a

How could

a

people subdued by

"If the Union cannot be preserved but by

a

war of ex-

termination, "wrote Harvard professor Joel Parker, "it is
far better
that it should be dissolved."

titter as defeat.

Victory in

a

brothers' war would be as

But whether conservatives loved the Union so much

that they would fight or loved it too much to soil it with
blood, they

were united in their determination to force the Republicans to compromise with the South.

17

Ill

The conservatives hoped to open the breach that increasingly sepa-

rated moderate and radical Republicans.

Robert Winthrop even speculated

that this policy might suceed in defeating Lincoln in the electoral
college.

Everett assured

a

Southern friend that if the South were only

patient the Republican party would disintegrate.

The growing dispute

over Massachusetts' Personal Liberty Law provided an opportunity for
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the conservatives; for Banks and
Andrew had disagreed sharply
on the
issue and their respective speeches
had left bitter feelings in
both

wings of the Republican party.

It was inevitable that the
debate

should be heated, as the statute's
history was closely intertwined
18
with the Commonwealth's antislavery
struggle.
By 1861 there was no single
personal

liberty law but rather

series of statutes and amendments that
curbed the ability of
to recover his fugitives in Massachusetts.

a

a

master

The earliest among them

dated back to 1843 and merely forbade state
officials from assisting
in the capture of slaves or using
Massachusetts jails for their de-

tention.

Conservative Republicans would later emphasize the
fact that

Democrat Marcus Morton had signed this bill into
law.

Not until after

the turmoil of the Burns affair did sentiment
against slave-hunting

force stronger legislation.

The return of Burns to slavery was

a

watershed in Massachusetts' attitude toward slavery and the
federal
government.

As a result, the Know-Nothing legislature passed
a

law,

over Governor Gardner's veto, that virtually nullified the
severe 1850

Fugitive Slave Act.

This personal

liberty law imposed heavy penalties

on any Massachusetts official who aided in the return of

slave and forbade any Massachusetts judge from holding

a

fugitive

a federal

that would require him to execute the Fugitive Slave Act.

In

office

addition,

it granted to alleged fugitives the right of habeas corpus and
trial

by jury.

The report of the legislative committee that drafted the law reveals the sentiments behind this new defense of personal liberty.

It

asserted that, when Massachusetts was asked to violate the fundamental
principles of the feclera" Constitution as well as her own, she would
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re-assert her rights as an independent
state.

"She cannot forget that

she had an independent existence and
a Constitution before the
Union

was formed," the committee maintained.

The Massachusetts Constitution

secured to all its citizens the rights
of trial by jury and habeus
corpus.

These essential elements of her liberty
she had never bartered

away; "she will not suffer them to be
wrested from her by any power
20
upon earth."
In 1856, conservatives led by Charles
Hale worked to repeal

1

the

laws; they were on the verge of success when
Brooks' brutal assault
on Sumner intervened.

Radicals argued convincingly that repeal

at such a time would be a rebuff to the injured
Senator.

1858 the

In

law's penalties were slightly reduced; but the following
year an amend-

ment required county sheriffs to remove fugitives from federal
custody
and forbade federal officers from reclaiming

declared

a

free man.

a

suspect whom

jury had

a

Early in 1860 radicals in the legislature made

strong, though losing, effort to pass

a

a

law freeing any slave setting

foot on Massachusetts soil.

Anti -Republicans argued -that the Personal Liberty Laws demonstrated

Republican willingness to override the Constitution and threaten social
order.

Caleb Cushing drew an analogy to demonstrate the subversive

nature of the law.

Suppose, he said, your wife attended some abolition

meetings and "got some pretty large notions in her head."
you, takes your child and apprentice, and goes to Maryland.

Maryland had

a

personal

force her to return?"

She leaves

"What if

liberty law that frustrated your attempts to

Cushing asked.

Harvard Professor Joel Parker

argued that the Massachusetts law proved antislavery men no longer gave
their allegiance to the government of the United States but considered
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it "a kind of foreign
jurisdiction."

Other conservatives maintained

that Massachusetts Republicans had
repudiated one of the basic compromises that had made the Constitution
possible.
The South would not
have entered the Union without the
fugitive slave clause. Massachusetts,
by ratifying the Constitution,
had given its sacred oath to
enforce it.
By its attempts at nullification,
Massachusetts gave the Southern states
a legitimate reason to declare
the partnership dissolved.

The Post de-

clared that, by enacting the Personal
Liberty Laws, Massachusetts was

more in rebellion against the Constitution
21
than South Carolina.

Conservatives mounted

a

movement for repeal when Lemuel Shaw, the

venerable Chief Justice of Massachusetts'
highest court, agreed to head
a petition challenging the laws'

constitutionality.

The December petition,

sponsored by many of the state's most distinguished
lawyers, urged the

legislature to revoke the laws "for the sake of the
sacredness of the

Constitution" and for "social order and domestic peace."

Repeal, its

supporters argued, could give great strength to the cause
of the Southern
Unionists.

22

Conservative Republicans, led by Charles Hale, supported repeal.
Hale and his allies, emphasized the laws" Know-Nothing origins, and

denied that they formed part of responsible Republican Party doctrine.

Lincoln and the entire party, they declared, were pledged to

enforce the Fugitive Slave Law regardless of how obnoxious it might be.
Benjamin

F.

chusetts and

Thomas,
a

a

former justice of the Supreme Court of Massa-

supporter of Lincoln, published

on the Personal Liberty Laws.

a well

-circulated pamphlet

"Incapable of substantial legal good,"

he wrote, "they do much political and moral evil."

For whether the laws

were constitutional or net, secessionists used them as

a

pretext for
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treason.

Charles Rogers' Boston Journal bitterly
criticized Andrew's

intransigence on the issue.

It accused him of lavishing
his solicitude

upon the hypothetical chance that a
black might be returned to the
South.

The governor's real responsibility,
this Republican paper

argued, was to avoid a civil war; his
first concern should be with "the

helpless women and children of his own race." 23
Some Republicans hoped to find a compromise
position that would

avoid the appearance of capitulation to Southern
demands.

They wanted

the laws submitted to the courts for a ruling
on their constitutionality.
But the proposal languished in the absence of

a

case; for the very

presence of the laws discouraged attempts to recover
fugitives in Massachusetts.

Moderates suggested that the legislature pass

a

"Declaratory

Act" affirming that the Personal Liberty Laws were not
intended to impede
the deliverence of bona fide slaves.

Others urged compensating slave

owners as an alternative to the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave
Act in

Massachusetts.

24

Still, the Personal Liberty Laws were not without their unconditional

supporters who accused compromisers of

a

shallow allegiance to freedom.

The Atlas and See vigorously attacked the Springfield Re publican for its

suggestion that the laws be repealed.

Would Samuel Bowles like it if he

were seized and dragged before an officer who made twice as much for
deciding against him than for setting him free?
would he consider the law "useless?"

Under those circumstances

John Andrew defended the laws in

ringing terms, reminding his audience of the state's obligation to protect
even its most "obscure and friendless inhabitants."

And Sumner argued

that saving the Union by repealing the Personal Liberty Laws was like

rescuing

a

floundering sl.ip by throwing overboard

a

jewel of little

.-/eight
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but great value.

25

As the forces for repeal gathered
strength, the radicals began
to mobilize.

When the Rhode Island legislature
revoked its Personal

Liberty Law on January 25, their
anxieties heightened.

Robinson and

Bird, along with a number of other
Sumnerites, established

called the Tocsin to firm up the radical
position.

a

tabloid

Paraphrasing

Garrison, they placed on the masthead the
defiant announcement that
they were Republicans "Who are in
Earnest and Who will be Heard."

Sumner wrote

a

legislature.

long letter to Henry Pierce that was
passed around the

.

After warning that repeal would only encourage
the seces-

sionists to bolder acts, he referred to his
assault by Brooks.
once said that the assault on me saved the law.

consoles me for much that

I

have suffered."

"It was

If this were so it

He told Pierce that he

would gladly suffer for it again.
The radicals noted that since the enactment of the laws
the Common-

wealth had enjoyed peace; the Vigilance Committee had dissipated
through
inactivity.

Recalling that it had cost Boston $10,000 to return Sims to

slavery, supporters of the Personal Liberty

Lav:

argued that repeal would

only invite a new round of costly riots and arrests.

Furthermore, it

was important that state officials be enjoined from enforcing the Fugitive
Slave Act lest

they lose the respect and confidence of the community.

Radicals also maintained that under the Constitution it was

a

state

responsibility to regulate the return of fugitives and to ensure that
no free man be sacrificed to slavery.

Inherent in this responsibility

was the mandate that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law."

27

Frank Sanborn claimed that the Personal Liberty Laws had helped
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free him from the federal
marshal at Concord.

Without the law, Sanborn

maintained, "white citizens of the
Commonwealth have little security
for their persons." And Andrew
planned a dramatic presentation
before
the legislative committee that
would look into the question
of repeal.
Writing to Sumner, he revealed his
strategy:

"I

have arranged to have

our 'Ida May' and a large number
(say ten to twelve) of other
handsome
and bright freed slaves, exhibited
before the Committee, as persons

touching whom kidnappers might get up
full
fidavits

....

to human hearts."

'records' and ex-parte af-

A live man: woman! childl-these are
great arguments
28

By mid-February both sides were anxious
to strike a bargain.

Con-

servatives were disappointed by Adams' refusal
to support the movement
for repeal and recognized that the
anti-abolition riots had played into
the hands of the law's supporters.

any change that could be heralded as

They were now willing to settle for
a

gesture to the South.

Radicals

feared that Lincoln might express opposition to
the Personal Liberty Laws,
and were anxious to dispose of the issue before
his inauguration.

The

compromise forged by the legislative committee provided
for only modest
alterations in the statute.

It restricted to the Massachusetts Supreme

Court the power to issue writs of habeas corpu s in fugitive
slave cases,

permitted claimants of alleged fugitives to testify, and allowed the

militia to quell any riot associated with the attempted return of

a

slave.

Put the core of the Personal Liberty Laws remained, and radicals applauded
the committee's assertion that every man on Massachusetts soil was prima

facie free and that nothing in the Constitution prevented the state from

protecting its citizens from unjust seizure.
leave the laws untouched, the radicals had won

Though they preferred to
a

victory over those who
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wanted to appease the South.

IV

The attack upon the Personal
Liberty Laws was only part
of the
conservatives' offensive. Virtually
all the Massachusetts anti-

Republicans agreed that the Crittenden
Compromise was the key to
sectional peace.
In December, the Senate's
Committee of Thirteen
had refused to endorse the
proposals, but during January Crittenden

campaigned for

a

national referendum on compromise.

The Massachusetts

conservatives sought to assist the Kentuckian
by pressuring their
Congressional delegation into conciliation.

A committee headed by

Lawrence, Everett, Benjamin Curtis, and
William Appleton, launched
a massive drive to secure signatures
to a pro-Crittenden petition;

and in Boston, Mayor Nightman ordered the
city's police to canvas

every residence for supporters.

Collecting over 22,000 signatures

from around the state, the Union Committee
delivered its flag-draped
roll of petitions to Washington in February.

Crittenden presented

them to the Senate, arguing that they represented
in popular sentiment.

a

great revolution

He noted that in the town of Scituate which
had

cast 350 votes in the presidential election, the petition
had gathered
328 names.

In Ballardsvil le, a

manufacturing hamlet with but forty-four

votes, forty-one persons had signaled their support for compromise.

And

of Boston's 19,000 voters, the Senator claimed that 14,000 had supported
.

.

,30

his proposals.

If Crittenden's assertions were accurate, the petition indeed would

have represented a substantial force.
on at least two grounds.

But its validity can be questioned

First, many of those who signed the docume.it
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later claimed that they believed
they had endorsed only
a general plea
for compromise; others had
assumed that the Crittenden
proposals merely
provided for the restoration of
the Missouri Compromise.
Secondly,

antislavery men asserted that the
petitions were filled with
fraudulent
signatures, and that the sponsors
had paid two dollars for
every name
acquired.
John Murray Forbes reported that
he had overheard a boy
complain that he only had the
chance to sign the petition
fourteen
times.

And Garrison complained that his
name appeared on the list

along with those of Wendell Phillips
and the deceased Theodore Parker.

"Warrington" condemned the petition as
likened to men administering

a

a
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farce; its sponsors he

bread pill to the invalid Union.

Sumner,

replying to Crittenden on the Senate
floor, suggested that the signers
were ignorant of the proposals they had
approved.

Crittenden was very

popular in Massachusetts, Sumner maintained,
and many people were willing to endorse anything that had the
sanction of his respectable name.

A few days later Sumner introduced his
own anti-compromise petition.

Though much smaller than Crittenden's, the
Massachusetts Senator insisted that it represented the true spirit of the
Commonwealth, which
could only be found "away from the paving stones." 32
But pro-Sumner Republicans had more to worry about
than merely
the relative size of petitions.

Crittenden supporters hoped to attract

the support of conservative Republicans by identifying
themselves with

Charles Francis Adams.

Everett, Winthrop, and Saltonstall made every

effort to cultivate the Massachusetts Representative to their cause and
to blur the public distinction between Adams'

Mew Mexico proposal and

the more sweeping Crittenden plan.

Adams, however, was aware of the conservatives' strategy and he

was determined to frustrate it.

"The Bell-Everett people
mean nothing

but mischief," he told Richard
Henry Dana.

"They laud me in the same

breath that they recommend the
Crittenden compromise which

I

denounce."

mid-January Adams had abandoned the
New Mexico proposal, believing
that ft could no longer be used
to divide the South.
But by the end
In

of the month he was once again willing
to promote immediate statehood
for New Mexico; now it would serve
to divide Northern conservatives..

The New Mexico scheme would give
Republicans of the Advertiser school
an alternative to the Crittenden
compromise and keep them from be-

coming the cart behind the Bell-Everett
horse.

By supporting Adams,

conservative Republicans could express their
desire for peace without
repudiating the Chicago platform. 33
One of Crittenden's amendments created
special problems for Mass-

achusetts conservatives:

slavery would be protected not only in exist-

ing territories, but also in those "hereafter
acquired."

ended wording troubled even the Bell-Everetts
miss it as

a

merely abstract question.

,

Such open-

though they tried to dis-

But Republicans pushed hard on

this phrase which they denounced as a "bounty on filibustering."

fcnry Pierce argued that, as it was the propensity of the
Anglo-Saxon
to acquire additional

evitable.

land, future territorial conflicts would be in-

And Richard Henry Dana predicted that the provision would

result in "a whole string of Floridas," with white populations equal to
South Boston but with power in the Senate equal to New York. 34

Despite these obstacles, conservatives were encouraged when Virginia
invited all the states to send representatives to Washington in early

February to discuss ways of promoting sectional peace.

They hoped that

the "Washington Peace Convention" could become a 'vehicle for the adoption
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of the Crittenden compromise.

But the first task for the
Massachusetts

conservatives was to prod their state
into sending

a

delegation.

For

when the conference opened on February
4, Massachusetts was unrepresented. 35

Massachusetts Republicans were divided
over the Virginia invitation.
Most radicals opposed participation
in any meeting called for
the purpose
of compromise.
Frank Bird warned that attendance
would be the first step
toward total abandonment of principle.

William

Robinson denounced the

S.

convention as "irregular if not revolutionary,"
and argued that, as Virginia had invited states that were willing
to offer "adequate guarantees"
for the security of slavery, Massachusetts
was not included.

Republicans of

a

Even some

moderate stripe had little use for the
convention.

"There is nothing to settle, but whether
there is

a

government or not,"

wrote Richard Henry Dana.
Initially, Andrew shared these sentiments.

He advised Ohio governor

William Dennison to refrain from sending any delegates,
at least until
after Lincoln's inauguaration.

But Andrew retained his ability to be

strategically flexible while remaining ideologically rigid.

He recog-

nized that rejecting Virginia's offer to talk was hardly
the way to keep
the Border States in the Union.
a

However futile the convention might be,

month of speeches might fill the time remaining until inauguration

and help the Republicans take office with the capital

intact.

Another

consideration forcing Andrew's hand was the concern that the Commonwealth's conservatives might send their own delegation to represent
Massachusetts.

One group, meeting at the Merchants' Exchange, had al-

ready resolved that "the people" should appoint their own delegates if
the governor and the legislature refused.

37

With the exception of Sumner, the entire Massachusetts Congressional
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delegation believed that the state
should attend the conference.

"If

the meeting be a treasonable one,"
Adams wrote the governor",
"the

Massachusetts delegates would, of course,
be able to expose it to the
country.
If not, they would appear to
take some interest in any proposition to reconcile differences.

I

confirm the charge of indifference."

am much afraid that absence would
Even Sumner was not irreconcilably

opposed to sending representatives, though
he remained adamant that

Massachusetts remain an example. of steadfast
principle.

If Massachusetts

yielded "one hair's breadth," he feared, other
states would yield

a

mile.

He wrote that while he would not advise
that the state attend,
38
he would not stand in the way.

Andrew angered some radicals when he recommended
to the legislature
that it authorize him to select

a

delegation, and furthermore, that it

refrain from issuing instructions to oppose the
Crittenden proposals.
But the governor precluded any possibility that
Massachusetts might

endorse compromise at the Washington Convention by appointing
with unbending antislavery views.

a

commission

Conservatives were enraged at the

selection, but Sumner was delighted when he saw the list and
discovered
that there was "not

a

single weak joint" on it.

Andrew chose George Boutwell
John Z. Goodrich.

Theophilis

P.

,

To lead the delegation

John Murray Forbes, and Lieutenant-Governor

The other members v/ere Andrew's own law partner,

Chandler, who recently had urged

a

preventative war to

"drive the ruffians into the Gulf of Mexico;" Charles Allen, an old

Free-Soil warrior of the 1840's; Francis Crowinshield

,

of the Massachusetts House; and Richard P. Waters,

"stiff-backed"

Republican from Beverly.

a

former Speaker

39

The delegation met Sumner's expectations.

They offered no substantive
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suggestions at Washington, drew out
the proceedings as much as
possible,
and voted against virtually every
proposal before the assembly.
George
Boutwell, who became the principle
Massachusetts spokesman, declared

belligerently that if the Union could not
be saved without providing
new guarantees for slavery, it was
not worth saving.
If secession continued, he warned, "we shall march our
armies to the Gulf of Mexico,

or you will march yours to the Great Lakes."

The convention's final

resolutions, prepared in the last days of
February, closely resembled

Crittenden's.

The Massachusetts delegation duly opposed
them, but was

unconcerned that they had passed.
Andrew:

•

As Goodrich cheerfully assured

"The recommendations of the Convention have
no moral weight

whatever they might be."

Congress rejected the proposals soon after

the convention disbanded, and with their failure
died the hope for

political compromise.

Massachusetts Republicans rejoiced at the occasion,
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CHAPTER

XI

THE MINUTEMEN OF 1861

Conservatives were not surprised by the
obstructions which Massachusetts Republicans placed in the
path of compromise.
In a bitter
editorial, the Courier lamented that no
other free state nurtured such

disloyalty-especially among its clergy, its
intellectuals, and its

women-as Massachusetts.

The paper regretted that, while
Massachusetts

felt "fervid and vehement" passion toward
personal liberty, it cared
little for the Union.

Massachusetts' bond to the Union was self-interest

rather than sentiment-a careful calculation
of the advantages which the
national attachment might bring to the state.

similar opinion.

The Post expressed a

It argued that Massachusetts and South
Carolina were

fundamentally alike and that they had done more than
any other states to
disrupt the Union.

One was the birthplace of abolitionism, the other
of

1
nullification; but both had eaten fruit from the tree of
disunion.

Massachusetts Republicans hotly disputed any question of their
national
loyalty.

But there was more truth to the conservative argument than

Republicans would admit.

Behind their refusal to offer substantive con-

cessions to the South was the conviction that some things were more important than the preservation of the Union.

Most Republicans would save the

Union if it was within their power--but only if the cost was minimal.

They believed that the sacrifice of anti si a very principle, party integrity,
and personal pride was too great
nation.

a

price for the continuation of

a

united

"Save the Union if it can be done with honor," William Claflin

advised Henry Dawes, "but save your honor anyhow."

2

There were, of course, differences among Massachusetts Republicans.
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Some conservatives, especially those in
the eastern section of the state,

displayed a reverence for the Union that was
barely distinguishable from
the Webster Whigs.

The Newburyport Herald voiced this
sentiment when it

declared that "not since the days of primeval
chaos" had

a

people been so

free and happy as Americans under the
protection of the Federal Union.

The Constitution worked so well, the Herald
declared, that it was almost
as if "heaven had made us a self-regulating
community."

In

order to pre-

serve the Union, the Herald was willing to accept
the Crittenden compromise.
But the unwavering Unionism of Webster and Choate, though
it lived
on in the oratory of Everett, was no longer the dominant
emotion of

Massachusetts.

The Webster Whigs had clothed the Union with powers great-

er than that of a mere political organization.

Recognizing that the

United States lacked the institutions which gave stability to other

societies— a royal family, ancient traditions,

a

national church—con-

servatives had given the Union the mystical attributes of divinity.
Nagel discussed this phenomenon in his study of American national-

Paul

ism, One Nation Indivisible .

He saw the sanctif ication of the American

Union as the response of an apprehensive people "to the questions of

order and security, purpose and achievement, glory and honor."
was

a

The Union

Gestalt, far greater than the several states that comprised it.

But when Massachusetts Republicans discussed the value of the Union, they

rarely did so in transcendental terms.

They believed that the Union held

value, but that its merits were specific and tangible.

Republicans ap-

preciated the freedom which it gave to trade and travel within the United
States without the constant barriers that one found in Europe.

They

recognized that the Unioi promoted peace among the sections and provided
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common shield against foreign aggression,
and that it embraced

common legal and political tradition.

a

Republicans respected the Con-

stitution as the heritage of an honored
generation of heroes and as
4
one of the world's foremost political
documents.

But unlike those who defined their
identity in national terms,
Bay State Republicans thought of themselves
as citizens of Massachusetts
or as New Englanders.

Like Southerners, their primary allegiance
was to

their state and region rather than to the
United States.

In this they

differed from the nationalistic Republicans of
the West.

For New England

had a long history and a tradition that on the
eve of the Civil War-was

more than three times the age of the Union under
the Constitution.

By

contrast, the West had no such heritage, and was in
fact the offspring
of the federal government.

It was natural

that

a

Westerner would think

of himself first as an American rather than asanOhioan
or Illinoisan.

Western Republicans like Lincoln held

a

different perspective of the

Union than men like Charles Sumner and Henry Wilson.
Hans Kohn has written that the North pursued the Civil War "for the

maintenance of imperial Union against the principle of self-determination."
Such a characterization is hardly applicable to Massachusetts Republicans;

they had formed their party in protest against large institutions— the

Catholic Church, huge factories, and the growing cities—which threatened
local control and personal

responsibility.

of federal authority in the 1850'

s

They had fought the extension

when those in power had sought to ex-

pand slavery; and this experience had left them with a fear of the corruption of power.

One of their arguments against the Crittenden proposals

was that it would give the federal government authority over the states

which it formerly did not have.

5
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During the secession winter,
Massachusetts Republicans carefully
weighed the value of the Union
against the cost of Southern
demands.
Generally the Union came out wanting,
with some Republicans asking
if
it had substance enough to save.

One country paper noted that
there

was "a want of nationality among
our people" and suggested that
no

political connection could unite people
as disparate as New Engenders
and cotton planters.

Perhaps, it suggested, the Union was
an artificial

device that had served

a

purpose during the early days of continental

independence, but whose usefulness had passed.

years-far longer than many other governments
works of man, it was mutable.

It had lasted seventy-two
in the world;

like all the

Other Republicans noted that the United

States lacked many of the traditional trappings
of

a

nation; there were

few institutions that welded North and South
into a common bond.

The

country had no national capital in the manner of
London or Paris.

Washington served as

a

seat of government, but not as

for commerce or culture.

a

national focus

Indeed, Massachusetts Congressmen had always

dreaded their return to Washington,

a

with the odor of Southern slavery.

More than one Republican had sug-

gested that Washington was

a

raw and unfinished city, permeated

place the North could cheerfully abandon.

6

Some Massachusetts Republicans asserted that the Union was based
on dishonorable compromise and that it forced the North to fulfill un-

conscionable obligations.

The Hampshire Gazette deplored the Constitu-

tional provisions which made the North enforce laws "purposefully designed
to be irritating and humilitating to all our ideas of self-respect and

manhood."

Even Charles Francis Adams, though imbued with the nationalism

of his father, admitted that the Constitution forced the North to shelter
en institution which it vould otherwise repudiate.

Massachusetts Republicans
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generally believed that slavery
survived only because the Union
had
preserved it. Outside the Constitution,
Southern slavery would be
doomed.
Some Massachusetts Republicans ridiculed
William Seward for

"making

a

fetish out of the Union" when the New
York Senator gave an

emotional, patriotic address on January
12.

Others, like the editor

of the Traveler, sympathized with
Seward's sentiments but suggested

that he "threw pearls before swine" when
appealing to the South.

Massachusetts' deeply-rooted anti-Southern ism
crucially affected the
state's response to the secession crisis.

Many believed that the South

was a benighted region which regularly indulged
in unspeakable atrocities
in order to uphold slavery.

Even moderate newspapers like the Springfield

Republican and the Boston Evening Transcript often read
like Theodore
Weld

'

s

Slavery As It Is, leading subscribers to presume that
Southerners
o

were beyond redemption.

Massachusetts newspapers reported the continual harassment of Northern whites who traveled beyond Mason and Dixon's line and suggested
that

impeccable proslavery credentials were needed to venture into the South.
In the

months before the Civil War, Massachusetts read that travelers'

luggage was opened and searched, that teachers were expelled for Republican

sympathies, and that visitors to Mount Vernon encountered insults and
hostility.

Alabama when

One account told of
a

a

Massachusetts citizen expelled from

letter from Sumner was discovered in his trunk; another

reported that a man in Virginia was made literally into

a

"Black Repub-

lican" when a mob seized him and covered him with printer's ink.

As

the secession crisis grew darker so did the nature of the atrocities

which Massachusetts journals published.

In

February, the Travele r
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reported that Southerners had seized
two Northern artisans, denounced
them as abolitionists, and hanged
them.
The case of Joseph Ribero

attracted particular attention.

A carpenter working in Savannah,

Ribero allegedly said that Lincoln's
election would mean the end of
slavery.

For this crime, outraged Georgians
shaved his head, ordered

slaves to lash him, and threw him on

a

Boston-bound ship.

The press,

noting that the assailants had taken away
Ribero's tools, urged "friends
of freedom" to help him secure employment.

Republicans argued that such

incidents proved that Southerners had violated
one of the basic principles
of the Union-that an American citizen should
receive the protection of

any state he visited.

One rural

legislator asserted that

a

Massachusetts

man would be more secure in the Barbary States
than in Virginia.

believed that Northerners would be safer traveling in

confederacy under

a

United States passport.

a

Others

separate Southern

9

During the secession winter, Massachusetts Republicans repeated
their

now-familiar arguments about the squalor of Southern civilization.

At

a

time when healing words were needed to avert dissolution, Republican
con-

tempt took on an added dimension.

Many New Englanders believed that the

South languished in ignorance and illiteracy, that they needed "an army
of primers and elementary text books," and that their society was "an

inversion of the ordinary rules of morality."

Owning slaves had made

Southerners incapable of living under republican government.

In the

eyes of many Yankees the South was both odious and alien, comparable to

Turkey with its polygamy or India with its suttee.

Some in Massachusetts

looked for additions from the North to replace the departed states.
"Canada will rush to our embrace," exclaimed John Alley before the House

of Representatives.

Sumner and Andrew both v/elcomed such an exchange.^
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II

Historians have tended to discount
the sincerity of Republicans
who, during the secession crisis,
called for peaceable disunion.

David Potter, for example, has
argued that all public men were
well
aware that the only real options
during the winter of 1860-61 were

compromise or war.

Those who urged that the South be
allowed to

leave the Union in peace did so only when
the immediate alternative
was compromise.
war.

'

Faced with a choice of disunion and
war, they chose

Potter is correct in noting that Republicans
who urged peaceful

separation at the outset of the crisis grew
more bellicose as the

winter proceeded.

But he is engaging in a hindsight not
available to

the men of 1851 when he suggests that
compromise and war were the only

possible results.

Acquiescence to peaceable secession in 1861 only

appears fanciful when viewed through the patriotic
dust swept up by the

war-time North, anxious to clothe the cause of the
North with divinity.
One fact seems clear:

if the Massachusetts population truly loved the

Union, they would not have tolerated the disparaging
comments by their

politicians, journalists, and preachers.

Most Massachusetts men would

not shed their blood for the abstract virtues of the American Union.

Many clearly entertained the idea of peaceful separation.

11

The pages of the Springfield Republican trace the evolution of the
idea of peaceable secession.

During November this influential mouthpiece

of moderate Republicanism argued that the principles of representative

government forbade coercing any state to remain within the Union.

It

noted that, while some politicians still glorified the Union "with

a

drapery of eloquent and patriotic phrases," the masses no longer believed

2
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its preservation to be of "infinite
consequences."

The citizens of

the free states, it argued, were
not about to fight to keep
the slave

states from departing.

1

By December, the Republican focused
upon the process of secession.
It still maintained that the slave
states were free to leave; South

Carolina could "re-annex herself to the
kingdom of Dahomey" if she
wished.

But the paper insisted that the Southern
states leave the

Union in a constitutionally acceptable way.

They should petition

Congress if they wanted to break the national
tie.

But until they re-

ceived the assent of a majority of the states,
their actions constituted
rebellion.

Under such conditions, presidential action could
not be con-

sidered coercion but merely enforcement of the law.

The Republican re-

minded its readers of the expense which the entire
nation had borne in
the acquisition of Louisiana, Texas, and Florida;
before they could

leave the Union, compensation was due.

But the Republican still hoped

that separation could be accomplished orderly.

When South Carolina

announced that it would send commissioners to Washington to discuss
the
federal

property within her borders, the paper interpreted it as
.

positive sign.

a

13

But as it became clear that the commissioners were issuing demands

rather than negotiating, Bowies' Republican became incensed.

It was

in-

tolerable, it declared, that the squalid republic of South Carolina
should try to dictate to the rest of the nation.

increased when Southerners occupied Fort Moultrie.
firing on the Star of the West to be

a

The Re publica n's rage
It

considered the

declaration of war:

"The rebellion

at Charleston must be crushed out; Major Anderson must be reinforced; the

other forts in the harbot must be taken and held."

The Republ ican
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insisted that the nation would face "anarchy
and social confusion,"
if Southern lawlessness was not
suppressed.

But it still argued that

it was this lawlessness and not disunion
per se that was the peril. 14

Nineteenth-century New Engenders strongly
believed that

a

society

could remain healthy only so long as its
citizens took responsibility
for their actions and honored their obligations
to others.

It was

natural that they should think of the relationship
among the states in

much the same terms.

The Union was not so much an indivisible or
im-

mutable institution as it was a community of members,
bound by common
laws.

The community could survive the departure of individual
members,

but it could not survive the destruction of its laws.

Massachusetts

Republicans, who most strongly embodied this attitude, feared that
illegitimate secession could become a threat to law and order throughout
the nation.

This fear, combined with their belief that the South was

'

growing increasingly belligerent, lead them to prepare for war. 15

As the secession winter progressed Republican journals as far apart
as the T raveler and the Tocsin came to believe that Civil

evitable.

War was in-

"If you cannot have peace with it in the Union," the Tocsin

remarked about the South, "by the same token and more so, you cannot out."
Republicans catalogued the conflicts that would inevitably arise between
the rival confederacies.

confrontation was ominous.

In the area of trade alone, the potential

What would happen when the South attempted

to restrict the traffic on the Mississippi?

slave states as

a

for

Or when smugglers used the

haven to pass untaxed goods into the North?

To protect
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their economy, the free states would
raise

a

substantial force sealing

off the long border that once had been
as open as

a

county line.

The

two confederacies, believing it their
destiny, would attempt to expand

into Latin America; inevitably they would
clash in Mexico and Cuba.

The North could not allow the South to
re-open the barbaric trans-

Atlantic slave trade.

But what would happen when the United States

hanged a Southern citizen for slaving?

when Southerners executed
ist?

a

And what would the North do

citizen of the United States as an abolition-

Peoples so inimical could not live peaceably as
neighboring

republics.

Let us meet the issue now, at the point of a bayonet,

James Stone wrote his friend Sumner, "rather than leave it
an unhappy
legacy for my children."
As the prospect of war came closer, many appeared willing to face
it.

Chandler warned an audience at the Music Hall against the "tempta-

Pel eg

tions of peace."

He asserted that one must inquire into "the quality

of what is called peace" before assuming it is preferable to war.

told the story of

a

pacifist who denounced all recourse to arms and who

used the Mexican War as

a

particularly odious example.

do if you were a Mexican?" he was asked.

came the reply.

He

"What would you

"I'd fight to the last gasp,"

The Adams sons were caught up in the same martial spirit.

Henry, who wrote of his desire to join "some Cromwell type of Massachusetts

regiment," believed that it would benefit the Northern cause if Anderson
and his command were murdered in cold blood.

His brother Charles talked

of making Southern whites "eat the pie of humility" and handing them over
to their slaves.

In the Senate,

Henry Wilson spoke of those who were

preparing for the coming struggle:
acres

.

.

.

"farmers who till their own fee-simple

mechanics whose hands are skilled by art

.

.

.

laborers who

8
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recognize no master but Almighty God."

And Emerson predicted that

2,000 Concord men of Wilson's description could
march at an instant's

notice.^
Massachusetts Republicans agreed that the South
would be no match
for aroused Yankees.

With a wary eye on both its slaves and its white

mudsill, the planter class would be unable to resist
the massed forces
of the North.

The Advertiser noted that Tennessee's Andrew Johnson
had

suggested that "it

better to keep the North to quarrel with, than to

is

quarrel among ourselves."

Republican newspapers offered historical evi-

dence that New England had won the War for Independence while the
South
had played the role of slacker.

A report that South Carolina had order-

ed her Palmetto flags from a Boston manufacturer was the occasion for

considerable mirth.

Republicans argued that Southerners would have to

fight with Northern arms and wear Northern clothes with Northern buttons;
they would use lead dug in Illinois, cast into bullets in New York, and

propelled by Connecticut powder.

1

But despite the bluster of the Republican newspapers, Massachusetts'

political leaders were worried lest the state be caught unprepared.

Andrew, working through January to ready the Commonwealth for war, relied

heavily upon his correspondents in Washington and particularly upon Sumner.
Moderates believed that Sumner was

a

dangerous influence.

Charles Francis

Adams wrote that the Senator was "full of stories of conspiracies" and

suspected that he looked forward to bloodshed," and Henry Adams believed
the Massachusetts Senator to be "the most frightened man in Washington."
But at times Sumner could be a moderating force.

January to issue

a

call

Urged by Bird in early

for Northern mobilization, Sumner replied that
,

the government could defend the capital with the forces at its disposal.

19
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Sumner became a confidant of Edwin
Stanton, Buchanan's new

Attorney-General.

The two met furtively at night;
and Stanton, whose

imagination was among the most active in the
capital, would relay tales
of treason in high places.

Believing that he had

a

window on the acti-

vities of the administration, Sumner hastened
to convey the information
to Andrew.

On January 26, he warned that Washington
would be attacked

before Lincoln's inauguration.

Alarmed by Sumner's reports, Andrew

asked the Senator to call on Buchanan and
discover why he had failed
to answer Massachusetts' offer of military aid.

The harried President

insisted that the movement of Northern troops would
only foster hostilities.

But Sumner pressed him.

"What else can Massachusetts do for the

good of the country?" the Senator asked.

sition," Buchanan replied.

"Adopt the Crittenden propo-

Ending the conversation, Sumner asserted that

Massachusetts would rather sink below the ocean and become
accept such dishonorable demands.

a

sandbank than

20

Sumner was not the only Massachusetts Congressman working to ferret
out conspiracy.

Henry Dawes was one of five members of

a

House committee

charged with investigating reports that armed rebels were gathering near
the capital.

He too was in contact with Stanton and received notes which

the Attorney-General clandestinely left at prearranged locations.

And

Henry Wilson belonged to an informal vigilance committee which sought to

prevent interference with the counting of the electoral votes in February.
Like Sumner, he believed that war was imminent, though he thought that

Massachusetts' major contribution would be money rather than men.

21

Andrew brought these reports to the Massachusetts legislature and
urged its members to take action.

He was particularly insistent that the

state's militia law, which limited the number of men actively enrolled to
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5,000, be amended so that he could enlist all
the troops he believed

necessary.

On February 4, the legislature went
into an unusual

session from which reporters and the public
were barred.

secret

The members

heard little that had not been rumored in
the press; but dark hints by
the Republican leadership that fighting
could erupt at any time con-

vinced them to assent to the Governor's requests.

Andrew received

authority to raise the troops he wanted and an
emergency fund of
$100,000 to cover the expense.

However, the Republican legislators

•

were reluctant to bail out the bankrupt Democratic
administration, and

deferred a request to guarantee $2,000,000 in federal bonds.
same day Virginia voters rejected immediate secession.

On the

Shortly after-

wards, the Dawes committee reported that it could discover no evidence

of an organized conspiracy within the District of Columbia; and

in mid-

February the counting of the electoral votes took place without incident.
Each of these events brought some respite from the anxiety.

But Mass-

achusetts' Congressmen agreed that they only had postponed the inevitable
clash.

There would be no need for troops before March 4; but after the

inauguration, conflict was certain.
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Many Massachusetts Republicans had acquired

a

low opinion of Abraham

Lincoln in the months after the presidential election.
one, thought he was

a

"simple Susan."

Samuel

Bowles, for

New Englanders sometimes tried to

cover their embarrassment with the president-elect by patronizing the

simplicity and openness of Westerners; but clearly they were displeased
with the rustic manners of their new leader.

Adams feared that Lincoln

lacked the "heroic qualities" that were necessary at such

interpreted his actions curing the crisis as

a

a

time and

sign of vacillation.
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"I am

much afraid," Adams wrote as he followed
Lincoln's progress

from Springfield to Washington, "that in
this lottery we have drawn
23
a

blank."
But Lincoln's inaugural address raised his
stature among Mass-

achusetts Republicans.

Virtually every faction of the party, from the

Advertiser to the Bird Club, applauded it.

Adams was grateful that the

President had endorsed the Constitutional amendment
that would forbid

interference with slavery in the states.

Though opposed by

a

majority

of his Massachusetts colleagues, Adams had supported
the measure; and
he hoped that Lincoln's statement would silence those
who had criticized
him.

But even Sumner was happy with the address for its unwillingness

to compromise basic Republican doctrine.

Using Napoleon's famous simile,

he called it "a hand of iron and a velvet glove."

greatly relieved that inauguration day had passed.

Republicans were
Many believed that,

with the party in control of the government, serious danger was ended.
"Again we have a government," John Goodrich exclaimed to Andrew; "the
inaugural

is

delivered and already the beat of the public pulse begins

to indicate returning national health."

24

The inaugural also unleashed a great scramble for office.
achusetts'

Mass-

leading Republicans were deluged with requests for patronage.

Many of the appeals were desperate, coming from men who claimed that
the economic difficulties brought on by the secession crisis made them

unable to feed their families.

Others were from former officeholders

who had lost their posts for refusing to uphold the proslavery policies
of the Democratic administrations.

All

proclaimed their loyalty to the

Republican party, recorded their past services, and asserted that they
should share in the frui

;s

of the victory.

In

these appeals the larger
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issues of war and peace, of union and
discord, of slavery and freedom,
are lost in the pursuit for places
in the Boston Customs House. 25

Massachusetts had hoped for

a

place in the new cabinet.

The most

likely candidate was Charles Francis
Adams for the Treasury post; but
the controversy over his recent
political course made his appointment

impossible.

The matter was sealed when Lincoln
gave New England's

cabinet seat to Gideon Welles of Connecticut.

Adams and Sumner were

both candidates for the Court of St. James,
a rivalry that could have

further divided Massachusetts Republicans.

Adams went to London, but

Sumner was assuaged when he became the chairman of
the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, a post that he would make
exceedingly important
.
..
26
in the coming years.
It was the

competition for more prosaic offices that created the

greatest friction.

Old-line antislavery men were jealous at those who

lately had climbed onto the Republican bandwagon; and the editors
and

publishers of Republican newspapers demanded
services.

"I am tired,

in mid-March.

reward for their past

sick, and unhappy," Sumner wrote Longfellow

"My rooms are 'full

with office seekers."

a

from early morning till midnight

There is reason to believe, however, that Sumner

enjoyed his role as Massachusetts' chief spokesman on federal patronage.
It was only human that he, who for so long had been excluded from the

inner circles of Boston and Wasnington, should appreciate his new influence.

The appointment of

a

Boston Postmaster and a Port Collector

was particularly important; for together they controlled hundreds of

positions.

Republicans relished their dominion over these offices

which were so important to the commercial life of Massachusetts' capital
city.

Pressing the claims of one candidate, Theophilis Chandler, Andrew
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crowed that State Street would have to
"take off its hat to him."
"We must, be bold.. We must use power
where we have it," the Governor

maintained.

Chandler, he argued, would not be afraid
"to use his

proper influence" to promote the Republican
cause.

Andrew was deter-

mined to punish his antagonists within the
Republican party.

Thus he

urged that Charles Hale, who wanted to be
postmaster of Boston, be cut

off from all preferments.

And he wrote directly to Lincoln to warn that

Nathaniel Banks was unworthy of consideration for
any post.

As a rebuke

to Boston for its coolness to Republican principles,
Andrew and Sumner
27
arranged for its leading posts to go to men from outside
the city.

Ill

The Charleston batteries that opened fire on Fort Sumter on April
12,

abruptly ended the argument over whether the seceded states should be
allowed to depart in peace.

With unanimity, Massachusetts citizens

sprang to their muskets, their bank accounts, and their Bibles, to lend

assistance to the Northern cause.

Men of all parties proclaimed their

determination to suppress the rebellion and punish those who had instigated the conflict.

There was no suggestion from any quarter that there

was an alternative to war.

For the sake of honor and manhood the agress-

ive Southern act would be answered.
If all

men recognized the inevitability of the events that were un-

folding, Massachusetts was not without those who received the news from
South Carolina with foreboding.

Adams wrote.

"Mr.

Lincoln has plunged us into war,"

He doubted the President's ability to lead and worried about

the fate of his own sons.

"Vie,

the children of the third and fourth

generations," he reflected, "are doomed to pay the penalties of the
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compromises made by the first."
opening of hostilities.

Sumner was no less appalled by
the

"Alas!" he wrote Longfellow,
"that

I,

loving

peace, should be called to take such
great responsibility in a dreadful

ghastly civil war."

He lamented that the nation
had not chosen

the road of amicable separation. 28

But other Republicans did not share
these regrets.

They eagerly

prepared to punish the South, not merely
for firing on one fort, but
for a train of abuses that extended
back for decades.

The deep-seated

hostility against the alien slave society
raised the emotions of the
post-Sumter days to

a

fever pitch.

turning South Carolina into

a

Some hotspur Yankees talked of

desert and sowing its fields with salt.

Confident of their own superiority, they believed
the task would be
completed before summer's end.

Massachusetts Republicans also calculated

that the manner in which the war had begun was to
their advantage.
the onus on the South, their cause would be strengthened.

With

Even the

Boston Recorder thanked God for allowing the North to begin
the struggle
with a clear conscience.

29

The Garrisonians recognized that, despite its attendant horrors, the

war could bring about the abolition jubilee.

Garrison himself urged sup-

porters to hold their criticism on the conduct of the administration.
"There must be no needless turning of popular violence upon ourselves,"
he warned.

Abolitionists must practice circumspection to avoid divisions

in the North.

save the

He was confident that the

Union— would turn

Phillips, who on April

9

into

a

war—which some fought only

to

war that would free the slaves.

had urged that Massachusetts not fight to keep

the slave states within the Union, recanted after the firing on Sumter.
For the first time in his life, he told

a

massive' crowd

,

he was proud to
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stand beneath the emblem of the national
government.

slave asks but

a

"Today the

sight of this banner, and calls it
the twilight of

his redemption; today it represents
sovereignty and justice."

were no less enthusiastic.

They crowded into

Blacks

Boston Baptist church

a

to pledge 50,000 troops if the color bar
30
on enlistment were lifted.

Conservatives were likewise ready to prosecute
the war.

Everett

argued that defeating the rebels was the only
way to save the country

from "general anarchy and confusion."
County, Right or Wrong."

The Courier

's

motto was "Our

Though it blamed Lincoln for bringing on the

war and denounced those who talked of reducing Charleston
to ashes, the
paper urged every citizen to support the federal government.

At Boston's

Jackson Club the members proclaimed that, despite their sympathy
for the
South, they would fight to sustain the Constitution.

community was also eager to prove its loyalty.

The commercial

Boston's banks loaned

$3,500,000 to the federal treasury and gave substantial aid to the Massachusetts mobilization.

The operators of railroads and steamship lines

offered to transport troops; and counting houses promised to continue
their clerks' salaries while they were off at war.

Some merchants ap-

peared relieved that the period of ambiguity was over.

"Anything like

certainty, even with an unfavorable result," the Commercial Bulletin

explained, "is better than

a

period of suspense."

31

Amos Lawrence was among those to offer his services to the government.

In the days

after Sumter, he urged his friends in the Border

States to rally their people for the Union.

He warned Crittenden that

the North "is becoming one great army" and that Kentucky would be "saved

or ruined in proportion

ment."

-?s

she supports or refuses to support the govern-

If the Border States remained loyal, Lawrence wrote, a purely
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sectional war could be avoided.

But if they went with the Confederacy,

32
the North would invade the South and destroy
slavery.

Massachusetts citizens showed their enthusiasm
for the war effort
in a variety of ways.

Ladies wore the tricolor on their dresses
and

flannel shirts and bandages for the departing
troops.

ir.ade

my two sons," one woman in Marblehead cried out;
more to go."

"I

am sorry

"Here are
I

have not

When a ship from Savannah arrived in Boston flying

a

secessionist flag, a mob forced the crew to take it down
and then ripped
it into pieces.

Northampton's Zachary Eddy, who had earlier enumerated

the evils of war, now welcomed the conflict as a time for
national re-

generation.

"History has always recognized something Divine in national

enthusiasm," he told Hampshire County volunteers.
of patriotism
On April

...

"The conflagration

is kindled by the breath of God."

33

15, Henry Wilson notified Andrew that Massachusetts'

military quota was 1,200 men.

initial

The Governor chafed that the number was so

low, but he immediately set to work answering the call.

His earlier prep-

arations payed handsome dividends as militiamen moved rapidly into Boston
from every corner of the state.

The sense of urgency was due not only to

the prospect that rebel troops might be marching on Washington, but to

a

determination that Massachusetts must place the first troops in the field.

Andrew did not overlook the politics of mobilization.

young conservatives as
of the war.

a

He commissioned

way to bind their merchant fathers to the success

And he placed Benjamin Butler in charge of the state's troops

to diffuse the charge that the conflict would be fought along partisan
34

lines.

Thousands streamed into Boston on April 17, to watch the Sixth Regiment depart for Washington.

Andrew reviewed the troops from the State
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House steps.

Avoiding controversy, he spoke but briefly
and exhorted

the soldiers to defend the flag and return
it with honor.

The Sixth

became the first armed regiment to arrive in
Washington's defense.
But before they reached the capital, they also
became the first to
shed blood.

On April

19-the anniversary

of the Battle of Lexington-

Massachusetts soldiers, passing through Baltimore, fought
secessionist sympathizers and suffered four casualties.

mingled with pride when the news reached Boston.

a

mob of

Rage was

Demands that Baltimore

be raised to the ground coincided with praise for the
Massachusetts

troops.

"Everybody in Massachusetts seems to be contratulating himself

that he is a citizen of such a state," wrote "Warrington."

And so the men of Massachusetts marched off to war.

United by their

determination to defeat the Confederacy, they were divided in their motives.
Many, lured by the bright uniforms and the spirit of the bands, had little

notion of why they were fighting, but were glad to join this new adventure
and leave

a

dull

life behind.

Yet others had firm intentions.

Some went'

because they wanted tc free the slaves, some to save the Union, and some
to serve the South its "pie of humility."

Few suspected that long years

*

would intervene before peace returned to the nation or the terrible cost
in lives and twisted bodies that the war would exact.

Neither did they

realize that the war would hasten the demise of the Massachusetts they
were leaving.

For the Massacnusetts of the farmer and artisan, of en-

thusiastic reform, of Anglo-Saxon Protestant dominance, would become
distant memory in the post-war world.

a

For the moment, however, Mass-

achusetts' men might think of themselves as "Minutemen of 1861" off to defend

their way of life from an alien threat.

,
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Sumner, Works VII, 26-40; Andrew to Jonathon Bourne, September 6,
1860, in Boston Evening Transcript , September 8, 1860.
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Springfield Republican October 20, 1860; Advertiser September 7, 1860;
Atlas and Bee October 29, 1860; Newburyport Herald quoted in Liberator June 15, 1860.
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,

45.

Atl as and Bee , August 2, September 5, 1860; Liberator August 10, 1860;
Springfield Republ ican September 7, 1860; Nason and Russell, Henry
Wilson 276-284.
,

,

.

46.

Charles Francis Adams Diary, October

47.

T. P. Chandler, speech at Brookline, in Advertiser
September 29, 1860;
Springfield Republican , November 5, 1860; Atlas and Bee October 10,
VI, 346.
30, 1860; Sumner, Works
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48.

Everett to Mrs. Charles Eames, June 29, 1860, Everett to Washington
Hunt, July 21
1860, both in Everett papers; see also Advertiser
August 23, 1860, and George Lunt to Amos A. Lawrence, January, 1860,
Lawrence papers.
,

,

49.

Pilot , September 29, 1860. See also Post August 29, September 10,
1860; Salem Advocate August 28, 1860; Erasmus Beach to Lawrence,
October 17, 1860, Lawrence papers.
,

,

50.

Pilot October 29 1 860; Atlas and Bee November 3, 1860; Edward Everett
to William Everett, October 1, 1860, Everett paoers; Butler to Cushing,
September 10, 1860, Cushing Papers; Post September 24, 860; Butler to
Lawrence, October 9, 1860, Lawrence papers; Boston Herald October 6,
,
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P
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both in Sumner papers.
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^4, 1860, Andrew Papers.
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Massachusetts, Secretary of the Commonwealth, Returns of Votes,
1860,
Microfilm copy in Library of University of Massachusetts,
Amherst.

Chapter VII

1.

Abbott, "Wilson," 197; Advertiser

2.

Advertiser , November 7, 1860; Sumner, Works
Evening Transcript November 9, 1860.

,

November 10, 1860.
,

VII, 77; see also Boston

,

3.

Advertiser
Republican

,
,

13, 1860.

November 12, 1860; for similar opinions, see Springfield
November 10, 1860; and Boston Evening Transcript, November
c-

4.

Post , November 28, 1860; Boston Herald

5.

Courier November 10, 1860; Post November 15, 1860; Everett to Henry
Holland, November 11, 1860, Everett Papers.

6.

Post November 10, 15; Courier
to Cushing, Cushing Papers.

7.

The following data on Boston's banks come from the Advertiser and Boston
Commercial Bulletin, November - December, 1860.
July figures from
Advertiser July 25, 1860.

,

,

November 15, 21, 1860.

,

,

,

November 10, 12, 15;

,

Holdings of Boston Banks, 1860
(in millions of dollars)

July
November
November
November
November
December
December
December

7

14
21

28
5

12

19

specie

deposi ts

5.3
4.9
4.8
4.5
3.9
3.5
3.5
3.5

19.7
20.1
19.6
19.3
17.9
17.3
17.1

•

17.3

W.

Raymond Lee
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impact
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Evening
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Conmercial
Bulletin
NovembeT74,
5°
Decemberl, 8,
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5
I860; Advertiser, November
24, 1860.
Reference to shoe
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towns in Commercial Bulletin , December
15, 1860.
Philip S Foner
described the New York economy in Business
and Slavery (New York, 1941)
-
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,

The following figures represent the
quoted prices of Massachusetts'
leading enterprises on the Boston stock
market, before and after the
election of Lincoln.
All figures from the Advertiser

Boston Stock Market, 1860

Merchants' Bank
Bank of Commerce
State Bank
Webster Bank
Boston and Providence R.R.
Boston and Maine R.R.
Old Colony R.R.
Boston and Worcester R.R.
Apple ton Manufacturing
Atlantic Cotton Mills
Bates Manufacturing
Chicopee Manufacturing
Lowell Manufacturing
Massachusetts Cotton Mills
Merrimack Manufacturing

9.

July
July
July
July
July
July
July
July
July
July
July
July
July
July
July

30
16
23
30
26
30

24
26
19
19

30
26
26
16
23

103-3/4

December
December
December
December
December
December
December
December
December
December
December
November
December
December
December

108- 3/4

70-3/4
109- 3/4
108

109-1/2
107-1/2
108
1110
940
113-3/4
347-1/2
740
967
1242-1/2

Courier December 3, 7, 11, 1860; Commercial Bulletin
1860; Post December 13, 1860.
,

,

4

8
10
8
7
5

4

10
6
6

12
26

100
103
65
103
106
110
105- 1/2
106- 1/4
1005
800
97
280

13

610

24
29

795
1070

December

1,

,

10.

Henry J. Gardner to C. F. Adams, December 10, 1860, Caleb Stetson to
C. F. Adams, December 15, 1860, C. F. Adams to Charles Francis Adams,
Jr., December 7, 15, 1860, M. H. Simpson to C. F. Adams, December 7,
1860, C. F. Adams to Simpson, December 9, 1860, all in Adams Papers.
See also articles in Boston Evening Transcrip t, November 17, 27, 1860,
and Atlas and Bee November 15, 22 and December 3, 1860.
,

11.

Pilot , December 1, 1860.
See also Courier November 10, 1860.
The
Post, December 1, 1860, denounced the John Brown meeting as "a severe
test of the forebearance of this community" but warned that interfering with it would play into the hands of the abolitionists. Atlas
and Be e, December 5, 1860 Charles F. Winslow Diary, November 30, 1860,
Winslow Papers.

12.

"Warrington" in the New York Tribune December 5, I860, quoted in
"Warrincton" Pen Por traits, 247; Boston Evening Transcript December
December 4, 1860; Liberator December 7, 1860; Post
3, 1860; Courier
December 4, 1860.
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,

,
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Post, December 4, 1860; Courier December
,
4,5, I860; Pilot, Decem1860.
New York Herald quoted in Atlas and BeeTPicember
5,

ber^,
15.

Boston Evening Transcrip t, November 27, 1860.

16.

Post,, December 11, 1860; Boston Evening
Transcript . November 30, 1860
bee also Pi lot, December 8, 1860; Boston Evening
Novema Transcript,
tLber 13, 20, 30, 1860.

17.

Post, December 10, 11 , 1860; Springfield Republican
20, 1860; Courier , December 14, 1860.

18.

,

December 4, 14,

Boston Evening Transcript December 24, 1860; Advertiser
1860; Springfield Republican December 27, 186(h
,

,

December 1,

,

19.

Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., December 18, 1860, Adams
Papers.

20.

Henry Dawes to Ella Dawes, December 9, 1860, Dawes Papers. See also
Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., December 9, 1850, Adams
Papers.

21.

Crittenden's proposals were first made public in New York Tribune
December 11, 1860. Thayer's speech in Congressional Globe 36th
Congress, 2nd session, December 12, 1860, 76-77.
David Potter in
Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis (New Haven, 1942),
refers to this period as an "interregnum in the party." See pp. 75111.
See also Kenneth M. Stampp, And the War Came: " The North and
the Secession Crisis, 1850-61 (Baton Rouge, La., 1950), 63-82.
,

,

Adams Diary, December 23, 1837, quoted in Duberman, Adams

22.

C.

23.

C. F. Adams Diary, August 10, 1848, quoted in Duberman, Adam s
151.
"The road to honor," Adams wrote, "if any such will ever be given to
me, is not likely to be through Executive patronage, least of all
whilst wielded by the hand which possesses it in America." C. F.
Adams Diary, October 8, 1841, in Duberman, Adams , 76.

24.

C.

25.

C. F. Adams Diary, November 12, December 20, 1860.
See also C. F.
Adams Diary, December 13, 15, 1860; C. F. Adams to Charles Francis
Adams, Jr., December 7, 1850; C. F. Adams to Erastus Hopkins, December 15, 1860; and C. F. Adams to Richard Henry Dana, December 23,
1860, all in Adams Papers.

F.

,

64.

,

F.

Adams Diary, April 6, 16, 1860.
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neport no. j|, 7-8; Duberman, Adams
27.

227-248.
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Frank Bird to C. F. Adams, January
6, 1861 and E. L. Pierce to C
F
Adams, December 29, 1860, both
in Adams Papers.
Piece's
article
appeared in the A tlas and Bee January
9, 1861
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See also E L^ Pierce to
Sumner, January 8, 1861, Sumner
Papers.
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'

L

Banfield,
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Member

Adams to
Robinson,
all in Adams
C.

S

F.

-

A ^rtise ^^January 1, 1861; William
Claflin to Sumner, January 4, 1861,

Sumner, Works_, VII, 78; Sara Lyman to Sumner, December
31
Pierce to Sumner, January 8, 1861, both in Sumner Papers.
to C. F. Adams, December 31, 1861, Adams Papers.

,

1860

E

E.

Pierce

L.

L

F. Adams Diary, December 18, January
6, 13; Henry Adams to Charles
Francis Adams, Jr., January 17, 1861, all in Adams Papers.

33.

C.

34.

E. L. Pierce to Charles Sumner, January
8, 1861, Sumner Papers.
In
January, Pierce told Andrew that he and Sumner were "the only
perfect
men left that I know of." E. L. Pierce to Andrew, January
8, 1861,
Andrew Papers.

35.

E.

L. Pierce to Sumner, December 15, 1860.
See also Pearson, Andrew
133-6; Henry Adams, T he Great Secession Winter (New York, 1958), 7-8.

,

I.

I,

Andrew to C. F. Adams, January 18, 1861, Adams Papers.
Charles Francis
Adams, Jr., wrote his father on December 29, 1860, that he had talked
with Andrew on his return from Washington, and that the governor approved of the New Mexico plan.
"That cheered me up amazingly," Adams,
Jr. wrote.
See letter from Richard S. Fay (leader of the anti -Brown riot) to Banks,
December 6, 1860, Banks Papers.
Banks' speech in Post , January 4, 1861.
Henry Pierce's response is in Atlas and Bee January 4, 1861.
,

—

,
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ActsandResol yes Passed
186_l_

C.

F.

(boston,

—

by the General Court of Massachus etts
for
~~
1861), 583-4, 586-90.

—

Adams to Andrew, January 4, 1861, Andrew Papers.

Pearson, Andrew, I, 143; William Schouler, A History
of Massachusett s
in the Civil War, 2 vols. (Boston,
1868), I,~18-19.
See also William
bchouler to Andrew, January 8, 1861, Andrew Papers.
Andrew tried to
keep these missions secret but word of them soon
spread.
See Boston
^ourna^, January 11, 1861; and letters by Erastus Fairbanks,
Governor
of Vermont, to Andrew, January 11, 19, 1861, both
in Andrew Papers.

Boston Journal , January 2, 1861. See speeches by Senator
Wilson and
Representative Delano in Congressional Globe 36th Congress,
2nd
session, 107, 210.
The Springfield Republican January 2, 1861,'
claimed that 125,000 muskets were sent to the South; but on
January 7
the paper reported that 120,000 remained:
"The Northern boys who go
South and mop out the traitors will not be at a loss for tools to do
it with."
,

,

Andrew to Winfield Scott, January 12, 1861, and Scott to Henry Wilson
in Wilson to Andrew, January 15, 1861, both in Andrew Papers.
See
also Robert E. McGraw, "Minutemen of '61: The Pre-Civil War Massachusetts Militia," Civil War History XV (June, 1966), 101-115.
Courier , January 21, 1861; Salem Advocate
Post , January 23, 1861
Pearson, Andrew, I, 152-53; Atlas and Bee
Evening Transcript January 23, 1861.

,

,

January 26, 1861.

See also

January 28, 1861; Boston

,

Chapter VIII

Charles Foil en to Sumner, February 7, 1861, Sumner Papers; White,
"Sumner and the Crisis," 138; Jane Pease and William Pease, "Confrontation and Abolitionism in the 1850's," Journal of American History LVIII
(March, 1972), 923-37.
Francis Jackson Garrison and Wendell Phillips Garrison, Willi an Lloyd
Garrison, 1805-1 879; The Story of His Life, Told b y His Childr en, 4
vols. (New York, 1889) , III, 447; Abbey ICelley Foster to Stephen Foster,
December 4, 1857, Abbey Kelley Foster to Wendell Phillips, June 24,
1859, both in Foster Papers, American Antiquarian Society, Worcester;
Liberator , March 30, June 15, September 28, 1860. See also Alma Lutz,
Crusade Tor Freedom: Women in the Anti-Slavery Movement (Boston, 1968),
265-70.
Foster had solicited funds for the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery
Society from Republicans and then had branded them as "the most dangerGarrison labeled this behavior
ous obstacles of the antislavery cause."
as "neither honest or wise."
Garrison to A. K. Foster, September 8,
1859, Garrison Papers.
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Garrison to Parker Pillsbury, June 3, 1859, Garrison
PapersGarrison to J. Miller McKim, October 21, 1360, Garrison
PapersGarrison's speech at Framingham in Liberator, July
20, 1860; speech
at American Anti-Slavery Society in Liberator May
18, 1860
See
also Liberator, September 7, 1860; Garrison to Wendell
Phillips
Garrison, August 9, 1860; Garrison Papers. Garrison had friends
enough in the Republican party to receive an invitation to a
Republican torch-light parade and an effusive letter from Sumner
expressing
gratitude for Garrison's long service against slavery.
See Rev.
John T. Sargent to Garrison, October 15, 1860, and Sumner to Garrison,
September 9, 1860, both in Garrison Papers.
,

4.

Lydia Child to Sumner, April 4, 1860, June 17, 1860, Sumner Papers.
See also Child to Congressman Signey hgerton, July 6, 1860, Miscellaneous Bound Letters, Massachusetts Historical Society.

5.

Liberator , June 8, June 27, August 24, 1860.

6.

Wendell Phillips, Speeches, Lectures, and Letters
(Boston, 1894), 294-5, 299, 303-5.

7.

Garrison to Andrew, March 8, 1861, Andrew Papers; Phillips to Sumner,
April 2, 1861, and Child to Sumner, March 23, 1861, both in Sumner
Papers.
See also Phillips to Andrew, January, 1861, Andrew Papers;
Garrison to Andrew, February 28, 1861, in Garrison to Sumner, April 6,
1861, Sumner Papers.
On the abolitionists' political advice, see
Garrison to Sumner, February 25, 1861, Sumner Papers; Howe to Bird,
January 30, 1861, Howe Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard. Andrew told
Garrison his advice was always welcome: March 5, 1861, Garrison Papers.

8.

Oliver Johnson, William Lloyd Garrison and His Times (London, 1882), 338-9,
346.
See also James B. Stewart, "Aims and Impact of Garrisonian Abolitionists, 1840-1860," Civil War History XV (September
i969) 197-209.

9.

Maria Wescott Chapman to Mrs. E. P. Nichol, December 10, 1860, AntiSlavery Collection, Boston Public Library; Liberator , December 7, 1860;
Phillips, Speeches , 344; Boston Evening Transcript December 17, 1860.

James Redpath, ed.

,

,

10.

Liberator , January 4, 1861; Phillips' speech, Liberator

11.

Courier

12.

Garrison to Oliver Johnson, January 11, 1861, Garrison Papers. This
letter also appears in the Garrison family's Life of Garrison IV, 3-4,
but the passage in which Garrison shows his respect for Mrs. Johnson's
Howe Papers,
Hov/e to Sumner, January 20, 1861
revelations is omitted.
Houghton Library; E. L. Pierce to Sumner, February 10, 1860, Sumner Papers;
Phillips to Samuel May, December 27, 1860, Anti-Slavery Collection, Boston
Public Library; Boston Evening Transcri pt, January 21, 1360; Carlos Martyn,
Phillips also owned
Tie Agitator ([lew York, 1890), 310.
Wendell Phillips:
See George U. Smalley, Ang 1 o - Anier i c a n Memo r i es
one of John Brown's "^ikss.

,

,

January 25, 1861.

December 18, 19, 1860, January 23, 1861.

,

,

(New York, 1911), 98-99.
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Iber t0r January 18, 1861; George W.
Curtis to C. F. Norton December 19^ 1860 Curtis Papers, Houghton Library;
James McPherson, The
Struggle for Equality: Abolitionists a nd the
Negro "
i n
the Civil~Wr
"
and Reconstruction (Princeton. 1964). 44-45
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Atlas and Bee, January 25, 1861 ; Lydia Maria
Child to Sumner, January
28, 1861, Sumner Papers; Baer, The Heart Is Like Heave n, 147-50Liberator, February 1 , 1860; Boston Evening Transcript : January '?4.

15.

Atlas and Bee, January 25, 1860; Boston Evening
Transcrip t. January 24
Liberator, February 1, 1861; Irving H Bartlett, Wendell
J,™?'
Phillips:
Brahmin Radical (Boston, 1961), 226-234.
.

16.

Pearson, Andrew , I, 150; Sma 11 ey, Anglo-American Memories
90, 101-102Boston Even ing Transcript February 2, 86'); Horace Sargent
to Andrew,
January 23, 1861, Andrew Papers.
,

,

17.

18.

Pearson, Andrew
Sumner Papers.

I,

,

1

151; R. E. Apthorp to Sumner, January 30, 1861

Boston Evening Transcript January 25, 1861
1861; Liberator February 1, 1861.
,

;

Advertiser

,

January 25,

,

,

19.
20.

Post , January 26, 1861

;

Boston Evening Transcript

,

January 25

1861.

,

Lydia Maria Child to Sumner, January 28, 1861
Springfield Republican
February 18, 1361; Z. K. Pangborn to Andrew, January 27, 1861
Andrew
Papers; Atlas and Bee January 26, 1861; Boston Evening Transcript
January 26, 1861.
Conservative Republicans were horrified by the implications of the riot.
"It is a red letter day in the calendar of
abolitionism," the Advertiser wrote, "when it can be said that its
arguments have to be answered by force." Advertiser January 25, 1861.
;

,

,

,

,

,

21.

Hampshire Gazette and Northampton Courier January 29, 1861. See also
editorials of Reading Gazette and Worcester Spy in Liberator February 8, 1851, and of New Bedford Republican-Standard
in Liberator
February 22, 1861.
,

,

:

,

,

22.

,

Thomas A. Dunham to W. S. Robinson, January 25, 1861, Robinson Scrapbooks, I, 3, Rare Book Department, Boston Public Library; Atlas and
Bee, January 21, 22, 28, 1861; Boston Evening Transcript January 22,
T86 1 ; Dedham Gazette January 26, 1861.
,

,

23.

Springfield Republ ican February 1, 1861; John Murray Forbes to Andrew,
January 26, 1861
Andrew Papers; Boston Evening Transcript February 15,
,

,

,

1861.
24.

Slade's letter originally appeared in the Georgia Literary and Temperance Gazette January 3, 1861; it was published in the Boston Journal,
January 11, 1 851
and Liberator February 8, 1861.
See Courier February
27, 1861 ; Atlas and Bee, February 20, 1861; .and Boston Evamng Transcript
,
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12, 1861 for committee testimony.
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Massachusetts Negroes, 1765-1860

'

Negro Population
Percentage of
Total Population

1765

1790

1800

1810

1820

1830

1840

1850

1860

4979

5463

6452

6737

6740

7045

8669

9064

9842

2.2%

1.5%

1.5%

1.5%

1.3%

1.2%

1.2%

.9%

.8%

——

Population figures from Abstract of the 1860 Mas sachusetts Census,
289, 334.

There was also a substantial decrease in the relative size of the
black population in Boston from 3.1% in 1830 to 1.3% in 1860. See
Knights, Plain People of Boston 29.
,

28.

Louis Ruchames, "Race and Education in Massachusetts," Negro History
Bulletin XIII (December 1949), 53-59; Ruchames, "Jim Crow Railroads
in Massachusetts," American Quarterly VIII (Spring, 1956), 61-75;
Ruchames, "Race, Marriage, and Abolitionism in Massachusetts,"
Journal of Negro History XL (July 1955), 250-273; Donald M. Jacobs,
The Nineteenth Century Struggle over Segregated Education in the
Boston Schools," Journal of Negro Education XXXIX (Winter, 1970),
76-85; Carleton Mabee, "'Negro Boycott in the Boston Public Schools,"
New England Quarterly XL I (September 1 968) 341 -361
William Wells
Brown has biographical material on Boston blacks in his The Black Man
His Antecedents, His Genius, and His Achievements (Boston, 1865). The
only historical study of the Boston black community is thin and
dated: John Daniels, In Freedom's Birthplace: A Study of Boston's
Negroe s (Boston, 1916).
,

29.

.

Benjamin Quarles, Black Abolitionists (New York, 1969), 237; Oates
To Purge Th i s Land
73-75; see also William H. Siebert, "The Underground Railroad in Massachusetts," Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society XLV (1935), 25-100.
,

30.

See the account
J. B. Smith to Sumner, June 7, 1860, Sumner Papers.
of a sparsely attended meeting on African civilization chaired by
A sketch of Rock appears
Smith in Boston Journal T November 3, 1859.
in Brown, The Black Man.
See also Quarles, Black Abolitionists
,

,
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224-5, 234; Liberator February 3, August
10, 1860.
Frederick
Douglass accused Nell,
Remond and other Massachusetts blacks
of being catspaws" of Garrison, but the evidence
would indicate
otherwise.
See also Pease and Pease, "Boston Garrisonians and
f Freden Ck Dou 9 lass >" Canadian Journal of
History
11 (1967)
39
,

'

31.

For example see Remond s speech in the Liberator,
March 12, 1858
where he laments the lack of black support for the anti
slavery and
anti -discrimination struggle.

32.

Handlin, Boston's Immigrants , 60-70; Frederick Douglass, My
Bondage
and My Freedom (New York. 1855: reprint ed., Chicago,
1970),
271-72; Liberator March 16, 1860.
There is no detailed study of
the displacement
of blacks by the Irish in Boston; but for a model
study of a similar phenomenon in Philadelphia, see Theodore Hershberg,
"Free Blacks in Antebellum Philadelphia: A Study of Ex-Slaves and
Socio-Economic Decline," Journal of Social History V (Winter, 1971James Freeman Clarke argued that there were more trades open
72).
to Irish than to blacks.
See Clarke's "The Free Colored Population
of Massachusetts,"
Christian Examiner March 1859, 354-55.
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,

,

33.

Liberator

34.

Liberator February 3, 1860; Springfield Republican November 4, 1859;
Atlas and Bee October 4, 1860; Lewis Hayden to Sumner, June 11, 1860,
Sumner Papers.

,

January 20, August 31, 1860.

,

,

,

35.

Liberator March 12, 1858;
Springfield Republican December 15, 1860.
Frederick Douglass also believed that American blacks would benefit
from fighting to suppress the secessionists. See his Boston speech
in James McPherson, The Negro's Civil War (New York, 1965), 14-15.

36.

Liberator February 22, 1861. See J. Sella Martin's address to the
Joint Committee on the Personal Liberty Laws in Atlas and Bee
January 30, 1861.

,

,

,

,

37.

Liberator , February 22, 1861

;

Post

,

February 15, 1861.

Chapter IX

1.

For biographical information on Nehemiah Adams see F. A. Warfield,
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Springfield Republican , December 24, 1860. The Advertiser and
the
Commercial Bulletin are the best sources for information on
specie,
stocks, and interest.
The Boston Evening Transcript and Springfield
Republican provide information on business closings. According to
the Commercial Bui letin , January 19, 1861, money for favored
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was down to 7-8 percent in Boston while it was still 8-9 percent
in New York.
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The Lowell Courier and Journal
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were both in full production.
David Donald in Charles Sumner and the
Coming of the Civil War , p. 269, writes that "Sumner was unmoved by
the appeals from the Boston mercantile community, hard hit by the
cutting off of Southern cotton;" but the evidence shows that no such
economic disaster had occurred.
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,
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E. Carver to C. F. Adams, January 7, 1861, Adams Papers.
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February 7, 1861
I.
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Amos A. Lawrence to Crittenden, January 12, 1861, Crittenden Papers,
Library of Congress.
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A tlas and Bee
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See also Charles Francis Adams, Jr., "The ReTgn of King
16, 1861.
Cotton," Atlantic April 1861 , 451-65.
The Atlas and Bee November 13,
1860, pointed out that the value of cotton produced in the United
States was only $100 million, while hay was valued at $150 million,
corn $200 million, and livestock $150 million.
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See also Boston Journal
ary 11, 1861.
Republican January 12, 1861; Boston Evening Transcript January 18,
February 5, 1861; Advertiser February 8, 1861; Commercial Bulletin
Republicans complained
December 15, 1860, January 16, February 2, 1861.
about the quality of the cotton shipped from the South. The Lowell
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Courier and Journal
The sand was
contained 670 pounds of cotton and 230 pounds of sand.
ruining the textile machinery.
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to Andrew, February 5, 1861, Andrew Papers.
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and Edward
Smith to Amos A Lawrence, March 6, 1861, both in Lawrence Papers. By
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Caleb Cushing to J. J. Henry, November 2, 1860, Cushing Papers;
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February 5, 1861.
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15.

Everett to Crittenden, December 23, 1860, Everett Papers. See also
Cushing to J. L. Carey, January 17, 1860, Cushing Papers; Nathaniel
Appleton to unnamed person in Charleston, S.C., in Boston Evem' ng
Transcript January 2, 1861.
,

16.

Its editorial of
The Boston Herald was rabidly anti-secessionist.
February 8, 1861, opposed the Crittenden proposals. Jessie A. Marshall,
ed.
Privat e and Official Correspondence of General Benjamin F. Butler
During the Period of the Civil War 5 vols. (Norwood, Mass., 1917), I,
6-13; Butler's Book 150-51; Traveler January 4, 1861.
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Robert Winthrop to Edward Everett, November 21
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1860, Dawes papers; Parker, Personal Li berty Laws
47.
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Boston Evening Transcript , December 18, 1860.

23.

Charles Hale to Amos. A. Lawrence, December 14, 1860,
Lawrence PapersBoston Journal
January 7, 1861. See also Advertiser November 10
1860, January 9, 10, 1861; Springfield Republican , November
17, 24*
December 1, I860; Benjamin F. Thomas, A Few Suggestions upon
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Personal Liberty Law and Secession (Boston, 1861).
,

24.
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Speech by Representative Wrightman of Chelmsford in Boston Evening
Transcript January 7, 1861; George Morey to Charles Francis Adams,
January 5, 1861, Josiah Quincy to C. F. Adams, February 21, 1861, both
in Adams Papers; John Murray Forbes to Sumner, February
28, 1861,
Sumner Papers.
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25.

Atlas and Bee November 21, 1860; Acts and Resolves of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts for 1861 , 581 ; Sumner to Henry L. Pierce, January 29,
1 861 ,
Pierce Papers

26.

James Stone, Henry Pierce, Howe, and Stearns were active in backing
the Tocsin
see Bird to Adams, January 28, 1861, Adams Papers.
Laura
White, in "Sumner and the Crisis of 1860-61," p. 67, reports that she
was unable to locate any copies of the Tocsin , and the Union List of
Serials does not refer to the journal. However, there is a complete
edition of the Tocsin in Volume II of the William S. Robinson Scraobooks at the Boston Public Library.
See also Sumner to Henry Pierce,
January 29, 1861, Pierce PaDers Albert G. Browne to Sumner, January
22, 1861 , D. W. Alvord to Sumner, January 23
1861
in Sumner, Works
VII, 183.
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27.
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Tocsin January, 1861, February 16, 1861; Remarks of Edward L. Pierc e
before the Committee of the Legislature of Massachusetts on the
General Statutes Relation to Personal Liberty at the Hearing of February 3
18 61 (Boston
See also Atlas and Bee
1861 )
February 4, 1861.
,

,

,

.

November 28, 1861

,

28.

Worcester

29.

James Lawrence to C. F. Adams, February 12, 1861, Adams Papers; Peleg
Chandler, to Andrew, February 9, 11, 1861, Andrew Papers; E. L.
Pierce to Sumner, February 10, 14, 1861, Sumner Papers; "Warrington"
February
in Springfield Remjbl ican , February 16, 1861; Atlas and Bee
20, 1861 ; Tocsin , February 25, 1861 ; Post, February 21 , March 16, 1861;
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My examination of this petition in the National Archives tends to
confirm these suspicions. Among the Boston signatures, which account
for over half the names gathered, there are several pages which appear to be in a single hand.
Some names appear again and again.
See
the several letters on this subject in Sumner, Works VII, 209-212.
Also Charles L. Fessenden to Sumner, February 27, 1861; Thomas
Bailey to Sumner, February 15, 1861, both in Sumner papers; Caleb
Stetson to C. F. Adams, February 18, 1861, Adams Papers; E. R.
Tinker to Dawes, February 10, 1861, Dawes Papers; Pearson, Andrew I,
155; Congressional Globe , 36th Congress, 2nd session, 985.
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32.

Springfield Rep ublican January 24, 1861; Congressional Globe
Congress, 2nd session, 995.

33.

William Appleton to C. F. Adams, February 7, 1861, Adams Papers;
Leverett Saltonstall, Speech in Boston Post , February 2, 1861; C.
Adams to Richard Henry Dana, February 9, 1861, and C. F. Adams to
Andrew, February 8, 1861, both in Adams Papers.

34.
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F.

Courier February 3, 1861; Post February 8, 1861; Everett to
Crittenden, December 23, 1860, Everett Papers; Henry Pierce, speech
in Massachusetts legislature, Atlas and Bee January 29, 1861; Dana
speech reported in Boston Journal
February 12, 1861. A. B. Ely explained that the "hereafter acquired" clause prevented his paper,
the Traveler from supporting the Crittenden compromise:
A. B. Ely
to Crittenden, January 26, 1861, Crittenden papers; A. B. Ely to
Amos A. Lawrence, January 22, 1861, Lawrence Papers.
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35.

The most complete account of the Washington Peace Conference is Robert
Gray Gunderson, Old Gentlemen's Convention (Madison, Wisconsin, 1961).

36.

Bird to Andrew, January 31, 1861, in Pearson, Andrew , I, 158; T ocsin ,
Springf ie Id' RepubFebruary 4, 1861; Atlas and Bee February 1, 1861
Adams
Adams,
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January
to
C.
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George Morey to Andrew, January 29, 1861, Andrew Papers; Amasa Walker
to Sumner, February 4, 1861, Sumner Papers; William Claflin to Sumner,
February 2, 1861; Advertiser February 3, 1861; Springfield Republ ican
February 2, 1861; Travel er ,~February 2, 1861.
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39.
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C. F. Adams to Andrew, January 28, 1861, Andrew Paoers; Sumner to
Andrew, January 26, 1861, Andrew Papers. See also C. F. Adams Diary,
January 28, 29, 1861, Adams Papers; Wilson to Andrew, January 29, 1861,
Andrew Papers.

Sumner to Andrew, January 28, 1861, Andrew Papers; Everett to William
Everett, February 13, 1861, Everett Papers; Springfield Republica n,
February 7, 1361; Atlas ana Bee February 6, 1861; T. P. Chandler to
Andrew, January 6, 1861 Andrew Papers.
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Boutwell's speech is in Lucius E. Chittenden, A Report of the Debates
and Proceedings in the Secret Session of the Conference for Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Held at
Wa shington, D. C. in February, A. P., 1861 (New York. 1864). 98-102:
George Boutwell , Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, 2
vols. (New York, 1890), I, 279-82; Goodrich to Andrew, February 7,
8, 11, 12, 16, 1861, Andrew Papers; Goodrich to E. L. Pierce, February 28, 1861, Pierce Papers; Forbes to Andrew, February 15, 1861,
Andrew Papers; Forbes to Sumner, February 28, 1861, Sumner Papers.
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January 17, 1861; Post , January 2, 1861.
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Courier
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William Claflin to Henry Dawes, February 6, 1861, Dawes Papers.
Claflin could have saved his ink, for Dawes felt the same way. See
Henry Dawes to Ella Dawes, December 14, 1860, Dawes Papers.

3.

Newburyport Herald
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The Union in American Thought
Nagel , One National Indivisible:
(New York, 1964), 9. Richard Henry Dana is a good example of a Republican
who weighed the value of the Union during the secession winter. He believed that the Union represented peace, civilization, the development
Its preservation
of the continent, and the founding of free states.
justified even "the most painful legal duty of rendering back a fugiBut Dana did not believe that the Union was worth "any
tive slave."
substantive political or territorial concession to the Slave Power."
See Dana to C. F. Adams, December 26, 1860, Adams Papers.
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Hans Kohn, American Nationalism (New York, 1957), 106; see speech by
Daniel Gooch, Congressional Globe 36th Congress, 2nd session, appendix,
261-4.
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Hampshire Gazette
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Hampshire Gazette November 20, 1860; C. F. Adams speech in Congressional
But not all anti36th Congress, 2nd session, appendix, 124-27.
G lobe
cause. John
their
advance
would
sTavery men believed that disunion
of a great
development
no
can
be
"there
Weiss, for example, wrote that
idea of
the
bear
cannot
I
...
North
emancipating plan without the
to Sumner,
Weiss
slaves."
upon
those
hold
losing all moral and practical
Papers.
Sumner
1861,
December 19, 1860, January 26,
,

,

8.
9.

Springfield Republican

,

February

9,

1861; Traveler

,

January 15, 1861.

Republican,
Transcript. January 31, November 14, 1860; Springfield
October
15, lobO;
rtiser
Adve
1360;
February 4, November 13, 14,
1360, February
20,
November
Bee,
and
Traveler, February 11, 1361: Atlas
that Ribero
57T3617 Cn November 22, 1361 the Atlas and Bee reported
Boston.was offered work "at fair wages" in
,

,

.

277
10

'

ostor Evening Transcript, December 31
}
1860, February 14, 1861- Charles
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Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd session, 583-6;
Laura White,
Charles Sumner and the Crisis of 1860-61," 156-60;
Gardner Brewer to
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Sumner Papers; Traveler Januarv 19 1861
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David M. Potter, Li ncoln and His Party , 51-57; Potter,
"Horace Greeley
and Peaceable Secession," Journal ofSouthern History
VII (May 1941),
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13.

Springfield Republican
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December 8, 12, 15, 1860.

14.

Springfield Republican , December 28, 1860, January 2, 12, 21, February
6, 23, March 2,

14, 1861.

15.

See Phillip S. Paludan, "The American Civil War Considered as a Crisis
in Law and Order," American Historical Review LXXVTT (October
1971),
1013-1034.
Paludan argues along similar lines. He also asserts that
for ante-bellum Americans, government was not "them" it was "us."
I
would argue that from the New England perspective this sentiment applied not to the national government but to state and local government.
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Tocsin February 7, 1861; Tr aveler January 31, 1861, February 9, 1861;
Atlas and Bee February 20, 1861; James Stone to Sumner, December 17,
1860, Sumner Papers.
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17.

Boston Evening Transcript February 28, 1861; Henry Adams to Charles
Francis Adams, Jr., January 8, 17, 1861, Charles Francis Adams to Henry
Adams, December 23, 1860, both in Adams Papers; Congressional Globe 36th
Congress, 2nd session, February 21, 1861, 1083; Emerson to Sumner,
February 27, 1851 in Letters of Ralph Waldo Emerson Ralph L. Rush, ed.,
6 vols. (New York, 1939)-, V, 241.
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Advertiser December 21, 1860; Atlas and Bee December 27, 1360; John
Murray Forbes to C. F. Adams, January 20, 1861, Adams Papers. The Boston
Evening Transcrip t, January 29, 1861, argued that, during the Revolution,
Massachusetts provided one patriot soldier for every 5.7 inhabitants
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